| the organization. It was assumed that man was involved only segmentally in the organization (i.e., work was only one of many interests and not necessarily the primary interest), and the member of the organization sought instrumental rewards that could be used to obtain basic satisfactions elsewhere. Given this conceptualization of the relationship between man and the organization and assuming that money is the primary instrumental reward, it was felt that man's behavior in the organization could be controlled by the judicious manipulation of monetary incentives. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The Behavioralists construct a substantially different scenario. For the Behavioralists, man's behavior is more variable (less manipulable) than had been presumed by Classical authors.
In part, this is because man is, or should be, more totally involved in the organization and should expect intrinsic, rather than merely instrumental, rewards from the organizational experience. These social and psychological rewards extend beyond money and are less easily manipulated than are monetary incentives.
Moreover, there are forces affecting man's behavior in the organization that are either beyond the control of the organization or at least more difficult for the organization to control. Internal to the organization are informal groups, a major focus of analysis for the Behavioral approach, which often elude organizational control but act as major determinants of individual behavior. Beyond the organization lie a variety of social forces that influence behavior in the organization but are likely to escape organizational control. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| All of this means, according to the Behavioralists, that the organization must learn to respond to a wider range of human needs if it is effectively to motivate man in the organization, let alone control his behavior. Organization man may be malleable, but he is not necessarily compliant. The organization cannot simply assume obedience to its directives, it must actively seek the consent and compliance of its participants. Indeed, the question of how best to secure compliance is a major theme, perhaps the central theme, of the Behavioral literature. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 7.There were also some major differences between the Classical and Behavioral approaches in the methods employed to realize the common ambition of constructing a science of administration. The Classical approach, as has been mentioned, was largely deductive and normative in its emphasis. The Behavioral approach, in contrast, was more inductive and descriptive in emphasis.
The Behavioral approach pursued much of its research in the logical-positivist tradition stressing the operationalization of concepts, the use of systematic techniques of analysis in the testing of hypotheses, and generalization based on an accumulation of empirical findings. Normative attributions about organizations were not so much abandoned as deferred pending the acquisition of more descriptive information. 8 It was maintained that we should not
| try to prescribe how organizations should operate (normative analysis) until we know more about how they actually operate (descriptive analysis). | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The works of Mary Parker Follett, Elton Mayo, and Chester Barnard are all integral to this developing challenge to the Classical organizational paradigm and precursors to the development of the Behavioral approach.
Follett's work was the earliest of these, and her work anticipated by more than two decades some of the central themes of the Behavioral period.
1.Most prominent among them were Follett's ideas about the nature of authority in the organization. In contrast to the Classical literature, which maintained that coordination flows from the exercise of authority and that authority resides in the apex of the organizational pyramid, Follett argues the authority flows from coordination and that authority is neither supreme nor is it delegated.
Instead, authority is pluralistic (i.e., it exists at many points in the organization), and it is "cumulative" (i.e., it arises from below instead of descending from above). Moreover, Follett argues that authority is exercised increasingly on the basis of the objective demands of the situation rather than personal and arbitrary mandates. Finally, Follett contends that authority is not a final moment of decision embodied in a command, but a reciprocally conditioned relationship among hierarchical superiors and subordinates in a series of interactions that precede, and determine, final choice. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Mayo's famous research at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company in the late 1920s and early 1930s laid much of the conceptual and empirical foundation for the Behavioral approach. Indeed, this research led directly to the Human Relations movement, a major component of the Behavioral approach. Mayo's research focused on social and psychological factors in human behavior in the organization with particular emphasis on informal group activity. Mayo asserts that informal groups develop within the organization in response to needs and expectations not effectively served by the formal organization and adopt norms of behavior that are not necessarily the same as those of the organization. Moreover, these informal groups, which are nowhere described in the organization chart, exert significant influence on individual behavior in the organization. Mayo contends that management must learn to deal with these groups, and to respond to the needs and expectations expressed therein, in order to achieve the objectives of the organization. By directing attention to the social and psychological aspects of organizational behavior, the Western Electric researches set the stage for a continuing empirical investigation of the relationship between changes in the organization (with particular emphasis on style of supervision), worker satisfaction, and productivity as emphasis shifted to precisely those elements of human feelings,
| passions, and sentiments that were largely either avoided or ignored in the Classical literature on organizations. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Barnard provides a conceptualization of the organization supportive of both Follett's ideas on authority and Mayo's assertion that subordinate needs, as they perceive them, must be satisfied to achieve organizational effectiveness.
Barnard asserts that the organization is a system of exchange in which each participant makes contributions in return for inducements offered by the organization. Both organizational inducements and individual contributions are subjectively evaluated by each participant, and an individual's participation will continue only as long as the participant perceives that the value of the inducements received from the organization exceeds the value of the contributions required by the organization. Why, then, should the organization pay attention to subordinate needs as they themselves see them? Because each subordinate subjectively evaluates the balance of contributions required and inducements received, and will terminate his association with the organization if these expectations and needs are not being met. This view of the organization prompts Barnard to formulate a concept of authority in a manner generally consistent with that of Follett. Barnard defines authority as "the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to or 'member' of the organization as governing the action he contributes." In short, authority lies in the consent of the governed. As such, it resides in a relationship between a superior and a subordinate, not in a position, and it is exercised only on acceptance of a directive, not on its issuance. By so defining authority, Barnard emphasizes the role of subordinate and the importance of compliance. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| If Follett, Mayo, and Barnard were precursors of the Behavioral movement, Simon was an important part of the movement itself. Simon's distinctive contribution was to shift the focus of analysis to decision making in the organization. More specifically, Simon argued that the science of administration should be founded on the factual premises of administrative decision making. In examining decision making, Simon sought to reconcile the rational-choice model of economic theory (and at least implicit in Classical administrative theory) with the emergent findings on human behavior in the organization. In Simon's hands the image of man is transformed from the "lightning quick" and omniscient calculator of the economics literature into an empirically more realistic image of a decision maker limited in cognitive and analytical abilities who chooses alternatives that are likely to be merely satisfactory rather than optimal. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| This revised view of the decision maker is relevant to the organization in that the organization must devise ways to cope with the probable limits on rationality in human decision making. The primary
| organizational strategy for dealing with human decision-making frailties is to devise appropriate decision premises so that organizationally rational decisions can be made despite the likelihood of individually nonrational processes. This means that the organization should alert the individual to decision situations (by structuring stimuli in the organizational environment) and provide decision rules that can be mechanically applied to render an organizationally correct outcome. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| This returns Simon to the central theme of the Behavioral approachthe problem of compliance. The problem is simply translated from a question of authority in general to a question of getting the subordinate to recognize and apply the appropriate decision rule. This Simon sees as largely a problem of providing appropriate inducements so that individuals will respond in the desired manner. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| As was the case with the Classical authors, there are both interesting relationships, and a lack thereof, among these authors and between these authors and those of the Classical approach. Follett was known, but not extensively cited, by the authors considered here. One of her pieces did appear in the famous Papers on the Science of Administration. Mayo was similarly included in the Papers. Interestingly enough, Mayo considered his work to be more a complement to, than a substitute for, the Classical formulation. As Mayo put it, there are three dimensions to management: the application of science and technical skill (the primary emphasis of Scientific Management), the systematic ordering of operations (the primary emphasis of the Departmentalists), and the organization of teamwork and cooperation. Mayo sought to redress what he perceived to be an imbalance in previous works by stressing the problem of securing teamwork and cooperation. Though the relationship between Mayo's work and that of Barnard seems obvious, Barnard denies that Mayo had any influence on his ideas about the organization. In contrast, the relationship between Barnard and Simon is both present and acknowledged. Simon relies heavily on Barnard's conceptualization of the organization as a system of exchange.
There are also some intriguing relationships between Simon and the Classical authors, especially with those in the Scientific Management movement. In particular, Simon's continuing stress on hierarchical control and coordination, here exercised through the formulation and induced application of decision rules, would appear to be more closely akin to the Classical stance than that of his Behavioral brethren. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The ideas of this set of authors have also had substantial impact on their successors, or contemporaries, in the Behavioral approach. The Human Relations movement was a direct outgrowth of research at the Western Electric Company. This movement sought ways of restructuring the organization and revamping managerial styles to become more
| responsive to a wider range of social and psychological needs in the organization. A related, but more negative, approach focused on bureaucratic organizations and their dysfunctional consequences and is exemplified by the writings of authors such as Robert Merton, Philip Selznick, and Peter Blau. Combined, these approaches pronounced a need for change and stimulated a search for alternatives to the hierarchical structures so warmly embraced in the Classical literature. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The Human Relations approach, in turn, prompted its own reaction as we move into the more contemporary literature.
