Innovation and creative re-engineering are pivotal to the well-being of people and advancement of nation states. Developing nations, with fewer legacy systems in place, provide greater avenues for technology enabled change, and India is no exception. However, for innovation to achieve its intended outcome, important background conditions such as training and guidance to think up creative solutions, a wider ecosystem to finance and incentivize innovation, and a state willing to take chances, as well as promote private entrepreneurship, are required. Unfortunately, post-independent India subscribed to an economic philosophy where the state assumed central authority to decide the allocation of resources and the direction and scale of private sector activity. This centralization of decision-making proved harmful to the ushering in of a paradigm shift in the way goods and services were delivered, prompting former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to famously remark that only 17 paise of every rupee earmarked for various welfare packages reached the citizen.
Under the guidance of former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, slow changes were initiated, resulting in a more vibrant role for the private sector and more avenues to raise capital. Simultaneously, regulatory institutions emerged to replace the license-permit Raj and regulate the interaction between private players, consumers and the state, in vital sectors such as capital markets, electricity, telecommunications, and insurance.
These developments coincided with a revolutionary technological shift, as a project incubated in the 1960s in the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) came into its own, and the internet era commenced in right earnest. Witnessing exponential growth that put Moore’s Law to shame, the Internet soon became a powerful tool for finding and sharing information, learning new skills, facilitating the delivery of public goods and services, seamless cash transfers, and a host of other applications. More importantly for India, devices capable of Internet access have kept shrinking in size and cost; currently all smartphones and other mobile devices come equipped with capabilities to access the net. The Internet and Mobile Association of India recently estimated 371 million mobile Internet users by June 2016.
The ‘sharing economy’, an outcome of faster internet speeds, cheap mobile internet devices, efficient cloud storage of data, and more accurate data analysis, enhances the ability of technology solution providers to offer services at cheap rates if not for free. In return, these solution providers capitalize on technology’s reach to cater to markets hitherto unexplored, and the creative use of voluminous personal data held with them. Indian startups such as Ola Cabs and Oyo Rooms are representative of this new way of doing business. This model of big data enabled solutions is not confined to markets alone, as the Indian state has relied on the same set of technological developments to promote India Stack, a complete set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that can be used by third party app developers. This project allows for authentication using Aadhaar, a potentially significant background condition for the flourishing of trust based sharing and access models. Similarly, the Unified Payment Interface, an architecture and a set of APIs to facilitate immediate online payments, has been created under the aegis of the Reserve Bank of India, to transition to lesser dependence on cash.
The potential of new technology to drive growth in India and revitalize both markets and the state, has excited attention in policy circles over the past decade. The (erstwhile) Planning Commission of India had constituted a Committee on Technology Innovation and Venture Capital, way back in September 2005. Focusing specifically on technology startups, this committee, in its 2006 report, observed that a sound venture capital funding system would thrive only when an ecosystem for innovation coexisted with a fiscal and regulatory framework that encouraged risk taking by financiers. In tune with this outlook, the committee offered several important recommendations to ease regulatory hurdles for venture funds and to promote a culture of innovation driven by universities and research centres.
This report now stands succeeded by a decade of learning – a period of massive upscaling in the Indian technology space. Between 2010 and 2014, venture capital and private equity funding went up from a meagre USD 13 mn to USD 1818 mn. In 2015 alone, capital worth USD 9 bn was infused into Indian startups. The NASSCOM startup report, 2015, estimate more than 800 tech startups being set up on a yearly basis, and projected the number of tech startups at 11,500 by 2020. The Union government has responded to this sudden spurt in creative and innovative activity by offering tax concessions to startup ventures and announcing an INR 100 bn government fund for financing tech startups. SEBI has also relaxed the listing norms for startups. The Digital India campaign launched by the Modi government in 2015 aims to create a comprehensive digital infrastructure for the whole nation with emphasis on rural area connectivity, e-delivery of goods and services, and generation of jobs in the digital space.
There is a need to understand the impact of emerging technologies and internet-enabled solutions in important sectors such as healthcare, finance, and education, and critically evaluate the tech promise of better delivery of public goods and services and smarter city spaces. It is also useful to survey innovation pathways in India and the financial and legal ecosystem supporting it, including an analysis of the intellectual property regime incentivizing ideas and creativity and its shifting texture.
The scale of technological progress has also brought in its wake serious concerns and important structural questions. The amount of personal data ‘out there’, largely fuelled by the sharing economy and social media, is massive and alarming. No aspect of an individual’s life has been left untouched by this technology revolution. Privacy, an important dimension of individual liberty, has become a major casualty in this process. The absence of a comprehensive privacy protection framework in India puts its citizens to huge risk in the event of security breaches in private corporations that hold extensive personal data. The Aadhaar Act, which deals with data management of extensive citizen data, including biometric information, collected by the state as part of the Aadhaar card enrolment process, has also been heavily criticized for its insufficient privacy safeguards.
The current, and exponentially expanding, levels of sophistication in automation and artificial intelligence technologies threaten the future of jobs. Moreover, predictive software and data analytics tend to make redundant various skills and abilities that paved the route to success in a less technology enabled world. The skill sets for survival in a sharing economy have shifted considerably, with renewed emphasis on visual and design thinking, imagination, and capability to add value in a ‘peer production’ model. Will India be able to effectively respond to such drastic shifts through a rethink of its educational and training system?
Sovereignty concerns posed by emerging technologies are equally worrisome, particularly from the perspective of state actors who seek to hold private entities liable for misconduct. The globally connected architecture of the internet, with the notable exception of China who has managed to firewall its internet and yet deliver its full capabilities, has led to a world where corporations with servers residing in foreign jurisdictions impact the lives of Indian residents. The enforcement of local laws has become a quagmire because there is no international framework to fix liability or prosecute truant actors. In the absence of such framework, countries have resorted to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and other bilateral arrangements. In the Indian context, the cumbersome and time-consuming nature of MLATs challenges our sovereignty in the internet era. In the absence of effective mechanisms, the usual state response has been to take recourse to disproportionate actions such as internet blackouts, website bans, and other censorship efforts. These measures have severe implications for free speech, as seen from the constitutional invalidation of India’s offensive speech provision, section 66-A of the Information Technology Act.
