Behind Sindhuratna disaster, a struggling Navy
Leaking hydrogen from batteries stored in the forward compartment of the INS Sindhuratna might have set off Wednesday’s fire which claimed the lives of two naval officers and injured seven, highly-placed naval sources told The Hindu . Sailors in the forward compartment battled the flames even while inhaling freon, a fire-retardant gas, from the ship’s automatic fire-fighting system, the sources said.
The two officers killed, the sources said, could not be evacuated in time when the compartment was sealed off to prevent the blaze from spreading.
Seaking helicopters were scrambled from Mumbai to evacuate injured crew. The seven sailors, who inhaled toxic gas, are now being treated at INS Aswini, the naval hospital in Mumbai.
“Even as the Navy must be asked hard questions about how this tragedy happened, I think we should salute the courage of the sailors involved, who potentially averted a far larger tragedy,” said maritime expert and former naval officer commodore C. Uday Bhaskar
In November 2008, the accidental discharge of Freon gas in an Akula class nuclear-powered attack submarine killed 20 Russian sailors and injured 41 others. That submarine, interestingly, now serves in the Indian fleet, renamed INS Chakra.
Part of a series of Kilo-class submarines purchased from the Soviet Union, Sindhuratna was commissioned into the Navy in 1988, and was originally intended to have been phased out in 2013.
However, delays in the modernisation programme had led the Navy to first cut back its operational hours, and then engage in a refit intended to extend the submarine’s seaworthiness.
In a report released last year, the Comptroller and Auditor General warned that “The Navy currently holds just 67% of the force level envisaged in its 1985 [maritime expansion] plan.” Privately, naval officials say the submarine fleet functions at just 40 per cent of its operational need.
India had commissioned a production line for German-designed U-209 submarines, also known as the Shishumar class, anticipating the ageing of its Kilo-class submarines. However, the line was closed down after the construction of INS Shishumar in 1994, after a scandal over alleged payoffs.
Though hulls have been laid for six French-designed Scorpene submarines, production delays mean it will be several years before the first vessel becomes available for service. France last year threatened to withdraw from the project, pointing to multiple delays since the agreement was signed in 2005.
INS Sindhuratna mishap: One more disaster under his watch, Navy Chief Admiral D K Joshi resigns
Admiral D K Joshi resigned as Navy Chief Wednesday following a spate of accidents that had raised serious questions about the safety record of the force, becoming the first armed forces chief to quit since Independence.
The resignation came hours after an accident on board the INS Sindhuratna submarine in which two officers were feared killed after one of its compartments was filled with smoke during a sea trial Wednesday morning.
Sources said Defence Minister A K Antony summoned Joshi seeking an explanation for the latest incident and Joshi is believed to have offered to resign, taking moral responsibility.
Following the meeting, Antony met the Prime Minister and the President to apprise them of the matter. By evening, the ministry said it had accepted the resignation and made a public announcement after informing Vice Admiral R K Dhowan he would be taking charge with immediate effect pending the appointment of a regular chief over the next few weeks.
“I have the honour to refer to recent incidents/accidents during the past few months that have impacted the professional image of the Navy. While the government has continued to repose its fullest trust and confidence in the service, I consider my continuation as Chief of the Naval Staff as untenable,” Joshi wrote in his resignation letter.
“In the interests of accountability, I therefore accept fullest moral responsibility for the above mentioned accidents/incidents and hence I have…to resign from immediate effect (sic),” he said.
Sources said it was not just the Navy’s safety record but even the handling of the accidents had come under a cloud. More than 500 officers were suddenly ordered to be transferred by the Navy Chief last month in what was termed as a “transfer tsunami”, leading to strong displeasure among the cadre, and several captains of warships that had faced accidents were removed, changing the entire future senior hierarchy of the force.
In the months before Joshi’s resignation, a deep wedge had emerged between him and the defence ministry, triggered by the accidents but also relating to what is said to be a lack of communication by the force headquarters with its civilian counterparts.
Sources said several factors had led to a growing dissatisfaction with the top officer. The defence ministry had been disappointed that the Navy was not accurately sharing details of the several incidents that had taken place on board warships.
While the norm has been that major developments – incidents at sea or personnel issues – are reported to the ministry, information was allegedly blocked under Joshi and on many occasions, the first information received by civilian officials was through media reports.
Reports on several major incidents, which were marked to be shared with the ministry as per standard protocol, had also been allegedly suppressed by the Navy Chief’s office.
The handling of the accidents had also not gone down well with the defence ministry which felt the navy was trying to downplay the incidents as “hype” by media and was taking corrective action only after the matter became public.
However, some Navy sources sought to defend Joshi saying the accidents could be explained individually and blamed on material failure, defects, human error and factors beyond the control of the Navy.
They said over the past few years, the Navy has been stretched beyond its limits with additional patrols and Coast Guard missions being commissioned. In one explanation to Antony, Joshi had said the rapid expansion of the fleet was causing manpower issues.
The argument was that while several new platforms had been inducted, the finance ministry had not accepted a concurrent increase in manpower, leading to resources being stretched and officers with lesser experience taking charge, specially on the technical side.