-One response addressed the empirical difficulties encountered by the Human Relations approach in the attempt to sort out the relationships among organizational characteristics, worker satisfaction, and productivity. To state the matter briefly, it was found that the suggested changes in the organization did not, as had been expected, always lead to higher levels of satisfaction, nor were higher levels of satisfaction always associated with increased productivity.
The response to these empirical difficulties came in the form of the Contingency approach. Contingency theory suggests that the Human Relations approach made the same mistake as had the Classical authors in assuming that there is one best way of managing all organizations. The Contingency approach suggests that management is a relative and adaptive process and that the appropriate style is contingent on a number of organizational considerations. The task assumed by the Contingency approach is to stipulate the conditions under which a particular approach is likely to be successful. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| --A second response to Human Relations has been what has been called organizational humanism. Based originally on the conceptual apparatus of humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow, organizational humanism is more concerned with the morality of the Human Relations movement than its empirical difficulties. Here it is argued that the Human Relations approach, as was the Classical approach, is simply concerned with raising productivity. The only difference, it is argued, is that whereas the Classical approach relied primarily on command, the Human Relations approach employs more sophisticated forms of psychological manipulation. Organizational humanism attempts to establish the intrinsic value of the satisfaction of human needs in the organization, rather than view it simply as a means for increasing productivity. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| --->The second major challenge to the Classical paradigm came in the form of the Administration-as-Politics approach, and in combination with the Behavioral approach questioned every fundamental premise of the Classical perspective. Whereas the basic difference between the Classical and Behavioral approaches concerns the way organizations should be structured and managed, the basic difference between the Classical approach and the Administration-as-Politics approach lies in
their differing definitions of the field of public administration.
In direct contrast to the Classical approach, the Administration-as-Politics approach maintains that it is impossible, and undesirable, to separate politics from administration. Consequently, public administration is different from private administration with the distinguishing characteristic of public administration being the political milieu in which the public administrator is required to operate. Moreover, this approach questions the possibility of separating facts and values. The combination of the rejection of the politics-administration dichotomy and the reservations about the fact-value dichotomy mean that the Administration-as-Politics approach considers public administration to be both art and science, and perhaps more art than science. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The politics-administration dichotomy is rejected on both empirical and normative grounds. Empirically, it is argued that even casual observation reveals that administrators are involved in political and policy concerns. An age of size and complexity requires the exercise of administrative initiative in the formulation of policy and the exercise of administrative discretion in its implementation, and both activities centrally involve the administrator in policy and political processes. Normatively, it is maintained that separating the administrator from policy and political matters deprives society of the creative input of those likely to be best informed about the programs they administer and tends to insulate the administrator from the legitimate demands of the public he is charged with serving. | |
|
|
| With the rejection of the politics-administration dichotomy, the central challenge for the Administration-as-Politics approach is to seek a satisfactory reconciliation of the necessity of administration and the requirements of democracy. This concern manifests itself in two forms:
1.a focus of the concept of administrative responsibility and
2.an emphasis on the public policy process itself.
The former, a focus on administrative responsibility, has concentrated on defining an appropriate role for the administrator in a pluralistic political environment. The Classical approach had stressed a role of neutrality regarding policy matters. The Administration-as-Politics approach counsels a role of policy advocacy, but with some differences about the standards on which that advocacy should be based. At first, the emphasis was on professional standards as the appropriate base. Later emphasis switched to representing clientele interests. This culminated in what has been called the new public administration which stressed participation both within the organization in a spiritual alliance with organizational humanism and clientele representation with the administrator charged with a special responsibility for representing those interests not adequately reflected through the formal electoral process or by elected representatives. This meant, for the most part, an obligation to represent the interests of minorities and
the poor.
The second development in the ADministration-as-Politics approach has been an analytical interest in the processes by which policy is formulated, adopted, implemented, and evaluated. In part, this has led to increasing concern with the techniques of policy analysis, such as planning and evaluation. More generally, there has been a focus on the policy process with particular emphasis on the role of the administrator at various stages of the process. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| I have included the works of Dwight Waldo in this volume, in part because they are illustrative of the concerns of the Administration-as-Politics approach, those concerns being stated most forcefully in his book The Administrative State. Beyond that, Waldo is widely recognized as perhaps the chief chronicler of the development of the field of public administration and one of its most astute critics.
=================================================================
Chapter 1
Max Weber: The Process of Rationalization | |
|
|
| Weber clearly saw administration in general, and bureaucracy in particular, as vital to these processes. Indeed, Weber asserts that domination is exerted through administration and that legal domination requires bureaucracy for its exercise. Moreover, Weber considered bureaucracy to be the most rational and efficient form of organization yet devised by man.
Despite his general admiration for bureaucracy, Weber was also aware of its flaws.
1.As an organizational form, bureaucracy subjects the individual to an oppressive routine, limits individual freedom, and favors the "crippled personality" of the specialist.
2.As a potential political force, bureaucracy becomes a danger when it oversteps its proper function and attempts to control the rule of law rather than be subject to it. Weber argues that the bureaucrat should stay out of politics and limit himself to the "impartial administration of his office" and that he should subordinate his personal opinion on matters of policy to his sense of duty. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| There are obvious relationships between Weber and the authors of the Classical period.:
1.His call for bureaucrats to be the neutral servants of their political masters echoes Wilson's admonition that administrators should be responsible only for the efficient execution of the law.
2.His description of the "ideal-type bureaucracy" is similar in form and process to organizations widely prescribed by the Classical authors. But to limit Weber's influence to the Classical approach alone would be misguided.
His call for the construction of a value-free social science corresponds to the the ambition and stated intent, if not the accomplishment, of the Behavioral approach.
His overall concern with power relationships in society is similar to the concerns of the Administration-as-Politics approach. In short, Weber's influence, although often indirect, has been pervasive in the field of public administration. | |
|
|
| | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Widely acknowledged as one of the founders of modern social science, Weber conceived of sociology as a science with the objective of interpreting and understanding social conduct. Weber's own ambition was to examine the relationships between economic institutions and actions and all other social institutions and actions constituting a given social structure. | |
|
|
| Though Weber acknowledges that sociology is not confined to the study of social action, it is the main focus of his analysis. Weber viewed
| the world of man in society as "a world of unit social acts, ordered by the need to make choices for an always uncertain future in terms of some principle of choice which we call a value." In analyzing social action, Weber hoped to go beyond statements of "lawful regularities" (the limited preoccupation of the natural sciences) to the definition of the causal and motivational forces that produce systems of action in social situations. More precisely, Weber is concerned with examining and explaining individual, purposive, rational social actions. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's focus on motivated behavior means that he is interested in what he calls "meaningful" action, not merely reactive behavior. Processes that are not the results of motivations are to be considered only conditions, stimuli, or circumstances that further or hinder motivated individual action.
