ARC 7(PART 4) LEFT EXTREMISM

3.1 Left Extremism: Spread and Intensity

The left extremist outburst, later known as the Naxalite movement, started in March 1967 in the three police station areas (Naxalbari, Khoribari and Phansidewa) of Darjeeling district in West Bengal. The ‘Naxalbari phase’ of the movement (1967-68) gathered momentum during May-June 1967 but was brought under control by July-August 1967.

Today, the left extremist movement is a complex web that covers many States. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘at present, 76 districts in the nine States(??.) of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal are afflicted with ultra-left extremism forming an almost continuous Naxal Corridor. CPI(ML)-PWG and Maoist Communist Centre-India (MCC -I) have been trying to increase their influence and operations in some parts of other States, namely Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala and in certain new areas in some of the already affected States.’

The merger of the CPI (ML)-PWG and the MCC in 2004 has strengthened their combat capability. It is estimated that these extremist outfits now have 9,000-10,000 armed fighters with access to about 6,500 firearms. There are perhaps another 40,000 full-time cadres.

3.2 The ‘Nature’ of the Movement

Barring a phase in the late 1960s and early 1970s’ the left extremist movement has been largely agrarian in the sense that it seeks to mobilize discontent and misgovernance in the rural areas to achieve its objectives. Some of the major features of the left extremist movement include the following;

• It has emerged as the greatest challenge to internal security.

• It has gained people’s confidence, grown in strength particularly in forest and tribal areas, by mobilising dispossessed and marginalised sections.

• It creates conditions for non-functioning of the government and actively seeks disruption of development activities as a means to achieve its objective of ‘wresting control’.

• It spreads fear among the law-abiding citizens.

3.3 Causes for Spread of Left Extremism

While the goal of the left extremists was to actualise their own vision of the State through ‘revolution’, they chose to usher that revolution by enlisting the support of the deprived and exploited sections of society particularly in areas where such sections constituted a significant part of the population. It is, therefore, necessary to identify the reasons for such deprivation and consequent discontent.

Land Related Factors

• Evasion of land ceiling laws.

• Existence of special land tenures (enjoying exemptions under ceiling laws).

• Encroachment and occupation of Government and Community lands (even the water-bodies) by powerful sections of society.

• Lack of title to public land cultivated by the landless poor.

• Poor implementation of laws prohibiting transfer of tribal land to non-tribals in the Fifth Schedule areas.

• Non-regularisation of traditional land rights.

Displacement and Forced Evictions

• Eviction from lands traditionally used by tribals.

• Displacements caused by irrigation and power projects without adequate arrangements for rehabilitation.

• Large scale land acquisition for ‘public purposes’ without appropriate compensation or rehabilitation.

Livelihood Related Causes

• Lack of food security – corruption in the Public Distribution System (which are often non-functional).

• Disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities.

• Deprivation of traditional rights in common property resources.

Social Exclusion

• Denial of dignity.

• Continued practice, in some areas, of untouchability in various forms.

• Poor implementation of special laws on prevention of atrocities, protection of civil rights and abolition of bonded labour etc.

Governance Related Factors

• Corruption and poor provision/non-provision of essential public services including primary health care and education.

• Incompetent, ill trained and poorly motivated public personnel who are mostly absent from their place of posting.

• Misuse of powers by the police and violations of the norms of law.

• Perversion of electoral politics and unsatisfactory working of local government institutions.

The first is the paradox that the diagnoses of the problem by the government and the left extremists are similar. Both ‘sides’ agree that concealed tenancy, tenurial insecurity, low wage rates and lingering feudal practices in many places have generated a discontent among the rural poor – a discontent that makes many

of them active participants in politically motivated violent upsurges. Despite a variety of legislations enacted to address a whole host of land related issues like introduction of land ceilings, distribution of surplus land, consolidation of holdings, prevention of fragmentation of land, protection of rights of tenants and settlement of waste-lands etc, their impact at the ground level is marginal due to tardy implementation. 

This has enabled the left extremists to exploit the disappointment of the promises made to beneficiaries particularly in areas where there are large number of landless labourers and share-croppers.