JOSHI vs ANTONY
Exchanges in the run-up to Navy Chief’s resignation
Exchanges in the run-up to Navy Chief’s resignation
Nov 20: After Aug 14 Sindhurakshak sinking, Antony says responsibility of Navy to ensure assets operated correctly and “not frittered away”.
Dec 3: Joshi says safety record “not all that bad” compared to other navies. Says incidents “isolated, separate cases”.
Feb 6: Antony says he cannot provide “100
per cent satisfaction certificate” to Navy.
Feb 10: Antony calls Joshi seeking explanation for malfunction on board INS Vikramaditya, third time he was called to explain such an incident in weeks.
Feb 26: Joshi called by minister to explain Sindhuratna incident; he comes prepared to quit, hands in papers.
Mumbai/New Delhi: Two officers were feared killed and seven sailors injured when a fire erupted on board a submarine, INS Sindhuratna, around 40 nautical miles off Mumbai in the early hours of Wednesday.
The Navy said the two officers, a lieutenant commander and a lieutenant, both from the electrical branch, were “still to be accounted for”. The seven sailors were airlifted by Sea King helicopters to INS Ashwini hospital in Colaba. “The sailors fell unconscious on inhaling the heavy smoke engulfing the submarine’s third compartment. They are now stable,” said an offi cer.
An upset defence ministry sought a detailed report from the Navy since this is the second major accident in the country’s ageing submarine fleet in the last six months, which has further dented India’s underwater combat arm.
INS Sindhurakshak, a Russian Kilo-class submarine like INS Sindhuratna, had sunk at the Mumbai naval dockyard, killing three officers and 15 sailors, after a series of internal explosions in its fully-loaded weapons compartment on August 14 last year.
INS Sindhuratna, incidentally, was berthed next to INS Sindhurakshak at that time and sustained minor damage to its hull.
The mishap on Wednesday took place when INS Sindhuratna had just begun its “sea workup phase” after undergoing a refi t at the Mumbai dockyard from May to December last year.
As part of the procedures, the Western Naval Command’s commodore commanding submarines, S R Kapoor, and his inspection team were on board to test both the crew and the submarine before clearing it for operational deployment. In all, there were 94 personnel on board.
“The submarine was not carrying any ammunition. A board of inquiry has been ordered to ascertain the cause of mishap,” said a senior offi cer.
But preliminary reports said a leak in the battery pit, which runs under the third compartment, could have caused the smoke to engulf the submarine. The submarine, in fact, was forced to surface after smoke was detected and the fi re-fi ghting equipment kicked in.
“At sea in the early hours, smoke was reported in the sailors’ accommodation, in compartment number three, by the submarine. Smoke was brought under control by the submarine’s crew. In the process of controlling the smoke/fire, seven crew members fell unconscious. The submarine is now returning to harbour under its own power,’’ said the offi cer.
Dec 3: Joshi says safety record “not all that bad” compared to other navies. Says incidents “isolated, separate cases”.
Feb 6: Antony says he cannot provide “100
per cent satisfaction certificate” to Navy.
Feb 10: Antony calls Joshi seeking explanation for malfunction on board INS Vikramaditya, third time he was called to explain such an incident in weeks.
Feb 26: Joshi called by minister to explain Sindhuratna incident; he comes prepared to quit, hands in papers.
DEEP IMPACT: NAVAL POWER TAKES A HIT
2 Feared Dead, 7 Hurt In Sub Fire
V Narayan & Rajat Pandit | TNN
Mumbai/New Delhi: Two officers were feared killed and seven sailors injured when a fire erupted on board a submarine, INS Sindhuratna, around 40 nautical miles off Mumbai in the early hours of Wednesday.
The Navy said the two officers, a lieutenant commander and a lieutenant, both from the electrical branch, were “still to be accounted for”. The seven sailors were airlifted by Sea King helicopters to INS Ashwini hospital in Colaba. “The sailors fell unconscious on inhaling the heavy smoke engulfing the submarine’s third compartment. They are now stable,” said an offi cer.
An upset defence ministry sought a detailed report from the Navy since this is the second major accident in the country’s ageing submarine fleet in the last six months, which has further dented India’s underwater combat arm.
INS Sindhurakshak, a Russian Kilo-class submarine like INS Sindhuratna, had sunk at the Mumbai naval dockyard, killing three officers and 15 sailors, after a series of internal explosions in its fully-loaded weapons compartment on August 14 last year.
INS Sindhuratna, incidentally, was berthed next to INS Sindhurakshak at that time and sustained minor damage to its hull.
The mishap on Wednesday took place when INS Sindhuratna had just begun its “sea workup phase” after undergoing a refi t at the Mumbai dockyard from May to December last year.
As part of the procedures, the Western Naval Command’s commodore commanding submarines, S R Kapoor, and his inspection team were on board to test both the crew and the submarine before clearing it for operational deployment. In all, there were 94 personnel on board.
“The submarine was not carrying any ammunition. A board of inquiry has been ordered to ascertain the cause of mishap,” said a senior offi cer.
But preliminary reports said a leak in the battery pit, which runs under the third compartment, could have caused the smoke to engulf the submarine. The submarine, in fact, was forced to surface after smoke was detected and the fi re-fi ghting equipment kicked in.
