Maoist Defeat in Nepal EPW

The results of the elections to the second Constituent Assembly (CA) of Nepal 2013 stunned the world and the Nepali Maoists in particular. Nobody had imagined that the party which emerged the largest in the 2008 CA elections with 229 seats will now emerge third in 2013 with only 80 seats. Previously, the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN(M) had more legislators than the combined strength of the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist [CPN(UML)] who had managed 223 seats in total. Now the Maoists’ strength has shrunk to be more than half of the NC-UML tally of 175 seats.

How did the Maoists suffer such a humiliating defeat in such a short period? Was this only due to “poll rigging” as they have claimed? What are the reasons behind their defeat?

Achievements

The defeat of the Nepali Maoists in the second CA elections has been even more puzzling because this has happened despite some of their major political achievements since the Jan Andolan in 2006. The 2000-year-old feudal monarchy was abolished and Nepal had become a democratic republic, almost by universal consensus in the first session of the CA in 2008. This process had been completed very peacefully despite the presence of a rebel army and the unresolved status of a long-standing Maoist insurgency. Also, due to the efforts in the CA, the highly centralised and unitary state of Nepal had been in principle transformed into a federal state. The only Hindu kingdom in the world had also been transformed into a secular state.

Other achievements were equally astounding. Many features of the Constitution in the making had a decisive socialist character and inclusive nature about them. The right to proportional, social inclusion of women, dalits, ethnic minorities, Madhesi communities, oppressed groups, workers, the poor farmers in state structures and institutions had been ensured as a form of social justice in the Interim Constitution (IC) promulgated in November 2006.¹ This special right had been unanimously agreed to be included in the new draft Constitution as well.²

The rights to employment, free secondary school education, free basic health services, food, social security for children, elderly people, widows and the destitute had been ensured as the fundamental right of every citizen in the IC and the new draft Constitution as well. Besides these rights, the right to access to proper accommodation and right to free higher education for dalits and people below the poverty line had also been added in the new constitutional draft proposed by committees in the first CA.³ With these, Nepal had been transformed into a benevolent social democratic state.

The declaration of the reinstated Nepali Parliament on reserving 33% of seats for women in all the state mechanisms in 2006 was also a landmark event in the history of women’s inclusion in Nepal. Three additional important rights for Nepali women had been guaranteed in the Interim Constitution: namely, the equal right of daughters and sons to ancestral property; the right of every child to get citizenship in the name of the mother as well (children who have no father and who were born out of wedlock); and, the right to reproduction and reproductive health.⁴

The new draft Constitution had proposed additional progressive rights for women. Most significant of all was the right to participate at every level of the state structure in proportion to their population (from 33% earlier to 50% henceforth). It had also been unanimously agreed that if a major post in the legislature is held by someone of a particular gender, the second major post must be allotted to someone of the opposite gender. Provisions of equal say and rights for both the husband and the wife in matters of the family (including property) were also incorporated in the draft Constitution during CA deliberations.⁵

One of the remarkable rights accorded to workers and peasants of Nepal and written in the new draft of the Constitution was that of participation in state structures on the basis of the proportional representation and the right to strike. In addition to this, the right to proper wages and social security had also been ensured.⁶

The dalits of Nepal had also been provided the right to participate in all the organs, agencies and sector of state mechanisms, on a proportionate and inclusive basis for the first time, in the draft Constitution. They were now entitled to obtain seats as a form of positive discrimination – 3% at the federal level and 5% at the provincial level. Landless dalits were also entitled to get land from the state once, after the promulgation of the new Constitution. The rights accorded to dalits in Nepal enshrined in the new draft Constitution seem to be far more progressive than those accorded to Indian dalits.

The initial draft of the new Constitution had also given Madhesis, Janajatis and Muslims the right of inclusion in all the state organs at all levels and its leadership on the basis of proportional representation. The highly marginalised and endangered communities would obtain special protection rights as well.

The exemplary practice of inclusive and participatory democracy could be seen in the first CA itself. Thirty-three per cent of the members of the CA were women, 8% were dalits, 34% were Madhesis, 35% were Janajatis and 3% belonged to the Muslim community; all by itself a big breakthrough in terms of representation.

By any measure, these were not ordinary political achievements. It was a profound political revolution which had the potential to alter the historical character of Nepal’s regime completely. These achievements were clearly made possible due to the leadership and ideological vision provided by the Nepali Maoists.

Roots of the Maoist Defeat

If these political achievements were so remarkable why did Maoists face such an embarrassing defeat in the second CA elections? It is clear that the Nepali Maoists could not properly explain their achievements – their remarkable and revolutionary nature and what it could mean for livelihoods – to the electorate. Four failures of the UCPN(M) primarily played a role in their humiliating defeat.