Another ‘cause’ which needs to be noted is the disruption of the age old tribal- forest relationship. Historically,tribal life was well integrated with the forest, but legislations and governance in the last century considerably altered this symbiosis.

3.4 Resolution of Left Extremist Conflicts – Successes and Failures

 Many left extremist movements, notably the uprising in Naxalbari, could be resolved successfully. An analysis of what really happened in such areas particularly in Naxalbari may provide necessary insights for resolving the present problem of left extremism.

 From 1972 onwards, the Government of West Bengal adopted a slew of ameliorative measures in the Naxal-affected districts. The Comprehensive Area Development Programme (CADP) was introduced to supply inputs and credit to small farmers and the government took the responsibility of marketing their produce. Naxalbari and Debra, the worst Naxalaffected areas, were selected for the programme. 

At about the same time, directives were issued to government officials in Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh and Ganjam in Orissa to ensure that debts incurred by the tribal poor are cancelled and instead, loans were advanced to them from banks and other sources for agricultural improvement. 

In West Bengal, after the Left Front government came to power in 1977, Operation Barga was started to ensure the rights of the sharecroppers. Alongside, significant increases were made in the minimum wages which benefitted large sections of the rural poor. As a result, the beneficiaries of these government programmes began to distance themselves from Naxalism and the process signalled the beginning of the end of Naxalism in these areas.

It is clear that a judicious mix of development and welfare initiatives coupled with land reforms and well planned counterinsurgency operations is required to restore peace, harmony and confidence in the administration in such areas. 

3.5 Managing Left Extremism – the Political Paradigm

 The ‘14-point policy’  rightly underscores the need to contextualize left extremism in a perspective that is much wider than the conventional wisdom which places trust on a mixture of the ‘police stick’ and the ‘development carrot’ as the panacea for militant extremism particularly of the left variety.

 It needs to be emphasized that while the ultimate goal of the left extremist movement is to capture state power, its immediate manifestation is in the form of a struggle for social justice, equality, dignity and honesty in public services. Viewed thus, the spread of the movement over a wide area signifies the fact that efforts to remove those conditions which give rise to the acceptance of the ideology of violent left extremism have not been particularly successful. In the circumstances it should be possible to visualize this movement not as a threat to the security of the State but a fight within the State for obtaining what the system promised but failed

to deliver.

 In that context, there may also be a need to keep the door open for negotiations with such groups and not necessarily insist on preconditions such as laying down of arms.

It will be reasonable, therefore, to take a view that while the movement has major law and order dimensions, it is not a purely law and order problem. The violent activities of the ‘foot soldiers’ – as opposed to its ideologically hardened hardcore – could well be due to the fact that their attempts to get their grievances redressed through non-violent, democratic methods may have not evoked due response. The temptation to utilise the police forces is very high but it should be remembered that unaccountable police action and abuse of police power validates violence even among the hitherto non-involved populations.

 To sum up, left extremism feeds on persistent and serious shortcomings in the domain of general and development administration, resulting in the failure of the government to address the needs of the poor in areas pertaining to land, food, water and personal security, equity, ethnic/cultural identity etc. If this diagnosis is accepted, then the ‘containment’ of the problem may inter alia require consideration of the following:

• Most of the ‘participants’ in violence perpetrated under the banner of left extremist organisations are alienated sections of society rather than perpetrators of ‘high treason’ – they have to be treated as such.

• A fortiori police action over a long period is counter-productive; it is likely to affect the innocent more than the extremists.

• Negotiations have a definite ameliorative role under the circumstances, this is the experience the world over.

• Faithful, fair and just implementation of laws and programmes for social justice will go a long way to remove the basic causes of resentment among aggrieved sections of society.

• Sustained, professionally sound and sincere development initiatives suitable to local conditions along with

democratic methods of conflict resolution have a higher chance of success.

Actualisation of such strategy of ‘containment’ would require all round capacity building within the apparatus

of the State and civil society, sincerity and perseverance of efforts and accountable and transparent administration as discussed in the following sections.