“At sea in the early hours, smoke was reported in the sailors’ accommodation, in compartment number three, by the submarine. Smoke was brought under control by the submarine’s crew. In the process of controlling the smoke/fire, seven crew members fell unconscious. The submarine is now returning to harbour under its own power,’’ said the offi cer.
Sindhuratna and beyond
Submarining has always been a dangerous profession, meant only for volunteers drawn from serving navy personnel. It is also a relatively young man’s profession, with commanding officers of conventional submarines going “over the top” in their late thirties, into staff jobs. The selection is strict and the training rigorous. New entrants are carefully screened in psychological tests to survive in close proximity, under difficult conditions, with other human beings, for long periods of time. Not surprisingly, the camaraderie is close and submariners make friends for life.
The Indian submarine service commissioned its first submarine in 1967 and the pioneers realised the imperative of laying down the strictest standards of safety right at the beginning. The explosion onSindhurakshak occurred in 2013, after years of accident-free service. The Sindhuratna fire, close on the heels of the earlier explosion, poses a huge leadership challenge to senior naval officers in assuring serving submarine personnel that their weapon platforms are reliable weapons to fight with. The “Kilo,” as these submarines are referred to in the West, and “Project 877” in Russia, are formidable weapon platforms, but have a reputation for being difficult to operate. They were the first submarines to be acquired, covered fully by anechoic rubber tiles and had a reputation for running silently in combat.
Cry of despair
The Indian Navy never fielded a “Kilo” in joint naval exercises with other navies for precisely that reason and their reputation remains an undisclosed secret. Their role in war in South Asia is all the more formidable being armed with supersonic land attack missiles that can be used punitively or to influence the course of events on land.
If submarining is a demanding profession, it is partly because a submarine emergency is truly a terrible event, particularly when it occurs in a submerged submarine. The Sindhuratna faced such an event a hundred miles west of Mumbai, and put into practice the hours of drilling that submarine crews undergo, while dealing with emergencies. The “Kilo” has a high resistance to flooding and fire as it is divided into watertight compartments. A damage control drill requires a damaged compartment to be “isolated” and the unspoken anxiety is, of course, the fate of the crew who are isolated. In Sindhuratna’s case, all the events are yet to be clarified, but it seems that two officers, both with brilliant service records, pushed the sailors out of the stricken compartment, and shut the compartment on themselves to fight the fire. Both succumbed to the fumes in an act of cold-blooded gallantry. The Sindhuratnasurvived the fire and will be back in service in a few months, but the Navy’s front line strength of submarines will be depleted.
The accident raises issues that go beyond the gallantry and competence exhibited by the crew of the submarine. The resignation of a serving chief, with more than 15 months of residual service, is a traumatic event for the service.
It is normally not only an act of honourable exit but a cry of despair, signalling to the service and the government that he was not permitted to hold himself to the same standards as those he demanded from his officers.
Since 1952, the services have laboured under a dysfunctional government “Rules of Business” which declares that the Ministry of Defence, under the secretary, is responsible for the Defence of India — not the armed forces, and certainly not the chiefs. Under this excuse, the services have the accountability; the Ministry has the power to create innumerable hurdles in the path of each service getting financial approval for anything from a battery to a ship. There is good reason to believe that the Sindhuratnawas operating with over-aged batteries which give off vast amounts of explosive hydrogen, because the replacement batteries were held up in contractual red tape. The Board of Inquiry will bring out the truth but is unlikely to apportion blame to the Ministry of Defence, whose lackadaisical performance has crippled more than one armed service in the past.
Series of delays
Questions arise that can only be answered by persons well above the level of the service Board of Inquiry, headed by a Rear Admiral. Why was the Navy forced into operating a 26-year-old submarine with over-aged batteries? Because the replacement submarines — the Scorpène class French-origin submarines — were six years in the choosing under Defence Minister A.K. Antony, and were thereafter delayed by another four years contractually on account of the Ministry’s decision-making.
The Chief of the Navy has taken full “moral” responsibility, but his act is more a cry of despair that he has been unable to represent the interests of his service with an unresponsive and callous ministry which has been warned repeatedly by the Naval Headquarters of the depleting force levels of submarines in the Navy. The government had, many years back, approved the Navy’s plans for a 24-submarine force as the ideal. Considering that in peacetime, no more than 60 per cent of submarines can be kept operational, the levels today have fallen to parlous numbers. In past instances, the resignation of a service chief has prodded unresponsive governments into reviewing its policies and procedures. In the Indian case, the Naresh Chandra committee report is still in limbo, according to the same Ministry of Defence.
Going nuclear
What can be done by the government to honour the sacrifice of Admiral D.K. Joshi and not merely send him on pension? Building of the Scorpène class is in progress but six submarines will join the Navy only by 2022. An immediate step could be the acquisition of two more nuclear submarines of the Akula class on lease from Russia. The Russians were willing to lease another submarine in any case following the handing over of the INS Chakra , but considering the good relationship between the Russian and Indian navies it might be possible to persuade President Putin to part with two more Akulas, until the Indian indigenous building project catches up. The only major navies still operating conventional submarines are China and Japan. The others have shifted to an all-nuclear submarine force and India should go down the same route. In the vast reaches of the Indian Ocean, the slow pace of transit of conventional submarines make them a liability, which can only be overcome by acquiring larger numbers. A far more elegant solution is the nuclear propelled SSN, which is normally twice as expensive as a conventional submarine but is far more effective than two conventional boats.