From online retail to crowd sourcing, drones to 3-D printing, and cab aggregators to wearable health trackers, the period from 2006 to 2016 has been a decade of significant churning. Sectoral regulators have been confounded by these drastic and disruptive changes and have, in many instances, resorted to protectionist regulations without careful application of mind. In some instances, such as with cab aggregator services, the federal structure of the country has come into direct conflict with ease of doing business as individual states have dealt with the technological solution in piecemeal fashion.
The Union government has also proposed measures such as the Geospatial Information Bill and restrictions on online retail that go way beyond the reasonable bounds of business regulation. These measures reveal an image of a state that speaks in two voices at the same time. Even as it unveils a National Intellectual Property Rights Policy to spur innovation, the state is careful about controlling disruption in sectors that have, post the 1990s, been subject to extensive regulation. To appropriately respond to this pushback by the regulatory state to India’s innovation story, a comprehensive review of the present response to emerging technologies needs to be undertaken.
There is a need to consider emerging technologies such as unmanned aviation and nanotechnology, and the Indian policy and regulatory response to them. We also need to look at the Indian approach to combating cyber threats and balancing the various concerns mentioned above. It would be useful to reflect upon the cost-benefit choices that societies have to make when using technology to solve long unaddressed problems.
Finally, technology is evolving at a fast pace today and its promises and concerns keep shifting. Despite or because of this rapid rate of change, there is a need to outline a path to think through technological change, particularly from a regulatory standpoint, and to shed light on the values that technology regulation ought to promote in order to encourage innovation. This issue of Seminar hopes to raise several central questions on the impact of technology and while responding to a few, also provide plausible directions to help us think through the others.
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Political Fallout of the Creation of New Districts in Manipur
Manipur is on the boil on account of the creation of new districts by the Ibobi Singh government. The agitation led by the United Naga Council (UNC) has intensified after seven new districts — Kangpokpi, Tengnoupal, Pherzawl, Noney, Kamjong, Jiribam and Kakching — were carved out formally from the existing nine districts by the state government on December 9, 2016. The respective Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police of these new districts have also been simultaneously appointed. The UNC blockade has been causing economic distress with prices of essential commodities including fuel and drugs increasing substantially. The impact of demonetization and scarcity of currency is also a factor contributing to public distress.
The Manipur High Court expressed displeasure while considering a petition on the matter, and enjoined the state government to ensure smooth flow of essentials to the people by keeping the two arterial highways serving Manipur – National Highways 2 and 53 – open with adequate security escorts. Reports indicate that even with paramilitary escorts, the UNC agitators have managed to stop and interdict the movement of trucks and other vehicles on the highways. In the Imphal Valley area, the predominantly plains people – the Meiteis and other tribals, as well as those in the nearby hinterland, are feeling the brunt of the economic blockade and agitation along the highway routes.
There appears however to be a re-think on the agitational posture adopted by the UNC and its support groups in the hill districts like Tangkul Naga Long, Chandel Naga Peoples` Organisation among others. This is in the aftermath of the High Court intervention as well as due to counter demonstrations opposing the blockade in Imphal. An internal ferment is also evident within the UNC on the future course of the agitation as well as on the need to leverage the support of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Issac-Muivah (NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM is tacitly supporting the agitation and is also in a dialogue process with Government of India (GoI) on the Naga issue.
While better administrative management of the seven new districts should be feasible, the Manipuri Nagas of the existing hill districts of Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Senapati and Chandel feel that some of the new smaller districts would be under greater political control of the Manipur state administration at Imphal. There is also a foreboding among the Nagas that non-Naga tribes like Kukis would eventually dominate in districts like Kangpokpi — where presently there is a coexistence of Kukis, Nagas and the Meiteis. A major point of objection of the Manipuri Nagas is that the constitutionally-mandated process of prior consultation with the tribal members of the state assembly and hill councils under Article 371 C of the constitution on matters affecting administration in the hill region has been bypassed.
The state of turmoil in Manipur appears to have become a recurrent phenomenon. About a year ago, serious disturbances affecting public order arose after the Manipur Assembly hurriedly passed three controversial bills on August 31, 2015. These related to compulsory registration of non-Manipuris, non-alienation of their land rights, and registration of employees of shops and establishments in the Imphal Valley. These were passed without prior consideration and vetting by the members belonging to the hill constituencies and hill councils. These bills, deemed to be negatively affecting the interests of tribals and violative of the afore-mentioned constitutional provisions, had triggered a huge reaction in the hill districts and Churachanpur. These three bills did not finally get Presidential accent, and perforce had to be reverted back by the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to the state government for reconsideration. As in the case of the creation of seven new districts, the state government`s unilateral and non-consensual action triggered the earlier crisis as well.
In the existing politico-security milieu of north-eastern states — and in particular the India-Myanmar border region which has experienced depredations by the NSCN-Khaplang group, such non-consensual actions by the state executive authorities cannot but be detrimental to India`s security interests. Though the anti-national insurgent Meitei groups drawing support in the Imphal Valley region seem to be lying low currently as a result of counter action by the state police and central paramilitary forces, political unrest is detrimental to the overall security situation in Manipur. The Union government has a residuary responsibility to assist in turning around the present situation. While a direct assumption of executive responsibility by the Union government may not be warranted, a more proactive role of the Governor at New Delhi`s behest, may be justifiably required. The Constitution has adequate scope for this purpose under its Seventh schedule and Article 371 C, without impinging on the autonomy of the state.
The existing situation may nevertheless continue to drift as none of the players on the state`s political scene may like to take steps which may result in an unfavourable political outcome for them in the upcoming assembly elections three months away. The complaint of the hills people — and particularly of the Manipuri Nagas, has been that the Meitei-dominated state governments have not been responsive to their developmental and socio-economic needs. They charge that the outlying hill areas of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Chandel and to-an-extent Senapati districts have been deliberately neglected. The means and mode of communication were stretched and tenuous. Moreover, adequate funds have not devolved to these districts` hill councils and the line functionaries, as well as project-cum-scheme sanctioning administrative and financial powers have not been transferred to them.
With the creation of new smaller districts and district headquarters closer to the respective inhabitants however, efficiencies in administrative tasks should be obtainable. The non-Meiteis of the far-flung districts would actually benefit more with the latest re-organisation measure. Reports do indicate that hill people and the tribals in Noney and Jiribam have enthusiastically welcomed the creation of their districts. The Ibobi Singh government seems to have worked in a calculated manner to strengthen its political support base in the run-up to the forthcoming state elections and would not be inclined to concede the demands of the UNC. The other political parties participating in the elections may also not contest the administrative reorganization that has been undertaken by the state government.