3.6 Capacity Building to Deal with Violent Left Extremism

 (i) Security Forces

(ii) Administrative Institutions

(iii) Government Personnel

(iv) L ocal Bodies

(v) C ivil Society Organisations

 Building Capacity of Security Forces (including the Police)

 The Commission in its Fifth Report on “Public Order” has examined in detail, various issues relevant to police reforms and made a large number of specific recommendations on the subject. Therefore, the

Commission would like to deal with this subject only briefly and draw attention to the following aspects:

(a) Where there is overt, recurrent violence, extremism cannot be tackled by negotiations alone. While the political and other non-police methods of handling the situation are dealt with later, it is clear that ‘dialogue’ and ‘accommodation’ are easier to find acceptance when the good intentions of the State and its will to restore order are concurrently visible. Thus subject to the limitations of police methods, security forces have a supportive but essential role in handling the situation. This would require suitable legal and motivational support to and effective deployment of the security forces.

(b) A satisfactory state of law and order is also a necessary precondition for development. Development, despite being essential to maintain peace in disturbed areas, must be accompanied by vigorous action of the

security forces including providing protection to personnel responsible for implementation of development programmes. In seriously disturbed areas where agencies involved with development work find it difficult to

operate, there may be a case for temporarily entrusting some development work to the security forces. This approach was tried successfully in West Bengal, where the local police helped in ensuring that schools and health institutions functioned effectively.

(c) It goes without saying that even in the most difficult and trying situations, the operation of security forces must be strictly within the framework of the law. To enhance the capacity of the security forces to act effectively and firmly but within constitutional bounds, it is necessary that standard operational procedures and protocols are laid down in specific terms and detail.

(d) Training and reorientation including sensitising police and paramilitary personnel to the root causes of the disturbances that they are seeking to curb are requirements that need no further elaboration.

(e) Formation of specially trained special task forces on the pattern of the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh also form an important element of the strategy to build capacity in the police machinery for tackling left extremism.

(f ) Notwithstanding the large scale deployment of forces from outside the affected areas, experience of handling extremist violence of different types indicates that a police force comprising primarily of local people is of inestimable value in dealing with the situation. Local police forces have a huge advantage in intelligence gathering capacity because of their constant interaction with local populations. In terms of costs also, strengthening the local police station is far more cost effective and more viable in the long run than inducting central forces. In areas affected by left extremism generally the representation from the groups involved – mainly the tribals – is inadequate. Scrupulously enforcing the prescribed reservations from the relevant areas, filling up existing vacancies in the police and law and order agencies, employment creation by induction

in Central and State police forces by launching special recruitment drives and raising tribal battalions of the Armed Police, and recruitment of local youth as Special Police Officers (SPOs) are some of the measures that require urgent attention.

3.6.3 Building Capacity of Administrative Institutions

 The Commission in its Reports on “Public Order” and “Local Governance” has dealt in detail with the need to build institutional, in addition to individual, capacity to improve the quality of delivery of services. Filling the administrative vacuum in the regions of the country affected by left extremism is of paramount importance. Institutional capacity refers not only to organisations but also to the legal framework and norms within which

services are to be delivered. In the context of left extremism, matters like more efficient implementation of laws impinging on the lives and livelihood of the tribals and endowing the delivery institutions with greater effectiveness and empathy are issues of particular relevance.

 Institutional capacity needs to be similarly strengthened within the line departments, particularly within their field formations in tribal areas by introducing appropriate management practices to deal with the specific needs of marginalised groups and to make deployment of personnel qualified to cater to area specific needs. At the State level, a coordinated approach towards converging development programmes for backwards/areas affected by left extremism by setting up suitable institutional mechanisms should be

considered. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the Principal Secretary, Remote and Interior Areas Development (RIAD) department heads such a mechanism to identify problems and suggest measures to meet the development needs of vulnerable areas and groups in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. Norms of development schemes, particularly those where a village or habitation is the unit of implementation pose difficulties in being applied to the tribal hamlets in view of their scattered nature and often minuscule population. 