Moreover, the affective and irrational components of human behavior are relegated to the status of "deviations" from rational behavior as Weber concentrates on "ideal type" rational behavior such as that exhibited in the formal elements of law and pure economic theory.Weber's sociology thus focuses on the single deliberate action of the individual that is directed toward affecting the behavior of others. The intention of the act is primary, and the success, failure, or unanticipated consequences are of only secondary importance. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber asserts that individual actions fall into categories and that they can be combined into social structures. His intent is to understand the categories and structures of social actions as they have appeared in history. In classifying social actions, Weber's distinctions are based on degrees of rationality. These range from rational expediencies such as economic actions, which are the most understandable of motivated actions, through the pursuit of absolute ends and affectual actions flowing from sentiments, to instinctual behavior and traditional conduct. Weber groups social actions by their determinants and orientations. Purposive, rational conduct is determined rationally and is oriented toward discrete individual ends. Affectual conduct is both determined by, and oriented toward, feelings and emotions. Traditional conduct is determined by, and oriented toward, historical precedent. These categories of social action yield three kinds of social structure: society, which is based on rationally expedient social action; association, which is based on affective social action; and community, which is based on traditional social action.14 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's approach to sociology is one of the primary alternatives to a Marxist perspective, and it was clearly intended as such by the author. Weber felt that Marx had only a partial perspective on history and had unduly emphasized material interests in his analysis. In contrast, Weber argues for causal pluralism in which factors such as nationalism and ethnicity join material interests as determinants of social actions. Although Weber agrees with Marx's belief that ideas are power-
| less unless joined with economic interests, he denies that ideas are simply reflections of those economic interests. Weber emphasizes the autonomous role of ideas and is concerned with the relative balance between "ideal" and "material" factors in history. 15 This viewpoint is most dramatically stated, of course, in Weber's famous analysis of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism in which Weber argues that the particular form of capitalism that arose in the West was, in large part, a product of the ideas and ethic of Protestantism. Of this, I have more to say later. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| This emphasis on the importance of ideas leads Weber to distinguish between class and status and to identify the latter as the primary basis of social dynamics. According to Weber, while class is based solely on economic power, status is determined by social estimates of honor and a style of life.16 Weber maintains that society is a composite of positively and negatively privileged status groups with the positively privileged status groups attempting to preserve their style of life through the monopolization of economic opportunities. Consequently, for every idea or value one should seek out the status group whose ideal and material interests are served. Conflicts among the divergent interests of status groups are resolved in social patterns of compliance and domination.17 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| A final distinction between Marx and Weber is the role of class struggle in their formulations. Weber does not deny the importance of class struggle, but he does reject the idea that class struggle is the central dynamic of society. Instead, Weber emphasizes the forces of rationalization and their organizational counterpart, bureaucracy. Human behavior is thus guided not only by economic interests but also by social affinity (status) and a legitimate order of authority that depends on a bureaucratic structure for its exercise.
| | |
|
| Weber's methodological objective is to make possible the treatment of social phenomena in a systematic and scientific manner. Although he personally contributed little to the realm of quantitative studies, Weber emphasizes the possibility of using quantitative techniques to define and explain social and cultural matters. Weber himself uses a comparative, historical approach to conduct causal analyses of social action. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| A crucial aspect of Weber's methodology is his use of the "ideal type" construct. Weber believes the construction of ideal types to be essential to causal analysis, and it was part of his broader effort to codify the concepts of the social sciences. Weber asserts that two kinds of meaning can be ascribed to social behavior:
a concrete meaning and a
| theoretical or "pure" type of subjective meaning. The problem with concrete meaning is that there is a bewildering variety of actual social phenomena each of which is complex in its own right. Consequently, most concepts in the social sciences are necessarily abstractions from reality, not "presuppositionless" descriptions, and they are not likely actually to appear in their full conceptual integrity. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The ideal type is intended as a mental construct that categorizes thought and helps capture the "infinite manifoldness of reality." More precisely, the ideal type is the conceptual construction of elements of reality into a logically precise combination that represents historical phenomena but that may never be found in its ideally pure form in concrete reality. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| It is important to understand what Weber's ideal type is not. The ideal type is not a description of reality. Reality is too complex to be seized and held. It is not a hypothesis, though it can be used to generate hypotheses. Most emphatically, it is not a normative model. As Weber puts it, the ideal type "has no connection at all with value judgements and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one."20 The ideal type is, "the pure case, never actualized, uncluttered by extraneous attributes and ambiguities."
| | |
|
| Science, according to Weber, is the affair of an intellectual aristocracy and its quest the knowledge of the particular causes of social phenomena. It is not possible to analyze all social phenomena, however, Weber notes that a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive and that one can bring order to the confusion of reality only by concentrating on that part of reality that is interesting and significant in regard to cultural values. Accordingly, a cultural social science necessarily involves some subjective presuppositions in regard to significance.22 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| It is clear that Weber sees a crucial role for values in the development of a cultural social science. Value discussions are important in the elaboration of value axioms as one attempts to discover general, irreducible evaluations. Value discussions are important in deducing the implications of value axioms. Value discussions are important in the determination of the factual consequences of alternative courses of action insofar as necessary means or unavoidable consequences are involved. Value discussions are important in providing empirical research with problems for investigation, particularly in Weber's cultural social science. Moreover, science itself is not free from suppositions of its own that may mask value orientations.23 Science supposes both that
| the rules of logic and method are valid and that the knowledge yielded is worth knowing. These suppositions are based on faith, not proof. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Nonetheless, Weber argues strongly that science must eschew value judgments and seek ''ethical neutrality." By value judgments, Weber means practical evaluations of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of the phenomena under consideration. 24 Weber asserts that there is no way to resolve conflicts about value judgments except by acceptance of a transcendental order of values such as those prescribed by ecclesiastical dogmas. Such an acceptance, he contends, is more an intellectual sacrifice than an assertion of science. Weber asserts that science cannot tell us what we shall do, it cannot tell us how we shall live, it cannot tell us whether the world has meaning or whether it makes sense to live in such a world.25 These matters, however important, are simply beyond the legitimate purview of science. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In particular, Weber condemns those who "feel themselves competent to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate questions 'in the name of science' in governmentally privileged lecture halls in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion, nor subject to contradiction."26 Weber argues that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relationships, or to reveal the internal structure of cultural values. It is another to take a stand on the value of culture itself. The task of the teacher is to serve students with knowledge and scientific experiment, not to imprint values or personal political views. The teacher in the lecture hall should simply fulfill a given task in a workmanlike fashion, recognize facts and distinguish them from personal evaluations, and repress the impulse to exhibit personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. Weber contends that those who seek something more than analysis and statements of fact in the classroom crave a leader, not a teacher.27 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Processes of Rationalization | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In moving from the method of sociology to its substance, Weber focuses on the concept of rationalization, which he considers to be the most general element in the philosophy of history and the constitutive element of modern Western society.28 Weber contends that it is only in the contemporary West that science exists at a stage recognized as valid, that law is characterized by the strictly systematic forms of thought essential to rational jurisprudence, and that the trained official has become the pillar of both the modern state and economic life. Weber measures the degree of rationalization in society in two ways. Positively, rationalization is measured by the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence and consistency. Negatively, it is mea- | |
|
|
|
| sured by the displacement of magical elements of thought. A second and related emphasis in Weber's analysis is the concept of domination. Weber maintains that the emergence of rational societies is critically dependent on the way in which domination has been exercised. Domination, for Weber, is a subset of the broader phenomenon of power. Weber defines power as the possibility of imposing one's will on the behavior of other persons despite their resistance. 29 Domination is distinguished from other exercises of power on the basis of the perceived legitimacy of its exercise; that is, for domination, it is believed that the ruler has the right to exercise power and the ruled have a duty to obey.30 Weber describes two forms of domination: domination based on constellations of interests and domination based on authority.31Domination based on constellations of interests is found in religious and economic associations, whereas domination based on authority is found in legal and bureaucratic relationships. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Domination Based on Constellations of Interests | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The first form of domination based on constellations of interests is religion. Weber's sociology of religion contains three major themes: an explanation of the distinguishing features of Western civilization; an analysis of the relationship between social stratification and religious ideas; and an examination of the effects of religious ideas on economic activities. Underlying all of this is Weber's central theme of the rationalization of the processes of domination, which, for religion, comes in a movement from magicians to priests who attempt to protect their positions by systematizing established beliefs. Weber identifies domination within each religion with a particular status group of religious leaders. For Confucianism, that status group is governmental officials with a literary education; for Hinduism, it is a hereditary caste of expert advisers (Brahmins); for Judaism, it is intellectuals trained in ritual and literature; and for Christianity, it is the urban bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Weber did not argue that religion is simply a function of the ideal, material, or political interests of a particular status group. Instead, the church stands for a universalism of grace and for the ethical sufficiency of all who are enrolled under its institutional authority. Moreover, as is the case with all bureaucracies, there is a democratic tendency in religions as they become bureaucratized that fights against status privileges, an argument to which I return in discussing bureaucratic organizations.32 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's analysis of Christianity focuses primarily on the Protestant sects and their relationship to capitalism. His interest in the development of capitalism is derived both from his perception that capital- | |