In the above backdrop, the political contention between the state government and the UNC may not die down conclusively and within a short time period. The UNC may have to work out its political posture to remain relevant among the Manipuri Nagas within the state`s context and realities as indicated above. If the situation does not evolve, there is a danger that some extremists within the UNC fold may resort to activities beyond the purview of law and the constitution to the detriment of India`s overall security interests. Within the canopy of the dialogue in progress with the NSCN-IM on the larger Naga settlement issue, GoI may consider inducing the former to influence the UNC to adopt an accommodative posture towards the Manipur state government.
MHA may simultaneously use the instrumentality of the state governor for suitable overview and to ensure that the consultative process necessary with the hill councils is mandatorily followed within the existing constitutional framework. A realistic appraisal of Manipur`s political situation as at present and its likely future trajectory seems to indicate that no political dispensation will be able to undo the administrative reorganization carried out without damaging its popular base. The endeavour from the national perspective should therefore be to minimize the disgruntlement and disaffection among the Manipuri Nagas to the maximum extent feasible.
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Countering Fidayeen Attacks
There has been an upsurge in violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in recent years. This has been accompanied by increasing cross-border violations by Pakistan and heavy retaliation by India. The Uri terrorist attack on September 18, 2016 — directed, equipped and supported by Pakistan, led to the surgical strike by India across the Line of Control (LoC), which caught Pakistan off-guard. These were followed by repeated attempts by Islamabad to disrupt the 2003 ceasefire along the LoC and hit at targets inside J&K through orchestrated terrorist strikes. The brief analyses fidayeen attacks that have taken place during the last three years by Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups. It then delineates steps the security forces could take to counter such attacks effectively.
Understanding the Numbers
According to a portal that tracks terrorism-related violence in South Asia, 2016 has witnessed the highest number of security forces casualties during the last eight years in J&K. The data suggests that 77 security personnel have lost their lives, even as 153 terrorists were eliminated until November 27, 2016. It also indicates that civilian casualties have come down to the least number since the beginning of insurgency. However, it would be useful to view these numbers in the right context, as the security situation in Kashmir reflects a change in strategy on part of Pakistan, which must be discerned with care.
The high numbers indicated by the media in the recent past do not take into account certain variables that impact the increasing violence in the recent past. As an illustration, it has been stated that the army’s combat death toll in J&K is the highest this year. The figures are indeed high in comparison with previous years. The reasons accounting for the high figures are delineated below. First, cross-LoC violations have been unusually high this year and have led to a large number of casualties, especially of the Pakistani regular forces. These figures do not reflect Pakistan Army casualties, which when included, could take the ratio of casualties to similar levels as previous years. Second, the increase in casualties also indicates an upswing in the number of violent incidents and the corresponding increase in the intensity of security forces operations. As compared to 208 incidents in 2015, 283 incidents have already taken place till November 6, 2016 in J&K. This is a reflection of Pakistan’s desperate attempt at ensuring continued instability in the region. The decision of terrorist handlers to resort to fidayeen attacks illustrates this change in strategy and therefore calls for reflection by security forces in India as well. Third, the low figures of civilian casualties are indicative of the nature of operations being conducted in Kashmir. In the recent months, despite grave provocation, security forces have ensured minimal collateral damage, often at the cost of suffering higher casualties themselves.
The Fidayeen Phenomenon
There has been a clear shift on the part of Pakistani handlers from preserving terrorists within J&K by avoiding encounters to fidayeen attacks. The very nature of these attacks — if successful in their initial attempt to close in with a target — can potentially give results far beyond the number of suicide attackers sacrificed. Kashmir is not the first or only instance where such attempts have come to light. The institutionalised expertise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), followed by those witnessed in Lebanon, Iraq and closer home in Pakistan and Afghanistan are telling examples of the efficacy of these tactics. While even one loss is a loss too many, yet an objective assessment suggests that with the exception of the Uri attack on September 18, 2016, security forces have been able to contain the damage, despite the shift in strategy as indicated by the series of such attacks. Even as some of these attacks are contained, fidayeen attempts, which include surprise and shock as essential elements, are bound to cause greater damage when compared to hit and run or standoff fire assaults. This clearly reflects in the casualty figures of 2016.
There has also been a carefully calibrated shift in terms of the nature of the targetsat the receiving end of fidayeen attacks. Amongst the ten major attacks that have taken place in the last three years in the hinterland (refer Table 1 and Sketch 1), terrorists have struck an active battalion headquarter in an operational area, police stations, formation headquarters, peacetime military units and security establishments. These attacks seem to have been equally spaced between areas north and south of the Pir Panjal. However, they were relatively more successful in areas closer to the border or the LoC and along major arteries. The failures have taken place in areas further from the borders. This may have been due to the inability of terrorists to maintain their momentum, motivation and logistical support system. This can be seen in case of attacks repulsed in Janglot and Langate.
More importantly, it is also a reflection of the security forces leadership which ensured a high degree of preparedness despite the monotony associated with guard duties at military installations. The wide spread nature of targets across the border also indicates a careful selection procedure possibly based on the need to retain surprise as well as the potential vulnerability of the chosen target. This is quite obviously beyond the ability of terrorists and reflects the expertise of a military establishment behind it. It also shows careful planning in each case, wherein, the orchestration of the operation was undertaken with due preparation. This included digging of long tunnels across the border, procuring and wearing of army fatigues or police uniforms to deflect attention, carrying of operation specific weapons, equipment and stores.
The raising casualties of the Pakistani Army, both in men and material, could not have remained a one-sided phenomenon, with an expected backlash on the Indian side in terms of casualties. A look at the incidents post Uri clearly reflects this reality. Even as India extracted a heavy cost on Pakistan in terms of fatalities, morale and loss of face, the targeting of two military establishments by fidayeens in quick succession thereafter could have been the only low cost option available to Pakistan as a face saving measure. Given this desperation, fidayeen attacks can be reduced over a period of time with better procedures and preparedness. However, these cannot be eliminated completely and that is a reality that security planners and the population at large must acknowledge.
This analysis clearly establishes that Pakistan stung by the humiliating cross-LoC surgical strike will continue to focus its attention on military, police and central armed police establishments which are seen as vulnerable targets for fidayeen attacks. This leads to the operative part of the policy brief, which attempts to concentrate attention on requisite means to reduce casualties in this regard.