The first failure related to the fact that while the Maoists managed to lead the transformation of the political system of Nepal, they failed to bring about such a transformation in the economic, social and cultural spheres. While they were in government (for limited periods during the first CA), they were unable to deliver anything significant or revolutionary in terms of policies or governance. The inability to follow up the “political transformation” with concomitant socio-economic reforms in the countryside – lack of progressive land reforms, for example, even though there was a commonly agreed provision in the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that spoke of elimination of all feudal remnants through scientific land reforms. The decision of the UCPN(M) to return all land and property of absentee landlords (expropriated during the peoples’ war) was also ironic. In the absence of land reform, sufficient industrialisation and socio-economic transformation in the countryside, the vast majority of rural people, poor peasantry, working class and lower middle classes could not feel the impact of the significant political changes effected by the Maoists. These were the prominent classes who had supported the Maoists throughout the armed insurgency until the last CA elections and the very same classes chose not to endorse them in the same overwhelming manner. There was clearly a detachment from their core classes and support base for the Maoists.

The second failure was that the Maoists in their limited time in government could not manage to initiate reforms in the state apparatus leading to changes in the bureaucracy, the army, the judiciary and the police. There were clear provisions on “democratisation” of the army and the bureaucratic administration in the CPA. When the Maoists first tasted power in 2008, they did not commence any reform of the state apparatus even when the situation was ripe in their favour due to the immense popularity as the victors of the first CA and that of the Maoist leadership led by Pushpa Kumar Dahal “Prachanda” himself. Yet, the government sought to adjust with the status quo rather than initiate anticipated reforms, perhaps with the belief that a consolidation of the state machinery would prove effective later. This strategy ultimately turned out to be counterproductive. As Prachanda sought to remove the then army chief Rukmangad Katawal (even as he was due for automatic retirement very soon) as a face saving way of asserting control over the army, the move boomeranged resulting in Prachanda’s resignation.

The third failure related to the inability of the Maoist leaders and their cadre to prove themselves to be qualitatively different in their morals and functioning while in power from the rest of the polity. The Maoist party members were seen to lead a suddenly acquired lavish and corrupt lifestyle, resulting in a drop in their popularity.

The fourth and biggest failure was the inability to write a Constitution on time. While this was a collective failure as all the four major forces – the NC, the UML, the Madhesis and the Maoists – could not manage to complete the process in time, it must be said that the UML and the NC were primarily responsible. There is no doubt that the UML and NC had an active role in the dissolution of CA as its Chairperson Subhash Newang was from the UML and the chairperson of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Nilamber Acharya was from the NC. If these representatives had opted to place the contentious issues in the drafting of the Constitution for democratic voting or for a referendum within the CA, the CA process could have been successfully completed. Yet, the absence of the CA chairperson Subhash Newang in the last plenary session of the CA, which he had himself convened, and the Maoists allowing the UML and the NC pretexts to derail the CA process, resulted in the dissolution of the body. The demise of the CA became inevitable as there was a Supreme Court ruling that its tenure could not be extended beyond 27 May 2012. The two major status quoist parliamentary parties actively sought pretexts to block the promulgation of a very progressive Constitution under Maoist leadership. The Maoists tactically failed in preventing this outcome.

The main issues of contention in the first CA which led to its dissolution related to the name, number and boundary of federal provinces (state restructuring) plus the issue of form of government at the federal level. A compromise and an agreement had been possible on these issues on 15 May 2012 due to the initiative of a Contentious Issues Resolving Mechanism of CA led by Prachanda himself. The compromise was that the name of the provinces would be decided by the provincial parliaments once they were elected (11 provinces were agreed upon). The boundaries of provinces were to be decided based on recommendations by a commission comprising experts. The form of government was to be based on the mixed French model wherein there would be a directly elected president and a prime minister elected by parliament as well (provisions were to be made for clear-cut sharing of power between these two posts).

Although there were serious drawbacks in the mixed model form of government (because it could have led Nepal to political instability due to two competing power centres), the agreement made on the federal issues was more or less fine. However, the Maoist leadership withdrew immediately from the agreement due to pressure from the Madhesi parties and Janajati leaders. The withdrawal from the agreement at the eleventh hour proved to be a political blunder because there was no time left for another agreement. It gave sufficient  pretext for those who wanted the leftist-dominated and Maoist-led CA to be dissolved without producing a new Constitution. The ideological confusion within the Maoist leadership resulted in a situation where they could not come up with a clear view on what to agree upon (as a compromise) and what not. Being the biggest party in the CA, the Maoists thus became equally responsible for the dissolution of the CA without the Constitution writing process having been completed.

The Maoist leadership also committed a grave mistake in not adopting a political strategy that combined negotiations using the active support of the full house in the CA with mass agitations and street support for the progressive Constitution. The leadership engaged only in closed room battles with the leadership of the other three main political forces, and it must be said that they were outmanoeuvred by the latter, who were far more well versed in the art of parliamentary politics.

The Maoists also made the mistake of not being congenial enough after their win in 2008 in bringing about the needed consensus. If they had taken the initiative of power sharing with the NC and the UML on their own accord (without the need for elections), their leadership could have been sustained as established and unchallenged. Instead, they came across as arrogant and as being engaged in gamesmanship when they refused the choices offered for the posts of president, vice president and CA convenor, only to be foisted with the very same choices after the NC and the UML united against them.