The indigenous route to nuclear SSNs is some years away since SSNs require more powerful reactor plants than the missile-armed Arihant . India’s submarine community also needs to arrive at an intellectual consensus on the merits of transiting to an all nuclear submarine force and communicating that decision to the government. The government on its part needs to help the Indian shipbuilding industry and the Department of Atomic Energy by looking for strategic partnerships involving the building of nuclear propelled submarines — an activity not under the purview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In the decades to come, the Navy will become the prime service as India dumps its anxieties over territorial integrity and pursues its global self-interest. The Navy must also shift its strategic thinking from antiquated ideas of coastal defence and a Karachi blockade to an oceanic maritime strategy that is in line with India’s status in the region and its interests overseas. A good beginning was the seminar on nuclear submarines conducted in Visakhapatnam by the Commander-in-Chief to help the submarine community come to grips with future submarine policy. The Navy must now speak with one voice in favour of nuclear submarines.
The real naval disaster
Recent incidents have only highlighted that the navy’s submarines are old and should have been replaced
Beginning in August 2013, when the Indian naval submarine Sindhurakshak sank, stories have been appearing about naval “disasters”, culminating with the fire on the Sindhuratna, another submarine of the same class, which resulted in the death of two officers. This led to the resignation of the naval chief, Admiral D.K. Joshi, owning moral responsibility for all the incidents.
This is only the second time that a naval chief has demitted office before time. In the case of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in 1998, while the majority view of the navy, including retired officers, was that the manner in which he was dismissed was wrong, some believed that he was too autocratic and had overstepped his authority. In Joshi’s case, however, there is unanimity that he was not to blame but has taken a bold, honourable and courageous step on his own, setting a fine example for all.
Amidst the noise and hullabaloo, the “disasters” have not been critically examined to see whether they deserve to be termed as such. Let us get an obvious error out of the way: the incident of the empty gunshell fired from ICGS Sangram that hit the Western Naval Command headquarters in February 2014. Sangram is a vessel of the Coast Guard, which is an independent service and has nothing to do with the navy.
Coming to the navy, the collision of INS Talwar with a fishing vessel in December 2013 could only have been due to misjudgement on the part of the ship’s staff or negligence of the fishing vessel crew. Pending completion of a board of inquiry, the commanding officer has been suspended. For all we know, he may be exonerated, but if found guilty, will be punished. Similarly, the brush of INS Tarkash with the jetty was due to human error, but it was no “disaster”.
Ships have been having arguments with jetties from the days of Lord Nelson, and there will be any number of such cases filed away in the archives of not only the Indian navy but navies all over the world. The grounding incidents of Sindhughosh, Betwa, Vipul, Mysore and Airavat look big taken collectively but are not uncommon individually.
A ship can be blamed for grounding if it strays from a marked channel or goes into a charted navigational hazard. But if the incident is attributable to an underwater and unidentified object not marked on the chart, perhaps as a result of silting and lack of dredging, it will be most unfair to levy any blame on the ships’ staff.
All these incidents have been or are being examined thoroughly by the navy and disciplinary or corrective action has or will be taken on completion of the boards of inquiry. In none of the cases discussed so far does the buck travel any further than the captain of the ship.
Here, it is essential to point out that the captain of a ship is a prize appointment and the individual is selected by top officers of the navy after a detailed examination of his service record and proficiency. However, there is no escape from human error. According to reports, the navy chief had already taken corrective action by ordering a reappraisal of the performance of key officers and affected many transfers.
The collision with the jetty and the groundings were not “disasters”, either in the manner in which they happened or for the damages caused, which were not substantial except maybe in one case. These incidents should not even have found their way to the media. The navy would do well to investigate how this has happened. This is not to suggest that they should have been brushed under the carpet.
Proper procedure must be followed and necessary action taken, but unnecessary reporting in the media and painting a frightening picture of naval “disasters” is wrong. Admiral Joshi quite rightly spoke of them as minor incidents, and neither the media nor the ministry of defence had cause to disbelieve him.
We are now left with three incidents that are of a serious nature. The fire on INS Konkan seems to be an isolated incident and one does not have any details to comment on it. It is, however, pertinent to note that this happened on the east coast and, therefore, should not be held against the CinC Western Naval Command, who seems to be in the line of fire. The Sindhurakshak and Sindhuratna incidents have both occurred on Kilo-class submarines and can be grouped together, although the cause may not be the same.
In fact, full details are not yet known beyond the fact that there were some explosions on the former and smoke in a compartment on the latter. The Sindhuratna was on post-refit trials and had on board the Western Naval Command Commodore Commanding Submarines and his inspection team. Any charge of negligence is therefore incorrect. We should avoid passing judgement till we get to the bottom of the matter.
The submarines are old and well past their sell-by date. The navy has repeatedly apprised the defence minister and the MoD of this. The case for replacement of submarines is at least 10 years old. This is the true “disaster”, which has only now been highlighted because these accidents have occurred. It remains to be seen if the MoD makes fast progress on the acquisition of submarines so that such disasters, or worse, do not take place.