There is a case for providing much greater flexibility in the implementation of centrally sponsored and other development schemes in such areas for which decentralisation would appear to be the answer. Considering the nexus between food insecurity and disaffection with the State, it is necessary that the non-functioning public distribution system is revived by strengthening organisations like LAMP (Large Area Multipurpose Cooperative Societies) to replace privately owned fair price shops and to implement decentralised schemes for procurement and distribution of food-grains etc.

 Similar flexibility has to be introduced in the administrative and judicial set up so that dispute settlement at the local level is both timely and effective. Provision of local courts and giving judicial and magisterial powers to the officers of the revenue and developmental departments to effectively deal with local issues could also be considered.

3.6.4 Capacity Building among Government Personnel

Personnel management has been a neglected aspect of administration in tribal areas.

Posting and deployment in such areas is usually looked upon as a punishment by officers who either work half-heartedly or remain absent for long periods from their place of duty. This underscores the need to identify those officers from the State, including from technical services, who view postings in these areas as a challenging and satisfying experience and have empathy and sensitivity to appreciate the problems of its people and the commitment to play a role in resolving them. State Governments should give such officers the benefit of being trained at national level institutions like the LB S National Academy of Administration to professionally equip them to serve in tribal areas. Such officers could then bring their exposure and unique

experience in the making of public policies, strategies and schemes for the development of these areas and the well being of its citizens. As an incentive it would be necessary to reward these officers through better emoluments, recognition of their services and retention of residential accommodation and education of their children in the State headquarters, if so desired. There is need for a national policy which could provide for reimbursing State Governments for the additional resources that may be required to make it attractive for officers to voluntarily opt for serving under difficult conditions in such areas.

 it appears that at the supervisory level and among technical personnel, non-tribals tend to predominate. Equally well known is the fact that service in a tribal area (by non-tribals) is out of compulsion i.e. only till such time as a posting or alternative employment in non-tribal areas is not available. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that absenteeism, dereliction of duty and poor work standards are the norms in such areas,

and this, in turn, contribute to disaffection of local populations. 

Measures such as formation of regional cadres of technical departments taken by the Government of Assam for areas under the Bodoland Territorial Council are a positive step for obviating the situation but with ‘outsiders’ dominating such cadres, the problem of inadequate availability of willing personnel is not fully addressed.  The larger issue of maintaining a high degree of motivation and professional competence among government personnel, particularly those serving in ‘problem areas’ will be dealt with by the Commission in greater detail in its Report on ‘Refurbishing of Personnel Administration’.

 There is a strong case for ‘back to the basics’ in the matter of administrative monitoring and supervision. The system of periodic official inspections and review of organisational performance needs to be revitalised. It must be recognised that a major reason for such practices falling in disuse in ‘disturbed areas’ is the apprehension of senior functionaries about their personal safety while on duty. It would therefore be advisable to provide suitable security to senior administrative and technical officers while on tour, and thus should be taken into account in working out requirements for security forces in areas affected by serious violence.

3.6.5 Capacity Building in Local Bodies

 The Commission hopes that apart from taking the requisite legislative action, State Governments would also put in place mechanisms to monitor that the objectives set out therein are being met. It may be useful to link performance in this regard with allocation of untied grants for area development.

3.6.6 Capacity Building in Civil Society Organisations

 Opinions vary about the role of civil society organisations in bringing about peace in conflict situations particularly in cases of left extremism because many such organisations are alleged to have a leftist ideological orientation (without necessarily sharing the violent objectives of the extremists) and, in some cases, the ‘NGO’ may even be a ‘front’ for the extremists themselves. 

Votaries of the ‘law and order approach’ hold that such associations are no better than proxies for militant extremists with demoralisation of security forces as their primary aim and that they sidetrack the violence, killing and extortion by the extremists by raising the bogey of police persecution. On the other hand, there is a growing realisation that such organisations have a major role to play as interlocutors, and that their vigil and critical alertness acts as a bulwark against abuse of power by the police and other state functionaries – in other words their activities strengthen the rule of law. While there may be some ‘black sheep’ among these organisations, there is little doubt that they have the potential to act as a bridge between the extremists and the government and in educating the people about the futility of violence and preventing aggravation of the situation by ventilating public grievances within the legal-democratic framework. 