|
| sm has been a pervasive and unifying theme in modern history and from a desire to respond to Marx's concept of historical materialism. Weber's examination of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, and his assertion that causality flows in that direction, is an excellent example of both Weber's emphasis on ideas, as opposed to material interests, and his historical, comparative approach to causal analysis. Weber did not posit a simple cause-effect relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, however, nor did he consider the Protestant ethic to be the sole cause of capitalism. Weber emphasizes that social dynamics require a pluralistic analysis and that capitalism should be seen as the result of a specific combination of political, economic, and religious factors, not just the religious factor. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In discussing the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, Weber employs a rather special perspective on modern capitalism. Modern capitalism, according to Weber, presupposes the existence of a number of conditions: that there is private ownership of the means of production; that formally free labor exists; that a limited government allows the market to operate relatively freely; and that a system of finances exists, particularly a money economy. 33 Modern capitalism is characterized by the following attributes: | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 1. The calculation of capital is made in terms of money. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 2. Everything is done in terms of balances. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 3. Calculation underlies every act of partners to a transaction. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 4. Economic action is adapted to a comparison of money income with money expenses.34 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber believes that capitalism represents the highest stage of rationality in economic behavior. By "rational," Weber means an economic system based, not on custom or tradition, but on a systematic and deliberate adjustment of economic means to attain pecuniary profit.35 The rationality of modern capitalism is of a special type, however. The rationality of capitalism is "formal" and is measured by the extent to which quantitative calculation is both technically possible and actually applied. In contrast, "substantive" economic rationality involves the adequacy of the provision of goods and services.36 Weber asserts that the two concepts of economic rationality are always in conflict and that the formal rationality of money accounting and capitalism has no direct relationship to substantive considerations concerning the provision and distribution of goods and services. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| A primary question for Weber, and one that joins his interests in religion and economics, is the source of the particular ethic of modern capitalism. His answer is Protestantism. Weber maintains that the Reformation did not mean the elimination of the church's control over
| everyday life. Instead, it meant a new form of control in which a religiously based secular ethic and a worldly asceticism replaced the other-worldly asceticism of Catholicism and the indifference it had toward the rewards of this life. 37 Protestantism gave positive spiritual and moral meaning to worldly activities and imparted an ethos of planning and self-control to economic activity. The Protestant sects joined the idea that the gods bless with riches those who please them with a kind of religious conduct embodying the notion that honesty is the best policy. It thus delivered to capitalism its special ethos: the ethos of the modern bourgeois middle classes.38 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism is most clearly illustrated in the doctrines of Calvinism and its emphasis on predestination. The doctrine of predestination holds that only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace and that the meaning of individual destiny is hidden in impenetrable mystery. Furthermore, the elect do not differ visibly from the damned. Thus one cannot know his destiny. He must simply consider himself to be chosen and combat all doubts as temptations of the devil. The Calvinist creates his own salvation, or at least the conviction of his salvation, by the performance of deeds and in the service of a "calling." This requires systematic and continuous self-control in the performance of each deed rather than an accumulation of deeds as the Catholic church had asserted.39 In its emphasis on deeds, Calvinism rejected pure feelings and emotions and eliminated the idea that salvation could be granted by the church. Weber contends that whereas Catholics saw magic as the means to salvation with the priest as the magician, Calvinists demanded a life of good works with no place for the Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, and release, followed by new sin. Calvinism sought to subject man to the dictates of a supreme will and to bring man's actions under constant self-control guided by ethical standards.40 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Calvinism also sought to destroy spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment by insisting on ordered individual conduct and by transforming monastic asceticism into a worldly asceticism while adding the positive idea of proving oneself in worldly activity.41 Protestant asceticism holds that it is morally objectionable to relax in the enjoyment of one's possessions. The individual needs hard, continuous bodily or mental labor. The acquisition of wealth in the performance of one's calling is encouraged, but consumption should be limited. The combined effect of limiting consumption and freeing acquisitive activity is a compulsion to save and accumulate capital. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber concludes that the religious roots of modern capitalism soon gave way to the tenets of worldly utilitarianism, which has resulted in an orgy of materialism. But the religious epoch gave to its | |
|
| utilitarian successor an amazingly good conscience about the acquisition of wealth and comforting assurance about the unequal distribution of worldly goods. 42 It also legitimated the exploitation of labor since the employer's activity is also a "calling." But whereas the Puritan wanted to work because it was his "calling," modern man is forced to work in the "iron cage" of the new economic order, and the pursuit of material goods controls his life.43 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Domination Based on Authority | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's second major type of domination is domination based on authority. Obedience in systems of domination based on authority, as was the case with domination based on constellations of interests, is dependent on the perception of legitimacy. The sources of legitimacy differ, however. Weber asserts that there are three sources of legitimacy for domination based on authority: charisma, tradition, and legality/rationality. These are pure, or "ideal," types, and the bases of legitimacy usually occur in mixtures in their historical manifestations. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Charismatic authority derives its legitimacy from the personal qualities of the leader. Weber defines charisma as the "quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."44 Accordingly, charismatic authority is a form of rule over people to which they submit because of their belief in the magical powers, revelations, or heroism of the leader.45 Weber states that the pure type of charismatic authority appears only briefly in contrast to the relatively more enduring structures of traditional and legal-rational authority. Charismatic authority is a force for revolutionary change and is irrational in the sense that it is not bound by any intellectually analyzable rule. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The leader in charismatic authority is constrained only by his personal judgment, and he is not governed by any formal method of adjudication.46 Disputes are settled by prophetic revelation or Solomonic arbitration. The relationship between the leader and the led under charismatic authority is typically unstable. Although the authority of the leader is not derived directly from the will of his followers (obedience, instead, is a duty or obligation), the charismatic leader still must constantly prove himself through victories and successes, since charisma disappears if proof is lacking. In sum, the charismatic leader knows only inner determination and inner restraint. He "seizes the
| task that is adequate for him and demands obedience . . . by virtue of his mission." 47 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Administration under charismatic authority, according to Weber, is loose and unstable. The leader's disciples do not have regular occupations, and they reject the methodical and rational pursuit of monetary rewards as undignified. Whatever organization exists is composed of an aristocracy chosen on the basis of charismatic qualities. There is no procedure for appointment, promotion, or dismissal, and there are no career tracks. There is no continuing hierarchical assignment of tasks, since the leader can intervene at will in the performance of any task. Perhaps most important, there are no defined spheres of authority or competence to protect against arbitrary exercises of power and no system of formal rules to ensure equal treatment and due process.48 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Like charismatic authority, traditional authority involves personal rule, but unlike charismatic authority, it is not the product of crisis and enthusiasm. Rulers enjoy personal authority and followers are subjects, but the routine governs conduct. Traditional authority is based on respect for the eternal past, in the rightness and appropriateness of the traditional or customary way of doing things. It rests on piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed.49 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber argues that administration under traditional authority tends to be irrational because the development of rational regulations is impeded; there is likely to be no staff with formal, technical training; and there is wide scope for the indulgence of personal whims. A person, not an order, is obeyed as the leader claims the performance of unspecified obligations and services as his personal right. Traditional authority is a regime of favorites with a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted by a leader through arbitrary decisions.50 Justice under traditional authority is a mixture of constraints and personal discretion. There is a system of traditional norms that are considered inviolable, but there is also a realm of arbitrariness and dependence on the favor of the ruler, who judges on the basis of personal relationships.51 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In legal-rational authority, legitimacy is based on a belief in reason, and laws are obeyed because they have been enacted by proper procedures. Thus, it is believed that persons exercising authority are acting in accordance with their duties as established by a code of rules and regulations. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In administration, the legitimacy of legal-rational authority rests on rules that are rationally established. Submission to authority is | |