On one issue, however, the navy can be faulted. Content with the belief that the incidents were of a minor nature, it allowed the media to hype them and did not make timely efforts to clear the air. Its public relations machine is to blame. To draw an analogy, when a number of MiG-21 incidents were taking place not too long ago, the aircraft were labelled as “flying coffins”. But nobody was calling for the heads of the air force hierarchy.
The mystery behind Admiral Joshi’s resignation remains. What triggered his resignation when he had recently dismissed most of these incidents as “minor”? One can only conjecture that the MoD, if not the minister himself, and the media were hounding him and he was bearing everything manfully till the Sindhuratna incident proved to be the last straw.
Navy hit by another accident; officer dead
Nine days after a submarine accident triggered the resignation of Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi, a naval officer was killed in a gas leak on boardINS Kolkata , officially known as Yard 701, while undergoing delivery trials at the Mazagon Dock.
A senior police official told presspersons that a fire-fighting test was under way in the carbon dioxide unit on board the guided-missile destroyer when the gas leak occurred around 12.45 p.m. Both Navy and dockyard personnel were present during the trial.
Additional Commissioner of Police Krishna Prakash identified the deceased officer as Commander Kundal Wadhwa. Two dockyard officials, also injured in the gas leak, wereundergoing treatment, he added. The Defence Ministry said that as part of the destroyer’s delivery trials, the carbon-dioxide fire-fighting system was being evaluated and accordingly the gas was to be released in one of the machinery compartments. “During the trials, one of the system valves on the CO{-2}bottles malfunctioned leading to leakage of CO{-2}in the compartment. Commander Kundal Wadhwa, Engineering Officer (Desig), inhaled the CO{-2}gas and was critically injured. The officer was rushed to St. George Hospital. However, efforts to revive him failed,” the Ministry said in a statement. BJP spokesman Prakash Javadekar, meanwhile, demanded the resignation of Defence Minister A.K. Antony for the latest incident. The former Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash toldThe Hindu that he believed the gas leak on boardINS Kolkata and the Sindhuratna incident should not be linked.
Admiral R.K. Dhowan appointed new Navy chief
The Hindu
Admiral Robin K. Dhowan has been appointed as India's Navy chief.
His appointment could set off storm waves as the government takes a rare call to break line of seniority.
In a move that could ignite controversy, the Union Government has
appointed Admiral RK Dhowan as India’s new navy chief, ahead of his
senior, Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha. The navy has been without a chief
since the resignation of Admiral Devendra Joshi in August, owning moral
responsibility for a series of lethal accidents on board
Having been commissioned in 1975, Admiral Dhowan has commanded several
frontline warships, including the INS Delhi and INS Khukri in the course
of his 40-year career. He commanded the Eastern Fleet, as
Flag-Officer-Commanding of the Eastern fleet, and was Chief of Staff at
the Headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command. He has, however, not been
Flag-Officer-Commanding-in-Chief of any of India’s naval commands—a
significant departure from practice in all three services.
The Ministry of Defence picked Admiral Dhowan ahead of Admiral Sinha,
saying the senior officer had direct supervisory command at the time of
the submarine accidents which led to Admiral Joshi's resignation.
Admiral Joshi’s resignation came after a fire on the INS Sindhuratna,
which left two sailors dead—the consequence, an official investigation
has found, of their failure to adhere to mandatory protocols to wear gas
masks during such incidents. Last year, the INS Sindhurakshak exploded
and sank, killing 18 crew members.
Following Admiral Joshi’s resignation, Admiral Dhowan was made acting
chief, while the government weighed the competing demerits of Admiral
Sinha’s supervisory responsibility for the submarine accidents, and the
now-chief’s lack of experience as commander of the Eastern, Western or
Southern navies.
Brewing controversy
The Ministry of Defence’s decision to appointment Admiral Dhowan is a
rare departure from the decades-old principle that the senior-most
officer eligible is appointed service chief. The last departure from the
seniority principle in the navy was made in 1990, when Admiral
Laxminarayan Ramdas was made chief ahead of his immediate senior,
Admiral S. Jain.
Admiral Ramdass’ was preceded by a damaging power struggle within the
navy, which included the filing of a 400-page writ petition by his close
professional associate, then-Real Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat alleging
high-level corruption. Admiral Bhagwat himself rose to be chief, only to
be dismissed from service under controversial circumstances in 1999.
In an interesting irony of history, Admiral Dhowan served as staff
officer to Admiral Ramdas. Like Admiral Sinha, moreover, Admiral Ramdas
had direct supervisory command at a time of a major naval
disaster—serving as Flag Officer commanding-in-chief of the Eastern
Naval Command when the INS Andaman sank in 1990, the worst peace-time
loss until then.
The Indian army has had no departure from the seniority principle since
July, 1983, when General Arun Vaidya was appointed its chief, ahead of
Lieutenant-General Srinivas Sinha, later Governor of Jammu and Kashmir.
In theory, the government is entitled to pick the senior-most eligible
officer for a position—but, in an effort to minimise lobbying, have
generally worked on the assumption that all senior officers are equally
qualified to hold the top job. “The armed forces have backed this”, a
senior officer told The Hindu, “because it minimises the possibility of
political interference in appointments, which degrade the institution”.