3.7 Cutting the Source of Finances for Naxalites

Like any other extremist movement the Naxalite movement also mobilises funds which sustain them. Such mobilisation is in the form of extortion from local people and also from contractors executing various projects in the affected areas. Besides, funds are also raised through forest and mine operations. One way to ensure that development funds do not reach the extremists is by entrusting these works temporarily to organisations like the Border Roads Organisation and other governmental agencies which can execute these works directly. This is recommended as a purely temporary measure and not to stifle local private entrepreneurship

.

Clamping down on the sources of funding for left extremists is another area that requires urgent attention. The extensive contractor-transporter-extremist nexus and its links with illegal mining and collection of forest produce in the entire region affected by left extremism yields a huge volume of funds for the extremists. An effective anti-extortion and economic offences wing that can curtail if not totally dry up such funding sources to extremists, has to be constituted.

 Left extremism is posing serious challenges in different parts of the country through exploiting the sense of deprivation and consequent discontent of marginalised sections of community. Arguably, the Indian state and society have dealt with this malaise with a greater degree of sensitivity and with a slew of non-police methods in tandem with the conventional methods of law and order enforcement with greater success than in many

societies. At the same time, the fact that the phenomenon of left extremism is prevalent – and is in fact, endemic in several pockets – indicates that much more remains to be done.

Tripping on old mistakes

The killing of 15 Central and State police officers in Chhattisgarh on Tuesday is just the latest in the string of hideous losses India’s anti-Maoist counter-insurgency has suffered at regular intervals. India has, for the most part, accepted these as the inevitable costs of a war inflicted by insurgents whom Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once described as the most serious threat to the country’s internal security. The sacrifice, if that is what it is, appears to be paying off. The Maoist insurgency has been in steady decline since 2010. From a peak of 1,180 lives lost that year, the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal database records, fatalities fell to 421 in 2013. The slow choking of the Maoists is evident. Key leaders from Chhattisgarh and Odisha have left the party, and its efforts did nothing to stop a large turnout in the Assembly elections held in Chhattisgarh last year. The Maoists’ efforts to expand into small towns and cities has yielded little success. The fourth central committee meeting of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) issued a resolution admitting to the stark fact of declining public support, even in the party’s heartland regions.

Yet, the truth is that much of the loss of life the Indian forces have sustained in their war against Maoist insurgents were avoidable — even inexcusable. The succession of tactical errors which enabled Tuesday’s ambush is depressingly familiar: near-identical mistakes were made in disaster after disaster, from the annihilation of an entire Central Reserve Police Force company in Chintalnar, to last year’s slaughter of Congress leaders. The ill-fated patrol, as The Hindu has revealed, headed blithely into an area where State and Central intelligence services had warned Maoists were preparing an ambush. It used vehicular transport, and traversed a fixed route repeatedly, both lethal mistakes in areas where ambushes using improvised explosive devices are common. Little effort seems to have been made to initiate regular offensive patrols along the routes being used by the CRPF and the police, a standard means of making ambushes more difficult. Just as worrying, India’s multi-million dollar fleet of surveillance drones, not for the first time, failed to pick up any signs of an attack that involved over 200 insurgents. These errors all point to the fact that, many years into a counter-insurgency campaign that has been billed as the country’s most important, deficits of training, technology and leadership remain endemic. As in the case of past attacks, New Delhi and Raipur have busied themselves criticising each other for the loss of lives. It is time for both to step forward and admit that they are accountable for mistakes made, and lay out a blueprint to make amends.

The war within the war

In 1973, the social activist Baba Amte set up a small facility in Hemalkasa village of Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli district. The area was mainly inhabited by people of the Maria Gond tribe, who led a severely impoverished life. Often businessmen and traders from the nearby towns came to them, collecting dry fruits and other non-timber forest produce in exchange for a pittance. They were also exploited by forest guards and other government functionaries.