Countering the Fidayeen
It is important to outline that suicide attacks are possibly the most difficult and challenging form of terrorist strikes for security agencies attempting to neutralise them. These attacks, despite their tactical nature of conduct, have the potential of giving strategic gains if the targets are carefully chosen and the attack is executed with impeccable precision, as seen in case of LTTE in the past and terrorist strikes targeting the Pakistan Navy establishment in 2011 which led to the destruction of three P 3C Orion surveillance aircraft.
Stopping terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan into India remains the best way of avoiding and neutralising a fidayeen attack. This effort involving a section of about 10 soldiers on the LoC/International Border (IB) at the point of insertion saves the future effort of a division in an attempt to locate and neutralise the same terrorists at a later date and often at a heavy cost of own casualties. The dynamic nature of the deployment along the LoC, including the efficacy added by the fence, must be built upon and potential gaps plugged through multiple layers of deployment. The lower threshold of violence in the hinterland does open the possibility of redeploying Rashtriya Rifles in vicinity of the LoC for such a task. The situation is more complex along the IB sector. Here the limited numbers of the BSF do not allow a multi-tiered deployment like the LoC sector. This relatively low density deployment, despite the advantage of terrain when compared to the LoC, has led to infiltration in the past.
The second criticality for avoiding casualties relates to enhancing the intelligence network and capacity that feeds into the security apparatus. Almost every terrorist strike is immediately followed by a report that suggests the dissemination of suitable warnings. Having served in J&K on more occasions than one and being in receipt on similar warnings, one observes that prudence lies in differentiating between generic warnings that cover most days of an year and ones that are target-specific, which are bound to be more useful for a military commander. In fact, one reason for complacency to set in is the very nature of these ‘cry wolf’ warnings which make it difficult to differentiate between routine cautionary indicators and the more serious ones.
A third factor relates to measures required to strengthen protective measures in respect of potential targets. A comprehensive study of the same has been done in the past by a high-level committee headed by former Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Philip Campose. The study illustrates that the challenge is not related as much to understanding the nature of the threat existing at the target end, resources needed to safeguard it, or the procedures that require to be adopted to safeguard against fidayeen attacks. Rather, the challenge lies in implementing its recommendations. From the perspective of this brief, there is a clear indicator of the kind of targets that seem to repeatedly figure on the crosshairs of terrorist handlers. This raises the obvious question. Why have terrorists succeeded in causing severe casualties at some establishments, even as they have been stopped in their tracks elsewhere?
Units and formations have succeeded or failed irrespective of their nature and composition. While some had a stronger periphery, others were protected merely by a strand of barbed wire. Despite this, they are able to successfully fend off terrorist strikes. This relates to the larger issue of how well is the security apparatus galvanised in a unit when compared to some others. Soldiers are mentally and operationally a part of a cohesive sub-unit which operates as a small body on a daily basis. In an operational deployed unit, soldiers carry their weapons on person and are attuned to using them at short notice. A soldier does not have to run for cover, since the deployment ensures a degree of defensibility and interlocking supporting fire. Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) rehearse their drills as a routine and are trained to move and deploy in quick time at short notice. Most importantly, the focus and mental preparation of each soldier, sub-unit and the leadership remains on operations and operations alone, without the blurring of their orientation by more routine and at times peacetime duties that can potentially take the attention of a soldier away from possible threats. There is therefore no excuse for a unit or formation in active operations to falter on these issues.
Despite these attributes, in a peace station, a group of alert sentries, effective passage of early warning — as witnessed in case of Janglot, can still provide the necessary deterrence that can help eliminate the fidayeen. However, this alone cannot become the basis for preparing against terrorist strikes. The answer does not lie in converting these locations into hard field stations. However, it certainly does call for a two-fold initiative to enhance preparedness. One, all such establishments must be provided greater protection in line with the Campose committee recommendations. These include enhancing intelligence capabilities, isolating establishments from public passage as in the case of Nagrota, strengthening the physical infrastructure including perimeter walls, concertina coils, double or triple entry barricades, and security lighting among others. Vulnerable areas can be augmented further through the employment of training companies oriented towards countering terrorism, which will serve the dual purpose of keeping them oriented and buffer the strength of security forces in threatened areas. However, this must be undertaken in coordination with local deployment to ensure that command and control remains effective.
It is more important to enhance the capacity of units and establishments to undertake such challenges within their own capability rather than merely relying on erecting physical obstacles. The experience of the cases listed suggests the need to balance between equipping at least a third of the unit strength with weapons and ammunition, despite drills to the contrary in peace stations. It also calls for ensuring that the Ghatak Platoon of every unit or an equal strength in a formation headquarters be trained and equipped to react to the kind of contingencies that have emerged in the past.
The task such elite sub-units are required to perform to counter fidayeen attacks is specialised in nature which needs excellent situational awareness.This demands a degree of stability in their selection, training and continuity. Day-to-day changes in this regard cannot provide the requisite expertise to deal with the nature of threats that have to be countered. The inspection of units must focus more on their operational readiness against such attacks, including the efficiency of QRTs. These teams need to be equipped both in operational areas and peace stations with night vision devices, helmet-mounted communication systems, micro robots for room intervention to improve efficiency and reduce casualties. The establishment of a unified command centre to coordinate responses remains critical to a successful counter-terror operation. This has been a limitation in some cases in the past. In areas which have the presence of multiple security forces and lie on formation boundaries, it is all the more critical to ensure the same.
As a guiding rule, a unit must develop the capability to neutralise the challenge posed by 3-4 terrorists within its own resources. The repeated call for Special Forces to undertake a task which is well within the capability of a unit does not reflect well on its capacity and training. Two, a unit can only undertake a challenge of the kind posed by fidayeen attacks if the psychological and mental orientation of its men is focused towards it. Military and police establishments that fall within the vulnerable zone of such attacks must retain this very orientation and continue to prepare for such an eventuality. It requires giving higher priority to training, enhancing operational drills and procedures, cutting down on peacetime spit and polish, especially if it competes for a soldier’s time and professionalism. The principle of ‘back to basics’ in terms of basic drills and procedures that are the strength of a regimental system need to be strengthened further.
Three, the operational vulnerability witnessed in formation headquarters and logistics establishments must be addressed by assessing their operational role on the basis of counter terrorism drills and procedures. Lastly, such attacks cannot and should not create paranoia, especially in the hinterland. However, creating awareness about the potential for such attacks as well as ensuring basic defensibility of units and families is important. The antidote to fidayeen attacks is a well trained and informed soldier, who is clinical in his task of neutralising the threat as and when it arises.