Precedent shows governments have been loath to depart from the seniority
principle—even when failures have taken place on the watch of the
chief-designate. In 2006, for example, Admiral Suresh Mehta was
appointed navy chief even though the Naval War Room scandal took place
under his supervisory authority. Admiral Mehta, the government at the
time argued, did not have any direct role in the scandal, and was thus
not bypassed.
Vice-Admiral Sinha was not available for comment, but naval sources said
he may protest Admiral Dhowan’s appointment by filing a representation
before the Ministry and then going to court.
Dhowan's appointment a rare departure from principle
The government's decision to appoint Vice-Admiral R.K.
Dhowan as the Navy chief is a rare departure from the decades-old
principle that the senior-most officer is appointed a service chief. The
last instance of departure from the seniority principle in the Navy was
in 1990, when Admiral Laxminarayan Ramdas was made chief ahead of his
immediate senior, Admiral S. Jain.
Admiral Ramdas's
appointment was preceded by a damaging power struggle within the Navy,
which included the filing of a 400-page writ petition by his close
professional associate, then Rear Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, alleging
high-level corruption. Admiral Bhagwat himself rose to be the chief,
only to be dismissed from service under controversial circumstances in
1998.
In an interesting irony, Vice-Admiral Dhowan
served as staff officer to Admiral Ramdas. Like Vice-Admiral Shekhar
Sinha, Admiral Ramdas had direct supervisory command at the time of a
major naval disaster — serving as Flag Officer commanding-in-chief of
the Eastern Naval Command when INS Andaman sank in 1990, the worst
peace-time loss until then.
The Indian Army has had
no departure from the seniority principle since July 1983, when General
Arun Vaidya was appointed its chief, ahead of Lt.-Gen Srinivas Kumar
Sinha, later Governor of Jammu and Kashmir.
In
theory, the government is entitled to pick the senior-most eligible
officer for a position — but, in an effort to minimise lobbying, it has
generally worked on the assumption that all senior officers are equally
qualified to hold the top job. “The armed forces have backed this,” a
senior officer told The Hindu “because it minimises the possibility of political interference in appointments, which degrade the institution.”
Seniority principle
Precedent
shows governments have been loath to depart from the seniority
principle — even when failures have taken place under the watch of the
chief-designate. In 2006, for example, Admiral Sureesh Mehta was
appointed Navy chief even though the Naval War Room scandal took place
under his supervisory authority. Admiral Mehta, the government at the
time argued, did not have any direct role in the scandal and was thus
not bypassed.
Vice-Admiral Sinha was not available
for comment, but Navy sources said he may protest Vice-Admiral Dhowan’s
appointment by filing a representation before the Ministry and then
going to court.
The government had to name a Navy
chief as Admiral D.K. Joshi resigned in February after a fire on INS
Sindhuratna, which left two sailors dead. An official investigation
found that the sailors had not adhered to the mandatory protocols of
wearing gas masks.
Last year, the INS Sindhurakshak exploded killing 18 navymen.
Following
Admiral Joshi’s resignation, Vice-Admiral Dhowan was made acting chief,
while the government weighed the competing demerits of Vice-Admiral
Sinha’s supervisory responsibility for the submarine accidents and
Vice-Admiral Dhowan's lack of experience as commander of the Eastern,
Western or Southern navies.
Tasks before the Navy chief
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures: supersession is
rare in the Indian military hierarchy, and experience in heading an
operational command is normally a prerequisite for becoming the Chief of
the Naval Staff. The Indian Navy’s new chief, Admiral R.K. Dhowan,
who was slated to retire on May 31 on turning 60, has neither headed an
operational command — as was the case with a couple of others before
him — nor is he the seniormost officer. But the Defence Ministry
recommended the name, and the Prime Minister approved the choice. The
Indian Navy, navigating the most turbulent course since its inception,
finally has a helmsman, 50 days after the resignation of a competent Chief of the Naval Staff, D.K. Joshi. Admiral Joshi had 15 months of service left, but in the wake of a series of accidents, including one involving the submarine INS Sindhuratna
in which two naval officers lost their lives and several others were
injured, he tendered his resignation. In fact, most of the recently
reported accidents in the Indian Navy happened at its largest hub, the
Western Naval Command. Naturally, the chief of the Western Naval
Command, Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha, who is senior to Admiral Dhowan, was overlooked.
Admiral Dhowan will have a 25-month tenure as chief, with an opportunity
to shore up sagging levels of morale, put in place contracts to replace
ageing equipment, and chart a course-correction. He has addressed one
issue that has plagued the service by saying that his force would
strictly follow standard operating procedures without resorting to any
shortcuts. “It will be my endeavour to pull on the holes together while
keeping a hand on the tiller to ensure that we run an efficient, a taut
and a happy Indian Navy,” he said, after being named. It is a fact that
the Navy’s submarine fleet is aged
— only one of its existing 13 diesel-electric conventional submarines
is new; the rest have been in service for 20 years or more. Delays in
production and acquisition, and the Defence Ministry
taking inordinately long to clear proposals, has reduced the fleet
strength. There are huge operational gaps when it comes to submarines,
helicopters and minesweepers. The Navy’s future will depend on the
acquisition of state-of-the-art equipment and spares with minimal delay.