|
|
|
| based on an impersonal bond to a generally defined "duty of office," and official duty is fixed by rationally established norms. 52 Obedience constitutes deference to an impersonal order, not an individual, and even giving a command represents obedience to an organizational norm rather than the arbitrary act of the person giving the order. Thus, the official does not exercise power in his own right; he is only a "trustee" of an impersonal, compulsory institution. The organization of the administrative staff under legal-rational authority is bureaucratic in form. The system of justice under legal-rational authority is a balance between formal or procedural justice and substantive justice, but with relative emphasis on the formal aspects of justice. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In outlining the bases of legitimacy, Weber purposely eschews the notion of an evolutionary, linear progress from one form to another. Instead, Weber sees a general trend toward rationalization, which is punctuated by spontaneous and creative bursts of charisma. The victory of charisma over the rational and the routine is never complete, however, and in the end charisma itself is routinized.53 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The basic problem of charismatic leadership is one of succession: What occurs when something happens to the charismatic leader? In coping with the problem of succession, the charismatic situation starts to yield to a "routinization of charisma."54 Weber states that when the personal authority of the charismatic leader is displaced by mechanisms or rules for formally ascertaining the "divine will," a routinization of charisma has taken place.55 In regard to succession, as established procedures used to select a successor come to govern the process, the forces of tradition and rationalization begin to take effect, and charisma is disassociated from a person and embedded in an objective institutional structure. In the process, an unstable structure of authority is transformed into the more permanent traditional or legal-rational structures of authority. With routinization, discipline in the form of consistently rationalized, trained, and exact execution of received orders replaces individual action. With the development of legal-rational authority, either through the routinization of charisma or the breakdown of the privileges of traditional authority, there is a certain "leveling" influence with the recognition of authority treated as a sourceof legitimacy rather than as a consequence of authority. Thus, legitimacy in legal-rational authority takes on some democratic overtones.56 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The two major forms of domination based on authority discussed by Weber are the legal structure and bureaucratic administration. Weber asserts that law grows out of the "usages" and "conventions" found in all societies.57 Law is distinguished from mere usage and convention, however, by the presence of a staff, which may use coercive power for its enforcement. Weber notes that not all legal orders
| are considered authoritative. Legal authority exists only when the legal order is implemented and obeyed in the belief that it is legitimate. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber says that there are two kinds of rationality associated with the creation of legal norms: substantive and formal. An act is substantively rational if it is guided by principles such as those embodied in religious or ethical thought. An act is formally rational when it is based on general rules. Conversely, an act is formally irrational if guided by means beyond the control of reason (e.g., prophetic revelation or ordeal) and substantively irrational if based on emotional evaluations of single cases. 58 Weber traces a developmental sequence in the rationalization of the law that begins with primitive procedures relying on a combination of magically conditioned formalism and revelation. Next comes a theocratic or patrimonial form of legal system. From this there emerges an increasingly specialized and logically systematized body of law.59 Although economic interests play a limited role in the systematization and rationalization of law, there is at least a parallel between economic systems and legal structures. Modern capitalism is the prototype of purposively rational behavior, and the formal rationality of legal thought is the counterpart of purposive rationality in economic conduct. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Legal Domination and the State | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The concepts of legal domination and state are not coextensive for Weber. Law, according to Weber, is not exclusively a political phenomenon. It exists wherever coercive means are available. Conversely, the state has at its disposal means of greater effectiveness than coercive ones. Nonetheless, Weber defines the state in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, that is, the use of violent force. The state is a relationship of people dominating people supported by means of the legitimate use of violence. It is a compulsory organization that structures domination and, in the modern state, concentrates the means of administration in the hands of the leaders.60 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| According to Weber, the state was originally created to protect interests, particularly economic interests, and arose from the struggle between the estates and the princebetween the holders of privilege and the holders of power. This resulted in an alliance between the monarchy and bourgeois interests that wanted to be free of administrative arbitrariness and the irrational disturbances of the privileged and that wanted to affirm the legally binding character of contracts. This process eventuated in a legitimate legal order in the form of the modern state.61 The modern state is characterized by a body of law, bureaucracy, compulsory jurisdiction over territory, and a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Government administration in the modern state is bound by rules of law and is conducted in accord with generally formulated principles. The people who occupy positions of power are not rulers, they are superiors, and they hold office temporarily and
| not rulers, they are superiors, and they hold office temporarily and possess limited authority. The people, on their part, are citizens, not subjects. 62 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The rise of the modern state, based on systematized and rationalized law and administration, has produced a conflict between the formal justice embodied in that state and substantive justice. The difference is that whereas formal justice derives its premises from formal concepts, substantive justice derives its premises from the experience of life.63 In traditional society, Weber says, judicial administration aims at substantive justice and sweeps away formal rules of evidence. This may be rational in the sense of adherence to some general, fixed principles, but, Weber argues, not in the sense of logical rationality. Decisions in such a system may be based on considerations of equity, but they may equally well be made on the basis of expediency or politics.64 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The second major form of domination based on authority is bureaucracy. In addressing the topic of bureaucracy and its role in society, Weber makes one of his most influential contributions. Weber did not invent the term bureaucracy nor was he the first to examine its role in society. Nevertheless, Weber has given us one of the most famous statements on the characteristics of bureaucratic organizations and surely one of the most penetrating and controversial analyses of the bureaucratic phenomenon. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's analysis of bureaucracy is logically tied to his interest in legal-rational domination in the modern state. In fact, Weber considered bureaucracy to be a major element in the rationalization of the modern world and the most important of all social processes.65 Weber asserts that domination both expresses itself and functions through administration. Organized domination calls for continuous administration and the control of a personal executive staff and the material implements of administration. Legal domination calls for an increasingly bureaucratic administration in which domination is based on systematic knowledge. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber defines an organization as an ordering of social relationships, the maintenance of which certain individuals take as their special task. The organization consists of members accustomed to obedience; an administrative staff that holds itself at the disposal of the masters; and the masters themselves, who hold a power to command not derived from a grant of power by others.66 The orientation of human behavior to a set of rules is central to Weber's concept of the organization. Organizational rules regulate the possession and scope of authority in the organization.67 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber identifies bureaucracy as the dominant organizational form in a legal-rational society. The development of bureaucracy is a product | |
|
| of the intensive and qualitative (as opposed to extensive and quantitative) enlargement of administrative tasks. In other words, complexity breeds bureaucracy. Uncharacteristically, Weber never defines "bureaucracy." He does indicate that "bureaucracy" refers to the exercise of control by means of a particular kind of administrative staff, and he specifies the features of the most rational form of bureaucracy, which he calls the "ideal type" bureaucracy. Those characteristics are as follows: | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 1. Administration is carried out on a continuous basis, not simply at the pleasure of the leader. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 2. Tasks in the bureaucratic organization are divided into functionally distinct areas each with the requisite authority and sanctions. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 3. Offices are arranged in the form of a hierarchy. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 4. The resources of the bureaucratic organization are distinct from those of the members as private individuals (i.e., administrators do not own the means of administration). This characteristic derives from Weber's concept of office in which the official role entails specific duties to be performed, but the resources to fulfill those duties are provided by someone other than the official. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 5. The officeholder cannot appropriate the office (i.e., the office cannot be sold by the official or passed on by heredity). | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 6. Administration is based on written documents. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 7. Control in the bureaucratic organization is based on impersonally applied rational rules. Thus it is not simply the existence of rules but the quality and mode of application of those rules that distinguishes the bureaucratic organization. 68 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber also outlines the terms of employment in the bureaucratic organization: | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 1. Officials are personally free and are appointed on the basis of a contract. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 2. Officials are appointed, not elected. Weber argues that election modifies the strictness of hierarchical subordination. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 3. Officials are appointed on the basis of professional qualifications. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 4. Officials have a fixed money salary and pension rights. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 5. The official's post is his sole or major occupation. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 6. A career structure exists with promotion based on merit (though pressure to recognize seniority may also exist). | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 7. The official is subject to a unified control and disciplinary system in which the means of compulsion and its exercise are clearly defined.69 | |