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A Joint India-Indonesia Intervention on the Rohingya Issue
The problem of Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas has of late assumed a special dimension in both South-East Asia and in India’s immediate periphery. Festering since 2011, the problem erupted once again in November 2016. After inter-community riots in Myanmar’s western Rakhine province in 2012, a large-scale displacement of approximately one million Rohingyas occurred. The problem has surfaced again after violence broke out in the area on October 9, 2016.
For long, Rohingya Muslims have been at the receiving end of violence unleashed by Burman Buddhists, particularly by the Buddhist extremist group `969` led by the monk Wirathu. The displacement of Rohingyas from Rakhine province, where they have been domiciled for generations, to adjoining countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has of late assumed a destabilising dimension in Myanmar’s bilateral relations with these countries.
Rohingyas have also emigrated to India. According to authoritative reports including inputs from the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly a third of the 36,000 refugees registered with UNHCR in India are Rohingyas (more than 10,000). Some migrated as far back as 2005 (to Jaipur), while others are more recent arrivals housed in temporary make-shift conditions in states such as Assam, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Delhi and even Jammu & Kashmir.
Indonesia’s Vice President, Muhammed Jusuf Kalia, had expressed deep concern with regard to Rohingya migration to his country. Inter-alia, he stated that even though the Rohingya issue is Myanmar’s domestic problem, Indonesia will give suggestions and inputs to help resolve it. And he further added that Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has been sent to Myanmar on November 6, 2016 in order to intercede with the government there on the Rohingya issue.
Although initially the Rohingya refugee problem mainly affected Bangladesh, there were latent apprehensions in some quarters in India that eventually some of these refugees would spill over to this country. Despite the tolerant disposition of the Bangladesh government, conditions in Bangladeshi camps were not really ideal. The temporary settlement of a few thousand Rohingyas in Bangladesh after the ethnic riots in Meikhtila in Rakhine province in 2012 was also becoming a political issue among the country`s political parties to the extent that the Sheikh Hasina government could not afford to be seen as being very accommodative or deploying substantial financial resources on the settlement camps in Chittagong Division. Moreover, Bangladesh, after integrating the Buddhist Chakmas living in that part of the country, did not want a new problem in the form of Rohingyas. Consequently, it has been trying to send the Rohingyas back to Myanmar, albeit without much success. Given all this, it is but natural that some Rohingya refugees would flow into India as well as eastwards to places where they could live in reasonable conditions.
Of late, some of the refugees from these camps as well as a large number affected by the recent ethnic violence in Rakhine have been migrating to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have given refuge to some, but have tried to thwart the disembarkation of many especially those who had reached their shores in illegally arranged boats by human trafficking mafias. Indonesia, while trying to maintain some control, has been more accommodative. However, it is not the policy of the Indonesian government to give the Rohingyas citizenship, integrate them within Indonesian society or settle them on a long-term basis. Interestingly, Rohingya refugees have been enthusiastically welcomed by the predominantly Muslim people of Indonesia’s western province of Aceh. This poses a challenge to the Indonesian government in terms of ensuring civic harmony without affecting internal cohesion or the balance among different ethno-religious communities. The various implications of these developments would have undoubtedly weighed with Djakarta when the Indonesian Vice President advised the Myanmar government to resort to politically accommodative measures for resolving the Rohingya issue.
Radicalisation of the Rohingyas is another issue that looms large in the existing scenario. Though not attributable to any hostility of the Rohingya towards India per se, the footprint of some radicalised Rohingyas in setting off the 2013 blasts at the Buddhist pilgrim centre in Bodh Gaya in the backdrop of Burman Buddhist-Rohingya riots in Myanmar was not totally ruled out by authoritative government sources. Therefore, it is in India`s inherent interest to ensure that a further exacerbation of the Rohingya problem is prevented.
Considering that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to be more assertive and control the violence against the Rohingya minority. Further, it is essential that New Delhi and Djakarta consider joint measures – with consensual support from ASEAN – to prevent the emergence of another source or cause of radical extremism by a persecuted minority in South and Southeast Asia. And they should also adopt a common approach to push for a better outcome with respect to the provision of refugee relief and rehabilitation of the Rohingyas.
The pursuit of such an approach is feasible given India’s multi-faceted relations with ASEAN, of which both Indonesia and Myanmar are members. There is sufficient common ground between New Delhi and Djakarta to ensure the Rohingyas’ eventual repatriation to Myanmar, both on humanitarian grounds and with a view to curb the dangers of radicalisation among a population who are presently facing multi-dimensional socio-economic misery and political apartheid.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD did not show much consideration or interest on the Rohingya issue in the run-up to the last national elections. Now, with the democratic process instituted, albeit with the military exercising some oversight from the sidelines, the time is ripe to initiate a process for addressing the Rohingya issue. There is a strong case to modify the Myanmarese law of 1982, which has stripped the Rohingyas of not only citizenship but also of their basic rights to livelihood. At least, the following need to be instituted in this regard: work permits in Rakhine province and civic rights like movement for trade and intercourse, possession of property and observance of socio-religious customs, the availing of state-funded health and educational benefits, etc.
The Advisory Commission on the Settlement of Problem in Rakhine State (ACSPRS) set up on August 23, 2016 under the chairmanship of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan by the present Myanmar Government may be an instrument for resolution of the Rakhine-Rohingya problem provided it works impartially and with a modicum of international or at least ASEAN support. India and Indonesia could also act as facilitators in this respect. Notwithstanding the fact that the ACSPRS consists of three international persons of eminence including a Lebanese Muslim, the advisory body may not be able to push for a substantive outcome towards ameliorating the degraded condition of the Rohingyas unless some international pressure is brought to bear on Nay Pyi Taw. India has an inherent interest in acting on the Rohingya issue given its geopolitical and security interests. In the context of the interest evinced by President Widodo in developments in the Indian Ocean littoral, India, both as a littoral Indian Ocean country and as a neighbour with a near-similar political and socio-economic milieu, should forge an avenue of cooperation with Indonesia on the Rohingya issue.
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India’s UNSC Bid: Is it different this time?
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debated Security Council (SC) reform on November 7, 2016. Reports note that many states favoured India’s candidature for permanent membership and demanded that an updated Security Council reflect the far reaching changes the world has witnessed since the formation of the United Nations in 1945. This article examines whether the new debate on reforming the Security Council generates any hope for India’s membership in the world body. The first part of the article discusses issues related to UNSC reforms, demands, proposals, challenges, and prospects. The second part focuses on India’s aspiration, scenarios and possible challenges to India’s bid.