Admiral Dhowan will have to pursue procurement issues with the Ministry
with the same vigour and enthusiasm that Admiral Joshi had pursued
them, and use all the resources at his command to push new acquisition
projects with the new government. He has a well-defined task at hand.
His tenure will shape the course in which the Indian Navy will sail.
INS Vikrant gets another lifeline from Supreme Court
India’s first aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, which was headed for the scrap yard, got another breather from the Supreme Court on Monday as it blocked the vessel’s journey to ignominy.
“We had made a plea to the apex court to stay the scrapping and give a chance to other state governments to ‘adopt’ it and revive it. Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan has ordered a status quo on the entire matter till the next hearing. The court has also issued notices to the Defence Ministry and other concerned parties,” petitioner-activist Kiran Paigankar told IANS.
The ship was due at the scrap yard on May 17 after it was sold for Rs.60 crore through an e-auction to the Mumbai-based IB Commercials Pvt Ltd.
Through the ‘Save Vikrant Committee’, Mr. Paigankar and other activists last month moved the apex court in a bid to save the vessel which saw action in the 1971 India-Pakistan war.
“Our plea to the Supreme Court was to allow any other State government or port trust in the country to come and take over the ship — since the Maharashtra government was unwilling to save it — and accord her the status of ‘Antiquity’ under the Antiquity & Art Treasures Act, 1972,” Mr. Paigankar explained.
The imposing vessel, commissioned in the Indian Navy in 1961, was decommissioned in 1997 and has been kept anchored at the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai.
During the hearing of Mr. Paigankar’s public interest litigation in January, the Central government informed the Bombay High Court that the 15,000-tonne ship had completed its operational life.
The Maharashtra government expressed its inability to preserve it as a floating museum owing to financial constraints, following which the Bombay High Court dismissed Mr. Paigankar’s PIL.
The 70-year-old vessel, purchased as HMS Hercules from Britain in 1957 and rechristened as ‘INS Vikrant’, helped enforce a naval blockade of East Pakistan — now Bangladesh — during the 1971 war. — IANS
Modi govt must act fast to save India’s depleting submarine fleet
The Narendra Modi government will have to get cracking on a four-pronged strategy if it wants to rescue the country's underwater combat arm from sinking any further.
Defence ministry sources say the new political dispensation should ensure there are no further slippages in the ongoing project to build six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks, the long-delayed global tender for six new-generation submarines is issued, life extension for at least five ageing submarines is fast-tracked, and the long-term plan for nuclear submarines gets the requisite support.
The finance ministry is often blamed for being a "big obstacle" for military modernisation plans. But with Arun Jaitley straddling both MoF and MoD as of now, there is "hope" the "detailed action plan" for the submarine fleet will be swiftly cleared. Jaitley, on being asked by TOI if there was "a conflict of interest" in handling both the ministries, replied, "Well, I see it as supplementing of interest."
It is certainly required. Navy is down to just nine operational diesel-electric submarines, with another four stuck in long repairs and refits. All the 13 submarines are over 20 years old, while eight of them have crossed 25. India, in fact, is fast losing its underwater combat superiority over Pakistan, which has eight submarines, and falling further behind China with over 50.
For starters, there is the long-pending "Project-75India" to acquire six stealth submarines, armed with both land-attack missile capabilities and air-independent propulsion (AIP) for greater underwater endurance. Though this over Rs 50,000 crore project was granted "acceptance of necessity'' in November 2007, the global tender to select the foreign collaborator is yet to be even floated with the file being tossed between the two ministries.
"Since early-April, it's now again with MoF. The tender or RFP (request for proposal) can be issued only after first the MoF and then the cabinet committee on security approves it," said a source.
The urgency is required since it will take at least three years to select the foreign collaborator, and another seven to eight years after that for the first submarine to roll out. The first two submarines will be directly imported to save time, while three will be constructed at MDL in Mumbai, and the sixth at Hindustan Shipyard in Visakhapatnam.
Then, there is the ongoing Rs 23,562 crore Scorpene project at MDL, already running over four years behind schedule. The first Scorpene is now slated for delivery by November 2016, with the other five rolling out thereafter every 8-10 months. The Rs 1,800 crore contract to buy 98 heavy-weight torpedoes to arm the submarines is also yet to be inked.
On the nuclear front, Navy wants three SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles) and six SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines but without ballistic missiles) in the long term.
The force currently operates only one nuclear-powered submarine, INS Chakra, acquired on a 10-year lease from Russia for almost $1 billion in 2012, but it's not equipped with long-range missiles due to international treaties.
India's first indigenously produced nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, is yet to head for extensive sea trials after its reactor went "critical" last August. Two follow-on SSBNs, one already named INS Aridhaman, are being constructed under this advanced technology vessel project.
Defence ministry sources say the new political dispensation should ensure there are no further slippages in the ongoing project to build six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks, the long-delayed global tender for six new-generation submarines is issued, life extension for at least five ageing submarines is fast-tracked, and the long-term plan for nuclear submarines gets the requisite support.