Diseases were rampant, and in the absence of roads or healthcare facilities, the poor tribals would die of malaria, tuberculosis, bear attacks, or snake bites.

Seven years later, in June 1980, a group of Maoists entered this area from neighbouring Andhra Pradesh. They swung into action, interacting with the people and gradually making them aware of how they were being exploited. In a matter of few years, many from this area joined the Maoists.

More than three decades later, Hemalkasa and other villages around it are Maoist strongholds. Gadchiroli is a part of the Maoists’ main guerrilla zone, Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee. Baba Amte’s small facility is a big hospital now, run by his son Prakash Amte and his family. But even in these 34 years, not much has changed for the people there, beyond Baba Amte’s hospital. To this date, people come to his hospital from as far as about 200 kilometres, many of them even brought on string cots by their family members. In the rains, the area can get cut off for days from Gadchiroli town.

Hemalkasa is the heart of the state run in absentia by New Delhi.

The ongoing war between the Maoists and the Indian security forces has only complicated the lives of millions of people living across the red corridor in villages like Hemalkasa.

In the last two years, the Union Home Ministry has concentrated on eliminating the top leadership of the CPI (Maoist). The strategists at the North Block think the Maoists will just disappear once they are left bereft of their leadership. But the March 11 ambush in Chhattisgarh, that left 15 CRPF personnel dead, is a stark reminder that something is wrong with this assumption. Currently, a majority of the top Maoist leaders are either in jail or have been killed in police action. A number of senior leaders have deserted the party, citing serious differences with the leadership.

There is no doubt that sustained security operations across their areas of influence have forced the Maoists to retreat. In the last two years, their grip over certain guerrilla zones has loosened. The Maoists are surely down. But as the recent ambush reaffirms, they are not out at all; they are still able to launch lethal attacks on the state and inflict severe damage.

The immediate cause of casualties from the security personnel side is, of course, that in battle zones, they sometimes fail to follow the standard operating procedure. The other deficit is the coordination between the police and other security agencies, and sometimes, even between different units of the same force.

But the main reason why the fight against the Maoists cannot go beyond a certain level is that New Delhi has failed to address issues that lie at the heart of this conflict.

Change in ideology

The Maoists started on a different note, promising to change the lives of the poor and the marginalised in central India. In the process, they led themselves to a ‘revolution.’ But soon their focus shifted to fighting the state rather than changing peoples’ lives. In the last few years especially, Maoist watchers say, the party ideology has gone haywire. Some of the senior leaders who quit the party recently say that often the Maoist leadership has been made aware by many within the party of deviations that have taken place in the party line. They say they have been trying to get the leadership to debate over issues like the random killing of civilians after accusing them of being police informers, or obstructing development by preventing the laying of electricity lines. They say it is unlikely that the leadership will ever take note of such issues and make amends.

In several Maoist bastions, many former supporters or sympathisers are getting disillusioned. What the Maoists have managed to achieve though is remarkable. In the absence of the gun, the government would have never as much as looked at these areas. For decades, areas like Hemalkasa remained off New Delhi’s radar. After the war in the heart of India was brought to drawing rooms through television, the Centre was forced to acknowledge, though reluctantly, that there was indeed some problem with its functioning.

Now, with a few years of sustained security operations, the government should have managed to bring about tangible changes in the political and developmental landscape. But sadly there seems to be no blueprint for this.

Many people living in the red corridor may look at the government with hope, but the government looks away. As night falls, the Maoists return, and every gain made with months of security operations comes a cropper. In the meantime, the Maoists are able to bolster the morale of their cadres by ambushes such as the one in Chhattisgarh.

With every such attack, the fight against the Maoists takes a severe beating. But with elections round the corner, the political establishment hardly seems bothered about the loss of soldiers.

Towards the end of May, a new government will come into being in New Delhi. Whether it will continue to blindly push soldiers into the war without empowering the tribals will eventually decide how long this terrible civil war of sorts will continue to bleed India’s heartland.