UNSC Reforms: Demands and Proposals
During the 71 year history of the UN, Security Council reform has been a much demanded and debated subject. It is widely accepted that the existing membership and functioning of the UNSC reflects the realities of a bygone era. Global politics has changed a lot – as regards its power, structure, rules, and norms since the formation of the UN. The world has witnessed a redistribution of power and emergence of new power centres, along with a transformation from the era of colonialism to that of post-colonial independent states. However, as a global institution to promote international peace and security, the UNSC has not responded to these changes due to many reasons. The only change hitherto has been an increase in the number of non-permanent members in the UNSC from six to ten, that too as far back as 1965.
In 1992, a promising reform move was initiated in the form of General Assembly Resolution 67/62, which highlighted the three major criticisms raised as regards the Council — lack of equitable representation, unresponsiveness towards new political realities and domination of Western states. In 1993, General Assembly resolution 48/26 established an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to discuss SC reform. Most reform proposals revolved around the five core issues of “membership categories, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council, and Council working methods. However, even after negotiations for more than two decades, there exists a huge difference of opinion among members on these issues.
The major coalitions for SC reforms include the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), the L.69 (Group of 42 developing countries), the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (Group of 12 countries), the African Group (Coalition of 54 African countries) and P5 Countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States). G-4 is the leading contender for permanent membership in the Council, as they seek four permanent seats for themselves, and one more seat for the African continent. The coalition demands expansion of both categories of membership — permanent and non-permanent – so as to make the Council more representative of the new realities in the global political landscape. The L.69 comprises 42 countries from Africa, Asia, Caribbean, South America and Pacific — and includes three of the four G-4 members (Brazil, India and South Africa). Similar to the G-4, L.69 also argues for reform as a way towards greater accountability, transparency, representation and legitimacy.
The African Group, comprising 54 states from five regions of the continent, is another prominent advocate of reform. The coalition reflects the Ezulwini Consensus, the official position of the African Union, which demands two permanent seats with veto power for the African continent. In addition to these four constellations, some other coalitions have also proposed reforms in accordance with their own interests and preferences. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group led by Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea, the Arab Group comprised of members of the Arab League and 10 countries from Africa, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT), a cross-regional grouping of 27 countries, are the other leading constellations that have proposed reforms consistent with their particular interests and preferences.
Since the adoption of the two GA resolutions related to Security Council reforms in 1992 and 1993, and the inception of the OEWG in 1993, the question of reform has made little progress. The OEWG, which came out with its report in 1995, the formation of a Working Group to Inter-Governmental Negotiation (IGN) in 2009, and the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform have been some of the developments towards Security Council reform hitherto. However, none of these formal and informal efforts were able to bring in either concrete institutional reform or create a broader consensus regarding the issues under debate.
India’s Aspiration: What would it take?
India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC has a long history stretching back to two and a half decades. India was one of the leading countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which initiated a draft resolution of 1992 in the General Assembly on equitable representation in the Council. Since then, several formal and informal negotiations have been held both within and outside the UN to address the issue. These negotiations indicated the necessity and urgency of Council reform.
A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that nothing has changed at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified. In a repeat of the scenario of past debates, two of the permanent members — the United States and Russia – inflexibly opposed any alteration to the existing veto system. The other two major powers — France and the United Kingdom -- extended their support to reform that would keep alive the competence of the UN. China, as in the past, took an ambiguous position towards the expansion and reform of the Council.
The debate witnessed a division of opinion among the P5 members, whose unanimous consent is a pre-requisite for any reform, particularly on the question of veto. For instance, Vladimir K. Safronkov, representing the Russian Federation, observed that Council reform was one of the most complex issues on the UN agenda since the approaches of the major players are highly divergent. He also noted that any proposal which would “infringe on the rights of current permanent members, including historic right to veto” was unacceptable. While Russia continues to back India’s claim for a permanent seat from among the G-4 countries, its strong opposition to changes in veto has generated an apprehension that it is now inclined to support India as a permanent member only without veto power. The US also opposed an expansion or alteration of the veto and demanded the consideration of aspiring members’ contribution to peace and security as a criterion for granting permanent seats in an expanded Council. Since the start of the reform initiatives in 1992, the majority of Chinese statements has contained identical phrasings. A sample of such statements includes the following: “Council reform should be carried out on the basis of broad consensus”; “A proposal that was acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Member States had not yet emerged”; and “No artificial deadline should be set”.
Three among the five permanent members of the Security Council are still against Council reform that would entail a change in their present status. The possibility of changes in the positions of the US and Russia are unlikely since they are in a state of relative decline. Since it is their current status in the Council that provides them pre-eminence on issues related to international peace and security, they are not expected to support any move that reduces their say in global politics. It is unrealistic to think that China would give up its present privileged status in the UN, even as it seeks greater influence and presence in global politics as a rising power. Moreover, reading the text of the November 7 debate makes it clear that additional permanent seats with veto power is at best a distant possibility. The P5 are unlikely to approve the promotion of any states to permanent status due to the fact that such a change would eventually dilute their power. Therefore, for reform-seekers including India, there is nothing to rejoice in the recent UNGA debate.
Given the consistency of the P5’s positions in the past and the minimal progress towards reform during the last two decades, there are three possible scenarios regarding India’s quest for permanent membership in the Security Council.
First, India takes the leadership of reform calls and actively and relentlessly pushes other countries in that direction. Its latent power, remarkable economic growth, rapidly increasing defence capabilities, status as a nuclear weapons power, and contributions to UN peacekeeping all give it the right and privilege to assume such a responsibility. However, looking at India’s engagements with the UN combined with its growing indifference towards multilateralism in the recent past, such a development is unlikely. Beyond the rhetorical statements of leaders and officials, it is still not clear whether a permanent seat in the Council is a priority for India. Many of the policy makers in the country still entertain doubts about the wisdom of India seeking greater space in an institution that has lost its legitimacy. In this situation, it is unrealistic to think that India would take the responsibility of patching the holes of the UN.
The second option is to push for Security Council reform without changing the current status of veto power. Since having a seat without veto is almost similar to not having a place in the Council, the likelihood of such a move from India is even less.