|
| Weber states that the bureaucratic mechanisms described above exist only in the modern state and the most advanced institutions of capitalism. The ideal-type bureaucracy possesses rationally discussable grounds for every administrative act, it centralizes and concentrates the means of administration, it has a ''leveling" effect in that it does away with plutocratic privilege and rests on equality in the eyes of the law and equal eligibility for office, and it creates permanent authority relationships. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber clearly believes bureaucracy to be the most rational and efficient organizational form devised by man. Bureaucracy is rational in that it involves control based on knowledge, it has clearly defined spheres of competence, it operates according to intellectually analyzable rules, and it has calculability in its operations. 70 Bureaucracy is efficient because of its precision, speed, consistency, availability of records, continuity, possibility of secrecy, unity, rigorous coordination, and minimization of interpersonal friction, personnel costs, and material costs.71 In Weber's words, | |
|
|
 | | |
|
| Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organizationthat is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracyis, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. . . . It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.72 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Note that Weber does not argue that bureaucracy is the most efficient of all conceivable forms of organization, merely more efficient than the known alternative forms of administration. The alternatives, according to Weber, are collegial and avocational administration. He contends that these alternatives are inadequate beyond a certain size limit or where functions require technical training or continuity of policy.73 Weber is particularly determined in his opposition to democratic administration, a form of collegial administration. Weber contends that even simple forms of democratic administration are unstable and likely to fall into the hands of the wealthy, since those who work do not have time to govern. Moreover, as soon as mass administration is involved, democratic administration falls prey to the technical superiority of those with training and experience and thus to domination by technical experts.74 Weber also has substantial reservation about the broader form of collegial administration. Collegiality, he argues, almost inevitably
| involves obstacles to precise, clear, rapid decisions and divides personal responsibility. Collegial administration impairs promptness of decision, consistency of policy, the responsibility of the individual, the requisite ruthlessness toward outsiders, and the maintenance of discipline within the group. Weber asserts that it is impossible for either the internal or the foreign policy of great states to be carried out on a collegial basis. And, as is the case with democratic administration, collegial administration will eventually give way to the technical superiority of the hierarchical organization. 75 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber considers bureaucracy and capitalism to be mutually supportive social structures. The capitalist market demands what bureaucracy providesofficial business discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, with as much speed as possible, and according to calculable rules that make bureaucratic behavior predictable.76 Moreover, capitalism and bureaucracy share an emphasis on formalistic impersonality in their relationships. In the market, acts of exchange are oriented toward the commodity, and those acts, Weber asserts, are the most impersonal relationship into which humans can enter. Market ethics require only that partners to a transaction behave legally and honor the inviolability of a promise once given. The private enterprise system transforms even personal relationships in the organization into objects of the labor market and drains them of all normal sentiment.77 The bureaucratic organization, on its part, also offers the elements of calculability and depersonalization. Bureaucratic organizations operate sine ira ac studio (without bias or favor) and thereby exclude irrational feelings and sentiments in favor of the detached, professional expert.78 By eliminating incalculable emotional elements, bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by the apparatus of modern culture in general and modern capitalism in particular. The demand for legal equality and guarantees against arbitrariness requires formal, rational objectivity in administration, not the personal choice of traditional authority nor the emotional demands for substantive justice in a democracy.79 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Although Weber admires the rationality and efficiency of bureaucratic organizations, and respects the concept of justice embodied therein, he also associates bureaucracy with an oppressive routine adverse to personal freedom.80 Weber observes that bureaucracy has penetrated all social institutions, public and private, and that bureaucracy limits individual freedom, renders the individual incapable of understanding his own activities in relation to the organization as a whole, and favors the "crippled personality" of the specialist.81 Thus, though bureaucracy extends human capacities, it also increases the forces to which man is subject and may not even be just, since the propertyless masses may not be well served by a doctrine of formal equality before the law.82 Unfortunately, Weber sees only reversion to | |
|
| small-scale organizations as a means of avoiding the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucratic organizations, and that would deprive society of bureaucracy's benefits. 83 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's Political Perspectives | |
|
|
| | |
|
| When one moves from Weber's sociological analysis to his political writings, some shifts in emphasis, if not changes in direction, are encountered. Weber's political writings place more emphasis on class conflict, less on ideal interests, and capitalism is treated as an independent phenomenon, not just part of the processes of rationalization. Also, whereas Weber's sociology focuses on the achievements of bureaucracy, his political writings stress the limitations of bureaucracy and the likely future struggle between political leadership and bureaucracy. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Democracy and the Nation-State | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The "state," according to Weber, represents the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory and is an "ultimate" in that it cannot be integrated into a more comprehensive whole.84 The "nation," however, is more than coercive control over a territory; it is also a community of sentiment. A nation exists where there is some common factor among people, where this common factor is regarded as a source of value and produces a feeling of solidarity, and where the feeling of solidarity finds expression in autonomous political institutions or at least creates a demand for such institutions.85 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Culture is a complex of characteristics or values that constitutes the individuality of a particular national community. Weber asserts that there are reciprocally interdependent relationships between the state and its culture. The state can survive only if it can harness the solidary feelings of national community and culture in support of its power. Conversely, the national community preserves its distinctive identity by the protection it receives from the state. Weber adheres to the position that nations and the cultures they incorporate should be preserved. Weber contends that the state should serve national and cultural values and that politics is the appropriate sphere for the pursuit of these nonmaterial values.86 The ultimate value, Weber contends, is the power position of the nation in the world, with struggle and conflict being permanent features of social life. Even more, Weber believes that conflict should be encouraged because the highest qualities of life (i.e., qualities of independence engendered by struggles with the difficulties of life) can be developed only through conflict.87 This extends even to the ultimate conflict, war, which, Weber contends,
| creates a sentiment of community and gives a consecrated meaning to death. Only in war can the individual believe that he is dying for something. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber supports democracy as a means of providing leadership for national ends, but it is a "democracy" of a special type, and even then his support is at best reluctant. Weber warns against viewing democracy as a panacea for society's ills. He argues that democracy is inevitably governed by the "law of the small number" (i.e., that politics is controlled from the top by a small number of people). Democracy changes the rules for the selection of a leader, but leaders are still selected. 88 Instead, Weber defends democracy as a postulate of practical reason. It is to be preferred simply because it is the only reasonable alternative to authoritarianism. Democracy permits mass involvement, but on an orderly and regular basis, and it is consistent with the requirements of modern institutions and their demands for equality of status.89 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Nevertheless, Weber believes democracy to be distinguished not by direct mass involvement but by the use of demagogy, the regular use of the vote in choosing leaders, and organization by mass political parties. The influence of a democratic elite is viewed by Weber as not only inevitable but desirable. Weber warns against the evils of "leaderless" democracy in which professional politicians who have no "calling" rule. Weber argues that democracy requires leadership. In his words, | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen leader says, "Now shut up and obey me." People and party are no longer free to interfere in his business. . . . Later the people can sit in judgment. If the leader has made a mistaketo the gallows with him!90 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Political leadership is required to ensure the supremacy of the political over the bureaucratic. It is also required to ensure the supremacy of the political over the economic by focusing on social unity in the face of the divisiveness of class and material interests.91 Although Weber warned against leaderless democracy, he was also aware that democracy could lead to "Plebiscitary Caesarism" in the form of an individual carried to absolute power by the emotionalized masses92 What is needed is not just leadership but charismatic leadership. This requires more than popularity and it is different from caesaristic rule. The charismatic leader is one who is truly destined to rule and is suited for his tasks by supernatural gifts.93 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The importance of leadership to Weber is reflected in his discussion of the role and functions of the politician. The objective of politics, Weber tells us, is to share power or to influence the distribution of | |
|