In a way, the defeat of the Maoists in the second CA elections was an angry reaction of a highly frustrated electorate which had placed great hope in the Maoists to lead the way in the realisation of a new progressive Constitution, enduring peace, political stability, and progressive socio-economic transformation. The defeat is a wake-up call for the Maoists which should compel them to overhaul their party organisation and strategising, and correct their past mistakes.

The defeat of Maoists does not mean that the NC and the UML are more popular, not corrupt or that they are absolved of the mistakes they too had committed. The increase in the vote share of these parties seems to be the accrual of negative and reactive voting against the Maoists which begs the question whether this support would last long enough. They had other advantages, too. The splinter Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) that broke away from the UCPN(M) called for a nationwide boycott of the elections, but their cadre voted against the parent party in many places.

Institutional Rigging?

The UCPN(M) claimed that the unexpected election result was the consequence of a managed institutional rigging involving the Election Commission (EC) and the Nepal Army (NA) itself. As a mark of protest, on the very second day of vote counting, the party withdrew all of its party representatives from the counting centres and even declared that it will not accept the result. It maintained that it will not take part in the CA unless an independent probe commission is formed to investigate the alleged rigging that occurred after the voting. It has now been agreed that the new CA will form such a probe committee.

Reports indicate that a subtle institutional rigging could have taken place in some selective and targeted places. Although the voting process was generally free, fair and peaceful, there is the possibility that ballot boxes – under the supervision of the NA – were mishandled as there were no proper sealing and supervision by party representatives prior to army takeover. Following the EC directives, even those ballot boxes were accepted as valid for counting in which the seals had been broken, the cover of the boxes were open, the signature of the election officer was not verified and boxes were smaller or larger than when they were sealed.

Yet this cannot be the major cause of the Maoists’ surprising defeat because there is no evidence to suggest that this kind of malpractice occurred nationwide. It seems to have happened only in very selective and targeted places, and anecdotal evidence points to not more than 50 to 60 places in the countryside. The Maoists were not the only complainants about electoral malpractice. Other smaller parties – many opposed ideologically to the Maoists – also pointed to evidence of some degree of electoral malpractice affecting their prospects.

That is why, in the final analysis, it will be quite erroneous to conclude that the major reason of the Maoist defeat was electoral malpractice. Rigging of a relatively minor scale has been a feature of most elections in Nepal. Organisational drawbacks and mistakes committed by the Maoists as part of the power structure in Kathmandu must be seen as primary reasons for their defeat.

In the last CA elections, UCPN(M) leaders and cadres were based in the countryside and were working actively among the oppressed and working classes. But the NC and UML leaders, on the other hand, were more visibly active in the urban centres. This time around, in the second CA elections, the case was quite the opposite. With Maoist leaders and cadre concentrating their work in district centres, as these helped them thrive in patronage networks, the net result was that the base organisations of the Maoists at the grass roots were almost defunct. The Maoists’ decision to open its party to allow more and more members without proper scrutiny and ideological training saw to it that a number of corrupt, criminal and reactionary elements joined it. This was a major organisational blunder as it eroded the image of the Maoists and its popularity among the poor, in particular. Besides, the jumbo-sized district and state committees within the party acted more as obstacles rather than as help for the party. Erstwhile cadre from the Peoples’ Liberation Army who returned to their villages were dispirited after an army-integration process that was humiliating for them. Issues concerning the misuse of their rehabilitation expenses by their leadership also forced many such cadre to work to defeat their very own political leaders. The split in the Maoist party also weakened them to a certain extent.

Conclusions

The transformation of the Nepali Maoists who entered the peace process in 2006 as revolutionary liberators into the image of being status quoists within merely seven years resulted in their electoral defeat. In a way, a great revolutionary opportunity to transform the country’s regime, economy and society was missed, even as significant steps were taken to achieve a robust regime of rights and political reforms.

The defeat in the second CA elections conveys a message to the Maoists: they must undertake a serious, holistic and honest introspection right away. They have to reconstruct themselves organisationally and ideologically again. The correct path to socialism and revolution cannot be one of adjustment with the status quo.

A defeat in one election, at the same time, is by no means an end for a revolutionary force. It is only an opportunity for self and course correction. The way to victory in the war against the status quo lies in addressing the root causes of defeat, not in blaming others for it. The Maoists are, arguably, still the largest political force in terms of their organisational strength, more than that of the NC and the UML combined. The CA process, issues related to state restructuring, form and nature of government, etc, that dominate Nepal’s political agenda today are all a product of Maoist engagement in the political process. With 80 members in the CA, the Maoists can still represent the interests of Nepal’s poor, its peasantry, people of marginalised identities and its working classes effectively, and should try to retain the progressive features of the draft Constitution in the first CA. By avoiding a repetition of earlier mistakes, and by a re-engagement with the masses through mobilisations and struggle, they can certainly achieve that goal even with their reduced strengths.