The finance ministry is often blamed for being a "big obstacle" for military modernisation plans. But with Arun Jaitley straddling both MoF and MoD as of now, there is "hope" the "detailed action plan" for the submarine fleet will be swiftly cleared. Jaitley, on being asked by TOI if there was "a conflict of interest" in handling both the ministries, replied, "Well, I see it as supplementing of interest."
It is certainly required. Navy is down to just nine operational diesel-electric submarines, with another four stuck in long repairs and refits. All the 13 submarines are over 20 years old, while eight of them have crossed 25. India, in fact, is fast losing its underwater combat superiority over Pakistan, which has eight submarines, and falling further behind China with over 50.
For starters, there is the long-pending "Project-75India" to acquire six stealth submarines, armed with both land-attack missile capabilities and air-independent propulsion (AIP) for greater underwater endurance. Though this over Rs 50,000 crore project was granted "acceptance of necessity'' in November 2007, the global tender to select the foreign collaborator is yet to be even floated with the file being tossed between the two ministries.
"Since early-April, it's now again with MoF. The tender or RFP (request for proposal) can be issued only after first the MoF and then the cabinet committee on security approves it," said a source.
The urgency is required since it will take at least three years to select the foreign collaborator, and another seven to eight years after that for the first submarine to roll out. The first two submarines will be directly imported to save time, while three will be constructed at MDL in Mumbai, and the sixth at Hindustan Shipyard in Visakhapatnam.
Then, there is the ongoing Rs 23,562 crore Scorpene project at MDL, already running over four years behind schedule. The first Scorpene is now slated for delivery by November 2016, with the other five rolling out thereafter every 8-10 months. The Rs 1,800 crore contract to buy 98 heavy-weight torpedoes to arm the submarines is also yet to be inked.
On the nuclear front, Navy wants three SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles) and six SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines but without ballistic missiles) in the long term.
The force currently operates only one nuclear-powered submarine, INS Chakra, acquired on a 10-year lease from Russia for almost $1 billion in 2012, but it's not equipped with long-range missiles due to international treaties.
India's first indigenously produced nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, is yet to head for extensive sea trials after its reactor went "critical" last August. Two follow-on SSBNs, one already named INS Aridhaman, are being constructed under this advanced technology vessel project.
Secure sea lanes can drive India’s growth story: Modi
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Saturday conveyed his government’s sharp focus on modernising the country’s defence infrastructure and tying maritime security to India’s growth story.
Spending a few hours on the giant aircraft carrierINS Vikramaditya off the Goa coast, Mr. Modi conveyed his perception that the armed forces were also an engine for boosting economic heft. Navy sources said that during his interaction with personnel on board the warship, the Prime Minister stressed the importance of keeping the sea lanes open to boost commerce.
Advocating infusion of new technology and indigenisation to produce weapons and platforms, Mr. Modi signalled that Indian-produced military hardware could find a niche in countries belonging to the global South. Mr. Modi’s presence on the warship — he arrived in the forenoon from Goa in a Sea King helicopter — provided him the perfect image-building photo opportunity. The Prime Minister seemed to relish entering the cockpit of one of the recently acquired MiG-29K planes onboard the ship.
PM’s visit signals maritime ambitions
By choosing the giant aircraft carrier as his first outing to a defence establishment, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Saturday seemed to convey that India’s long-held aspiration of establishing a footprint in the Indian Ocean — which was drawing several competing powers — had not been extinguished.
Mr. Modi called for the establishment of a robust maritime infrastructure. Separately, Navy sources pointed out that a weak focus on strong maritime foundations had become graphically visible in the inordinate delay in the establishment of the Karwar naval base in Karnataka.
Mr. Modi apparently impressed his hosts by stressing plugging the “skills drain,” which follows the underutilisation of highly skilled people who retire from service. The sources said that the Prime Minister was fully aware that institutional mechanisms to redeploy this outflow of talent were poorly developed in the country.
During his address to the 1,600 personnel on board the carrier, the Prime Minister drove home the point that the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government would focus on serving existing and retired defence personnel. He pledged that the languishing one rank, one pension scheme, which had stirred considerable consternation within the armed forces, would be fully implemented.
The Prime Minister witnessed naval and aerial manoeuvres as well as a ceremonial “steam-past” of warships belonging to the western fleet past the imposing Vikramaditya .
| TROPEX – 2014 | ||
| The Indian Navy’s major annual exercise ‘TROPEX’ (Theatre Level Operational Readiness Exercise) concluded yesterday. The exercise involved large scale naval manoeuvres in all three dimensions viz. surface, air and underwater, across the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The month long exercise was aimed to assess the operational readiness of naval units, validate the Navy’s war fighting doctrine and integrate newly included capabilities in its `Concept of Operations`. Around 60 ships and submarines, and 75 aircraft took part in this exercise,along withparticipation of units from Indian Air Force and Indian Coast Guard. Theexercise also saw the `maiden` participation by the newly acquired P 8I Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft and the nuclear submarine, Chakra. The exercise also provided the Indian Navy with an opportunity to validate its network centric warfare capabilities, with effective utilisation of the recently launched Indian Navy’s Satellite, GSAT 7.
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