| power, and politics itself is any kind of independent leadership in political associations. 94 Consequently, the politician must have a capacity for independent action, he should not sacrifice his personal judgment for official duties (i.e., he should be willing to resign if that is necessary for him to live up to the responsibilities of leadership), and he must have skill in the struggle for power.95 The politician should combine passion and a feeling of responsibility with a sense of proportionpassion in devotion to a cause and a sense of proportion developed by establishing some distance between himself and others.96 He must fight vanity and avoid seeking power for power's sake. These attributes, Weber suggests, are most likely to be found among those whose economic position is sufficiently secure that they can "live for" politics, not have to "live off" it.97 According to Weber, the prototypical modern politician is the lawyer who is both available for service and has the skills required for effective participation in the struggle for power.98 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The functions of the politician are to give direction to policy in a continuing struggle with bureaucratic and party officials and to counter the influence of class conflict and material interests by giving expression to a common interest underlying superficial perceptions of class interests. In regard to the latter function, Weber differs from Marx in believing that divisions of class can be overcome within the capitalist system and that workers and entrepreneurs have a common interest in the rationalization of industry. Nevertheless, he also recognizes that capitalism has led to the pursuit of material interests (a "dance around the golden calf"), it has replaced personal relationships with impersonality, and it has led to conflict between those with property and the propertyless.99 This has resulted in a degeneration of the national political outlook and the subordination of the true function of politics to sectional and class interests. Weber argues that politics should be neither merely the pursuit of power nor simply an extension of economic activity in the form of class or interest-group activity. Instead, political leadership should draw people to an awareness of common interests, including a common interest in the perpetuation of capitalism. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber further contends that the honor of the political leader lies in his exclusive personal responsibility for what he does. Unfortunately, the ethical bases for the assumption of personal responsibility are ambiguous. Weber distinguishes between two kinds of ethics: the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility. Under the ethic of ultimate ends, one feels responsible only for seeing that the "flame of pure intention" is not quenched and action is taken regardless of the consequences. Under the ethic of responsibility, one is held accountable for the foreseeable results of his actions.100 The ambiguity stems from two sources. First, Weber argues, no ethic can tell us to what extent an ethically good purpose justifies an ethically dubious means. Second,
| one must face the reality that some of the tasks of politics can be performed only by use of violence, an ethically dubious means. The ambiguity poses a paradox. On the one hand, everything that is striven for through political action employing violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the salvation of the soul. On the other hand, if one pursues a goal following a pure ethic of ultimate ends, then the goals themselves may be discredited because responsibility for consequences is lacking. Weber admits that he cannot prescribe whether one should follow an ethic of ultimate ends or an ethic of responsibility, or when one should be followed and when the other. He does assert that only when the two supplement each other does one have a "calling" for politics. 101 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber's emphasis on political leadership was prompted, in large part, by his aversion to bureaucratic domination. Weber considered the ideologies of his day (primarily capitalism and socialism) to be of small consequence compared to what he perceived to be the nearly inexorable process of bureaucratization. Weber argues that bureaucrats will develop interests of their own and start to shape policy with the attendant danger that the rule of law will be undermined in the absence of effective political leadership.102 Weber asserts that the official, according to his proper vocation, should not engage in politics. He should engage only in the impartial administration of his office.103 The honor of the civil servant, Weber says, is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the orders of superior authorities, "exactly as if the order agreed with his own convictions."104 If the administrator receives orders with which he disagrees, he should make his views known to his superior; but if the superior insists, the administrator must comply to the best of his ability. In short, a sense of duty should be placed above personal opinion. This should be part of the administrator's ethic and is required for the rule of law. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The problem arises when the bureaucracy attempts to overstep its rightful functions and capabilities. Weber believes bureaucrats to be, along with feudal lords, the primary exponents of power and prestige for their own political structure.105 The aggrandizement of bureaucracy can subvert the rule of law, since the bureaucracy, which cannot be inspected and controlled, becomes a law unto itself. Moreover, Weber contends that the permanent official is more likely to get his way than is his nominal superior, who is not likely to be a specialist and thus be at the mercy of his expert subordinate. Knowledge becomes an instrument of political power, and secrecy protects the bureaucrat's monopoly on information. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber considers the bureaucratic machine to be one of the hardest of social structures to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means for achieving rationally ordered societal action. Nevertheless, the bureaucrat is also
| part of a community of functionaries who have an interest in seeing that the bureaucratic mechanism continues to function. These officials may develop into a status group whose cohesion stems, not from economic interests, but from the prestige of a style of life that fosters the values of status, security, and order. 106 Even more, bureaucrats may become a privileged class and use their positions for personal advantage. As a power group, bureaucrats may develop a code of honor that includes not only a sense of duty but also a belief in the superiority of their own qualifications.107 Once in power, the bureaucracy is difficult to dislodge because few among the governed can master the tasks performed by the bureaucracy. Democracy requires the prevention of a closed status group of officials from taking power and the minimization of the authority of officialdom. But the "leveling" consequences of democracy may occur only in regard to the governed rather than their bureaucratic masters, in a process to which Weber refers as "passive democratization."108 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The central political question for Weber is how to prevent bureaucracy from exceeding its functions or, stated conversely, how to maintain the supremacy of the politician. That is no simple matter. Collegial administration is slow and obscures responsibility; a structural separation of powers is inherently unstable, and one power is likely to become dominant; amateur administration does not provide the requisite expertise; direct democracy is possible only in small groups and also does not provide expertise; representative democracy must rely on political parties, which themselves are bureaucratized. Bureaucracy, Weber maintains, can be controlled only from the top. Charismatic leadership may be the solution, if there is one. It is, at least, the best hope. Politicians are the indispensable counterweight to bureaucracy, and both parliamentary and plebiscitary bases of leadership are necessary to prevent rule by a clique of political notables and governmental officials who will control the rule of law rather than be subject to it.109 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Nor is the economic sphere immune from possible bureaucratic domination. This, Weber argues, is as likely to be the result of the quest for the bureaucratic values of order and security as it is the result of a power drive by bureaucratic officials.110 Weber sees the bureaucratic threat in the economic sphere as emanating from two sources: from socialism, which seeks to replace capitalism with a bureaucratic order; and from the possibility that the bourgeoisie itself will go "soft" and precipitate a decline in capitalist values. Weber argues that socialism will make autonomous economic action subject to the bureaucratic management of the state. Economic transactions accomplished by political manipulation will replace the rationality and individualism of a capitalist economy. Weber believes that a system of bureaucratic rule is inevitable, but socialism will accelerate the process of bureaucratiza-
| tion and thus lead to serfdom. 111 Capitalism also faces dangers from within. Ironically, capitalism is itself a prime reason for the bureaucratization that threatens to stifle individualism. In addition, capitalism has encouraged the pursuit of material goods and the desire for a secure subsistence. This, Weber contends, will result in a "vast army of state pensioners and an array of monopolistic privileges," and the demise of the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism.112 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Despite an undeniably pessimistic strain, Weber avoids schemes involving inevitable social development or unavoidable historical cycles. There is the notion of a recurrent struggle between routinization and charisma. When the world becomes overly bureaucratized, the prophets and the Caesars return. The future is thus a field of strategy, not a repetition of, or unfolding of, the past. Social life is "polytheism of values" among which choices are possible, and charisma, says Weber, is the metaphysical vehicle of human freedom.113 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The main points of Weber's substantive sociology may be summarized as follows: | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 1. A fundamental dynamic of civilization has been the process of rationalization. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 2. The process of rationalization is reflected in various forms of domination or exercises of power perceived to be legitimate. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 3. The two basic types of domination are domination based on constellations of interests and domination based on authority. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 4. Domination based on constellations of interests is manifested in religious and economic associations. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 5. Domination based on authority is manifested in the operations of the state and bureaucratic organizations. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 6. The legitimacy of domination based on authority is derived from three sources: charisma, tradition, and legality/rationality. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 7. There has been a general historical trend toward increasing rationality in social relationships, but that trend has not been unilinear. Instead, the advance of rationalization has been punctuated by outbursts of charisma and reversions to tradition. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 8. Bureaucracy is the dominant organizational form in a legal-rational society and it derives its characteristicspredictability, calculability, and impersonalityas well as its sense of justice from the society in which it resides. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| 9. Whereas the past has been marked by a struggle between charisma and the forces of depersonalization, the future will see a struggle | |
|
| over who will enact the rules in a legal-rational society, a struggle that will pit the political leader against the professional bureaucrat. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Although Weber is held in an esteem that approaches reverence, he has not been without his critics. Indeed, scarcely a facet of Weber's work has not been the subject of careful scrutiny and, often, intense controversy. There is widespread agreement on one criticism. Weber's writing style is, at best, difficult, and the striking difference between the clarity of Weber's spoken word and the opaqueness of his written word is often noted. 114 Weber both defended and explained his sometimes tortured constructions by stating, "Personally I am of the opinion that nothing is too pedantic if it is useful in avoiding confusions."115 It is not clear that Weber avoided confusion, but his writing certainly qualifies as oftentimes pedantic. Another general criticism of Weber's work is his tendency to rely more on assertion than demonstration or proof. This is probably inevitable given the compass of Weber's interests and the sweep of his ideas. Nonetheless, his dismissal of important ideas is, at times, almost casual. For instance, Weber simply rules out some forms of democracy as being "impractical," and popular sovereignty is peremptorily reduced to the status of "popular fiction."116 | |