The final possible scenario is for India to accept the fact that, given the current pace and momentum, Security Council reform is never going to happen and to consequently search for alternatives to push the agenda of emerging powers. Given the miserable fate of such alternatives, for example, BRICS and its uncertain future, this option would also be a great gamble. BRICS was formed as a political and economic alternative to the Western-dominated architecture of global governance and to drive an emerging power agenda in such institutions. Nonetheless, no coherent action has been taken by BRICS countries in this regard. Such inaction raises questions about the ability of the emerging powers to either pilot multilateral institutions or push for reforms in the current global governance system.
Smallness at the border
In 2017, World Bank’s “Doing business” project ranks India 130th out of 190 countries. Rankings are a function of how other countries also perform. Ignoring that point, these rankings are based on 10 heads: Starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting electricity; registering property; getting credit; protecting minority investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. There is another head on labour, but that doesn’t enter the overall rankings. Compared to the other nine, the eighth head, trading across borders, receives relatively less attention in reform discussions. Let’s first understand what the World Bank does. As most people know, the entire World Bank exercise is based on two cities, Delhi and Mumbai. Specifically, on trading across borders, there is an export side and an import side. For exports, a shipment has to go from a warehouse in India (Mumbai/Delhi) to the US. The representative item is electrical machinery and equipment. For imports, it is the reverse and the representative item is parts and accessories of motor vehicles, imported from the Republic of Korea. The respective ports are Nhava Sheva and Mundra.
There are a bunch of documents associated with exports/imports — bill of lading, invoice, packing list, customs declaration, terminal handling receipts, import general manifest, bill of entry, cargo release order, certificate of origin. Notice this has nothing to do with price-based measures like tariffs or duties. Notice also that had it not been for export incentives or preferential trade agreements, the documentation would have been simpler. Straightforward exports/imports require fewer documents. In the bank’s work, there is an attempt to capture three types of costs — documentary compliance (non-custom type documentation), border compliance (custom type documentation) and domestic transport, cost defined both as time taken and money spent. There is no need to get into the rest of the methodology. Suffice to say, India doesn’t do as well on trading across borders as it does on getting credit, getting electricity or protecting minority investors. In the future, I suspect increases in India’s rank will be driven by starting a business, dealing with construction permits, enforcing contracts, getting credit and resolving insolvency.
The government has charted out an eight-point strategy to improve rankings and except the focus on increasing the percentage of direct delivery shipments, most elements pertain to these, not trading across borders.
In the past, if you look at what the World Bank considered a big bang (worthy of separate mention) under the head of trading across borders — you will find electronic data interchange (EDI) in 2008/09 and IceGate, the e-commerce portal of CBEC in 2017. Here is a quote from the CBEC website. “ICEGATE stands for the Indian Customs Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data interchange (EC/EDI) Gateway. ICEGATE is a portal that provides e-filing services to the trade and cargo carriers and other clients of Customs Department (collectively called Trading Partner). At present, about 24,000 users are registered with ICEGATE who are serving about 6.72 lakhs importers/exporters.” If IceGate delivers what it promises, why isn’t there a greater improvement in the 2017 rankings for trading across borders? Let me digress and mention a study done by the IIFT (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade) for the National Shipping Board in June 2016. This is titled “End-to-End Logistics & Costs for Shipping through Ports” and is a fairly recent report. There is a typo that is symptomatic of what this study found. “In import, goods are generally transported under CIF terms in which the fright (sic) is paid by the importer.”
The logistics story isn’t that good. Broadly, major problems are too many unorganised and unregistered players; registration, regulation and accreditation by too many agencies under too many statutes/orders; too many heads for levying charges; and non-standardised formats for documents. That’s the gist of it. You need to read the report for a wealth of detail. One can repeat the question. Why is a June 2016 study not that bright either?
Both the World Bank and IIFT findings are driven by responses to survey questions. Under the WTO, there is a trade facilitation agreement (TFA). India formally ratified this in April 2016. (That doesn’t mean India has to accept every provision of the TFA.) Following this, the CBEC now has something called SWIFT (Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade) that integrates into IceGate. This should integrate assorted government agencies and standardise documents, declarations and forms. Not too many countries have such a single-window interface and clearance system. Stated differently, whether it is the World Bank or IIFT, there is a time-lag issue. Because of what has already been put in place, somewhere down the line, India’s rankings will inevitably improve, subject to the caveat that ranks are a function of what other countries also do.
However, there is yet another caveat, flagged by the IIFT. There are too many unorganised and unregistered players. This is true not only of ports but elsewhere too. Efficiency improvements occur only when there is a greater degree of formalisation and fragmentation declines, leading to larger players. Years ago, thanks to Schumacher, people used to say “Small is Beautiful”. His book was published in 1973 and was then regarded as one of the most influential books ever published. That book had a point, particularly from the point of view of choosing appropriate technology. However, in other areas, efficiency and competitiveness have little to do with beauty. Trading across borders need not be beautiful and small.
Under siege, on edge
The Union government has finally woken up to the dangerous situation in Manipur and sent 4,000 Central paramilitary troops to control the ethnic tensions which have been building and are now threatening to spiral out of control. It should have done this at least a month ago, when as a consequence of an indefinite blockade on the lifelines of Manipur by the United Naga Council (UNC) over the anticipated creation of two new administrative districts, signs of retaliation from those at the receiving end of the blockade began showing. Violence erupted in an unprecedented way last Sunday when a mob of locals in the Khurai area — an outlying Imphal East township — overpowered a small detachment of police escorting a convoy of vehicles to Ukhrul district while staging a counter-blockade. After making the passengers dismount, the mob burned the vehicles along with the passengers’ belongings. In all, 21 vehicles were destroyed. Thankfully, no humans were targeted giving hope that the bitterness of the unfolding ethnic venom is still not beyond redemption.
Since Sunday’s violence, curfew has been imposed in the two Imphal districts, both of which have mixed populations. In Imphal West, it is a night curfew and in the outlying Imphal East, it is an indefinite 24-hour curfew. As a precautionary measure, the government has also suspended mobile internet services to prevent the spread of inflammatory rumours.
The UNC blockade began nearly a month-and-a-half ago on November 1, but Sunday’s incident still took everyone by surprise, even though many commentators have been predicting such a cataclysm if the UNC blockade continued and common folk’s livelihood was constantly under pressure over and above the difficulties heaped on them by demonetisation. The UNC blockade began over the possibility that the Manipur government would bifurcate Senapati district to give its SADAR Hills (Selected Area Development and Administrative Region) subdivision full-fledged district status, acceding to the long-standing demands of the residents of this sub-division, predominantly Kukis, but also Nepalis. SADAR Hills is located in the extended foothills in the north of the Imphal valley, with arms along the narrower foothills in the east and west of the valley, touching virtually every district of the state.