|
|
| | |
|
| But the bulk of the criticisms have focused on Weber's methodology, his historical analysis, and his analysis of bureaucracy. The critique of Weber's methodology centers on his use of the "ideal type" construct. The ideal type is intended to combine attributes in a logically consistent manner. It is to be based on, but not confined to, historical manifestations that approximate the ideal type. There are several problems with Weber's use of the ideal-type construct. One is that the construct can be used in a self-serving manner. Consider, for instance, Weber's treatment of the concept of capitalism.117 He defines a particular form of capitalism (an ideal type, if you will) that has as its essence a "spirit" that emphasizes honest accumulation as a "calling." Moreover, he traces the causal roots of this brand of capitalism to ascetic Protestantism. Note that this form of capitalism need never have actually appeared in its "pure'' condition in history, which means that an empirical test of the causal relationship is at least inappropriate and perhaps impossible. Note too that Weber is dealing with a narrowly defined economic phenomenon whose relationship to ascetic Protestantism may be more definitional than causal and which excludes other forms of economic activity generally considered to be "capitalistic." Mouzelis takes the critique of Weber's ideal type a step further in arguing that Weber's use of the construct does not always conform to Weber's self-imposed requirement of internal logical consistency. In particular, Mouzelis contends that Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy is not necessarily rational and efficient, and, consequently, Weber's
| posited combination of bureaucratic characteristics may not be "objectively possible." 118 Finally, it is argued that the use of ideal types alone does not accomplish Weber's theory-building objectives. To constitute a theory, it is held, the types should be "arranged and classified in a definite order of relationship."119 This Weber failed to do. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber has also been criticized in regard to his historical analysis. Most of this criticism has been directed at Weber's analysis of the causes of capitalism. Although Weber acknowledges the likelihood of causal pluralism, his own analysis is largely confined to the influence of religious ideas on economic activity. Moreover, while Weber sought to demonstrate that ideas preceded interests in the development of capitalism, he does not demonstrate that both Calvinism and capitalism were not the product of prior material interests.120 Finally, it is argued that Weber failed to deal with the processes by which the religious ideas of a dominant status group actually became an everyday standard of behavior for the common man.121 This omission leaves open the possibility that forces other than religious ideas may have been instrumental in giving rise to capitalism, and even its particular "spirit." | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Yet all of these criticisms pale in comparison to the reaction to Weber's formulation of the concept of bureaucracy.122 It has been argued that bureaucracy is not necessarily rational, it may not be efficient, that other forms of organization may well be more efficient, and that bureaucracy, by virtue of its structural and procedural complexity, may permit, if not encourage, evasions of individual responsibility. A particularly penetrating analysis is that of Robert Merton.123 Merton accepts Weber's construction of the bureaucratic phenomenon, abides by Weber's ground rules on the intent and use of the ideal type (i.e., it must stand only the test of internal logical consistency or objective possibility), and goes to the heart of the Weberian bureaucracy (i.e., the impersonal application of the rules) in formulating his critique. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| For Merton, the problem of bureaucracy comes in the form of a paradox. The paradox is that the very organizational features Weber thought to be associated with rationality and efficiency may instead be associated with irrationality and inefficiency. Merton cites as a case in point the consequences of the impersonal application of the rules in a bureaucratic organization. The impersonal application of the rules is intended to enhance organizational rationality and efficiency by encouraging a high degree of reliability and conformity in behavior in the organization. Problems arise, however, when these traits (reliability and conformity) become exaggerated. And, Merton argues, this is likely to be the case in bureaucratic organizations given a number of specified formal and informal dynamics. As rule enforcement assumes increasing significance, the organization develops what Merton refers to as a "punctilious adherence to formalized procedures," more commonly
| known as "red tape." Eventually, the enforcement of rules becomes an end in itself, and this results in a "displacement of goals" as an instrumental value (the enforcement of rules) is substituted for a terminal value (the accomplishment of organizational goals) as the purpose of organizational activity. Organizational rules become "sanctified" or imbued with a moral legitimacy of their own, and the organization develops rigor mortis and becomes unable to adapt to changing circumstances. In sum, Merton argues that bureaucracy contains "the seeds of its own destruction" in its emphasis on rules and the bureaucratic environment itself produces a mentality that encourages the enforcement of rules regardless of their consequences for the accomplishment of organizational objectives. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Weber is likely to remain a subject of both respect and controversy. On matters administrative, his particular genius was to place administration in a broad historical context and to associate the processes of bureaucratization with the processes of rationalization in the Western world. Moreover, Weber associated the mechanisms of bureaucracy with familiar concepts of justice, such as due process and equal application of the law, thus lending bureaucratic organization a significance that transcends even considerations of rationality and efficiency.
=======================================================================
Chapter 2
Frederick W. Taylor: The Man, the Method, the Movement | |
|
|
| | |
|
| The reason for doing so is that the definition of the field of public administration widely accepted in Taylor's day encouraged, indeed demanded, such an inclusion. That definition was founded on the premise that administration should be separated from political and policy concerns and that administrators should be limited to, in Woodrow Wilson's words, "the detailed and systematic execution of public law."
It was argued that by taking politics out of administration, a generic administrative functionnamely, the appropriate ordering of means to given endshad been identified. Accordingly, it was permissible to search for general administrative techniques in the private sector, and even in other constitutional systems, that could be used to enhance efficiency in the operation of American government.
With this charge, attention naturally turned to the techniques of Scientific Management, which were directly concerned with the question of efficiency and had achieved a large measure of public notoriety, if not always acclaim. Scientific Management attracted the enthusiastic support of many in government who believed that those techniques could be applied in the public sector. Taylor himself thought the techniques of Scientific Management to be applicable to the public sector, since, in his judgment, the average public employee did little more than one-third to one-half of a good day's work. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| Thus the reason for the inclusion of a review of Taylor's works in this volume is that Scientific Management was perceived as a way to achieve greater efficiency in the management of the public business. But this simply transforms an apparent anomaly into an irony. The irony is that a movement seen by most as a series of expedients to improve efficiency was seen by its originator as primarily a mechanism
for social reform.
Taylor saw Scientific Management as a "mental revolution" in which a "scientific" approach could be brought to bear not only on the performance of physical tasks but on all social problems. Only in the larger frame of social reform can one comprehend the evangelical zeal of the adherents of Scientific Management and the passion of the opposition. | |
|
|
| | |
|
| In this chapter, Taylor as a man and Scientific Management as both a method and a movement are discussed. I pay more attention to Taylor's life than is the case for most authors in this volume because of the intimate relationships among the man, his methods, and the movement as Taylor's virtues, and his vices, are reflected in Scientific Management. On methods, I consider time-and-motion studies, wage-incentive schemes, and functional organization as three of the primary emphases in the techniques of Scientific Management. On Scientific Management as a movement, I look at efforts to spread the gospel of Scientific Management and some of the controversy that surrounded those efforts.
| | |
|
| After serving his apprenticeship at Enterprise Hydraulic, Taylor assumed a position as an ordinary laborer at the Midvale Steel Works. The choice proved to be fortuitous. Midvale, at that time, was owned by a friend of the Taylor family and run by William Sellers, an innovative engineer who took a personal interest in Taylor's development. At Midvale, Taylor progressed through the stages of an ordinary laborer, but at a pace seldom achieved by the ordinary laborer. Taylor worked originally as a time clerk and machinist, became a gang boss after two months, and was chief engineer after only six years at Midvale.It was at Midvale that the rudimentary concepts of Scientific Management began to form in Taylor's mind. As a laborer, Taylor had identified with the workman and his mores, including sympathy for a practice Taylor would later resoundingly condemn, ''systematic soldiering," or informal output restrictions imposed by the work group. When Taylor became a part of management, his outlook and identifications changed markedly. Taylor took his primary loyalty to be to management, and he launched a concerted attack on systematic soldiering. Taylor's supervisory style was authoritarian in nature, and he became known as something of a "holy terror" in his relationships with his men. 7 Those relationships were at one point so tattered that Taylor exchanged physical threats with some members of his work group. Taylor's attempts to combat systematic soldiering led him to institute two important components of what was later to be known as Scientific Management: time-and-motion studies and a piecework incentive plan. Taylor reorganized the tool room, standardized the tools, and created five positions that were the precursors of "functional foremen": an instruction card clerk, a time clerk, an inspector, a gang boss, and a shop disciplinarian. In addition, Taylor began his study of metal cutting, which would eventually consume twenty-five years of experimentation.
In 1895 Taylor presented his first report to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in a paper entitled "A Piece Rate System." 10 Although, as the title suggests, Taylor proposed a new wage-incentive scheme, he was more concerned with the system of management than the scheme embedded in it.In 1898 Taylor took a position with Bethlehem Steel Company in what was to be a most productive association. While at Bethlehem, Taylor installed a system of production management and functional supervision that incorporated many of the basic ideas of Scientific Management. Taylor also collaborated on the invention of a high-speed tool steel, touted as the most important machine-tool invention of Taylor's lifetime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
No comments:
Post a Comment