The mountain ranges in the Eastern Himalayas generally run from north to south and, therefore, the foothills in the Imphal valley are much wider and deeper in the north and south than in the east and west. These foothills are flatter and better irrigated than the mountains further away, thus more suitable for wet rice agriculture. For reasons that have partly to do with the Nagas’ love for the higher mountains and partly due to the politics of colonial times, these foothills are generally inhabited by Kukis and aligned tribes.
The mutual ethnic cleansing campaigns between the Kukis and Nagas in the mid-1990s following a quit notice served to Kukis in the hills — on that occasion by the UNC as well — have also ensured the concentration of Kukis in the region adjoining the valley. After those deadly clashes, which left over a thousand dead and many more displaced, SADAR Hills virtually became a district with its headquarters at Kangpokpi as Kukis found it difficult to negotiate official matters at Senapati. The UNC’s objection to SADAR Hills is that it believes this land forms part of the ancestral Naga homeland and that the Kukis — who they see as migratory — can at best be their tenants, occupying the place only so long as they enjoy the pleasure of their landlords. They also see the Manipur government’s move as an attempt to fracture this Naga homeland — often referred to as Nagalim — echoing the vocabulary of the underground Naga group, the NSCN(IM), in peace talks with the Government of India since 1997.
Together with SADAR Hills, Jiribam, another tiny enclave on the Assam border adjacent to Silchar in the Barak Valley, was to be given district status. Since it is predominantly inhabited by non-Scheduled Tribe populations of Meiteis and Bengalis, Jiribam was till recently attached to the non-reserved Imphal East district 220 km away as a sub-division, and not to adjacent Tamenglong, a reserved district for STs for that would have created immense administrative and legal problems with regard to land ownership and enfranchisement. The Manipur government deferred the anticipated creation of these two districts in October end, but the UNC insisted on a definite official assurance that these districts will never be created without their consent and launched its indefinite blockades from November 1, the day the Kut festival of the Kukis is celebrated. This year it was an important date for the Meiteis too, for on their traditional lunar calendar this was also Ningol Chakkouba day, a traditional festival when married women come home for a feast with their siblings at their parental home.
In the meantime, those demanding the SADAR Hills district also began threatening a blockade. This pressure group too has resorted to blockades in the past and there was no assurance they would not have done so again had the government’s decision not been in their favour. In its wisdom, or the lack of it, after more than a month of the UNC blockade at midnight on December 8, the government decided to go ahead to let the matter go in the latter group’s favour, creating not just the SADAR Hills district, but six more, splitting seven of the state’s existing nine districts in the process. The new districts are Kangpokpi (the new name for SADAR Hills) bifurcated from Senapati district, Noney from Tamenglong, Kamjong from Ukhrul, Tengnoupal from Chandel, Pherzawl from Churachandpur, Jiribam from Imphal East and Kakching from Thoubal. Predictably, the UNC hardened its blockade. In response, counter-blockades began to be organised in the valley areas too.
These protests soon acquired the character of loose cannons hitting the wrong targets, and the damages have been immense. Instead of the government, those who ended up suffering are ordinary people, many of whom have little or no concern on whether there should be more districts or less in the state, so long as they can eke out their meagre earnings and daily bread. The friction began acquiring a communal hue too.
The valley is especially embittered. It had little stake in the politics in the hill districts, except for the fact that the UNC’s insistence on consolidation and the political autonomy of Nagalim corresponded with the NSCN(IM)’s pursuit of an exclusive sovereign Naga nation carved out of neighbouring states, including a huge chunk of Manipur, and merged with Nagaland. It is ironic that the NSCN(IM) and UNC, who are pursuing grand themes of “shared sovereignty” and “shared competencies” with the Government of India are averse to any idea of a shared homeland with tribes and communities who also have been inhabiting the same tracts of lands as them.
What has made the current crisis dangerous is that blockades embitter entire populations. The message is, I can throttle you to death if I please, and there is nothing you can do but submit. Unfortunately, the message is now felt mostly in the valley. Counter-blockades, therefore, sprang up in the valley that carry the same message, and reciprocal embitterment.
In the non-Naga districts of Churachandpur, Thoubal and Imphal East, which too have been split, the government’s move was welcomed. In the Naga districts too, except SADAR Hills, this was the case initially, but whatever their compulsions, they have now begun retracting their warm embrace of the new districts.
All play
Five years after the then human resource development minister, Kapil Sibal, nudged the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) into making board examinations optional for Class X students, the country’s premier school examination agency has reportedly decided to make these examinations compulsory again. The CBSE has also asked the schools affiliated to it to implement the three-language formula up to Class X. The Union minister for human resource development, Prakash Javadekar, has said that Sanskrit will be “mandatory” for students in north India while students enrolled in CBSE schools in south India will have to study Hindi. Javadekar has clarified that this should not be seen as a move to impose Hindi. But when the HRD minister roots for one language, the government stands the risk of reigniting old tensions over the language issue. The decision on Sanskrit also defeats the original purpose of the three-language formula: Teaching a modern Indian language, preferably from south India, apart from Hindi and English in the Hindi-speaking states.
Almost every government change in the past 15 years has been accompanied by a change in education policy, whether that of curriculum or related to examinations. The T.S.R. Subramanian Committee on Education had warned against political interference in education. Given that pedagogy has a political purpose, some politics is unavoidable. But the wounds caused by the turmoil over the language agitation in Tamil Nadu, for instance, have long healed and the government should be careful to not open them up again in a state with a long history of resistance to the imposition of Hindi.
It is nobody’s case that the school education system in India should not be reformed. But changes have rarely been well thought out. Take the move to make the Class X exams optional. It was believed that the board exams stressed students, tested their rote learning and did not make allowances for different types of learners and learning environments. But the UPA government’s decision to replace the Class X exams with the continuous comprehensive system of evaluation has run up against problems which should not have been difficult to foresee. There is much fuzziness around what is to be assessed and how. There is no mechanism to use the evaluations to ascertain a child’s educational growth. Teachers have complained that the process adds to their workload. That said, in India, the board exams acquire disproportionate weightage in a student’s academic life. Instead of raking up politically-fraught issues, the CBSE and the government should address these problems.