CRPF, State police ignored pinpoint warning on ambush

The Central Reserve Police Force and the Chhattisgarh Police ignored their own intelligence services’ pinpoint warnings that Maoist insurgents were preparing an ambush along the road where 15 police personnel were killed on Tuesday, highly placed government sources have told The Hindu .

The revelations will raise questions over why India’s $220-million fleet of Israeli-made surveillance drones was not used to track the build-up, and whether local counter-insurgency units were warned of the prospect that a lethal Maoist strike is imminent.

The Chhattisgarh Police Intelligence wing, the sources said, issued the warning on the looming attack on March 5.

Sighting

The warning recorded that 40-45 Maoist cadre had been sighted practising ambush manoeuvres between the villages of Gadam and Munga, under the jurisdiction of the Katekalyan police station on the Darba plateau in the Bastar region.

The report cited an informant as saying the ambush team was led by the head of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) Darba divisional committee ‘Surendra.’

Earlier, intelligence reports had identified Surendra, along with ‘Deval,’ ‘Vinod’ and ‘Nirmalakka,’ as key figures in the local Maoist hierarchy, reporting to Dandakaranya’s overall zonal chief, Ravulu Srinivas.

The CRPF generated a similar warning on March 6, saying the Maoists were planning ambush manoeuvres inside a small area bound by the villages of Kukanar, Paknar and Tongpal. It recorded that the cadre were sheltering under tarpaulin sheets.

Local CRPF and State police units, however, do not appear to have been ordered to launch offensive operations against the ambush team, or to take additional precautions against an attack.

The ambushed CRPF unit was charged with protecting ongoing road works in the area, and regularly used vehicular transport to access the site.

The Home Affairs Ministry declined on-record comment on the story, but on Tuesday blamed the State government for failing to act on available intelligence.

The National Technical Reconnaissance Organisation’s fleet of 12 Israeli-made Searcher tactical drones has also not led to success in detecting hundreds-strong Maoist units.

The fleet operates out of the Begumpet airbase in Hyderabad, pushing the drones to the extremities of their range by the time they reach the Darba plateau and leaving them with little hover-time to gather imagery.

Drones lose punch in tracking Naxals after long flights

India’s super-secret National Technical Reconnaissance organisation, or NTRO, operates a fleet of 12 Israeli-made Searcher tactical drones for surveillance of the vast forest tracts on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa-Chhattisgarh border, home to the largest Maoist formations in the country.

The expensive investment in remotely piloted reconnaissance assets has not, however, led to success in detecting hundreds-strong Maoist units.

The major problem, NTRO sources said, is that the fleet operates out of the Begumpet airbase in Hyderabad, pushing the drones to the extremities of their range by the time they reach the Darba plateau and leaving them with little hover-time to gather imagery.

The NTRO and the Air Force, government sources said, rejected calls for relocation of the fleet at a Defence Research and Development Organisation-run airstrip in Jagdalpur, near the site of Tuesday’s attack.

The NTRO agreed, though, to move to an airstrip run by the Steel Authority of India in Bhilai — which, over 250 km from Jagdalpur, is less than half the air-distance from Hyderabad.

Neither NTRO nor Ministry officials offered comment on why the fleet had not moved since 2012, when the agreement to relocate to Bhilai was made.

However, one NTRO official said there were concerns over housing and living conditions for pilots, who currently stay at Fortune Hotel in Begumpet during their fortnight-long rotational postings from their base station in Dehradun.

In addition, the NTRO fleet, dependent on the Air Force for pilots trained in handling the remote-control aircraft, has been hit by a chronic manpower shortage. “For all practical purposes,” an NTRO official said, “the fleet is available only some 20 days of a month, and that for only a few hours a day.”

Late information

Police officials deployed on counter-insurgency duties in the region say information comes in so late that it is often useless. The IAF passes on the data harvested by its drones to the NTRO for analysis.

The NTRO, however, complains it does not have real-time access to the ground intelligence being generated by the police and the Intelligence Bureau.

Maoists exploited police lapse in Sukma

With security forces deviating from the standard operating procedure (SOP), the Maoists took advantage of the lapse in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district, meticulously planning, over the past few weeks, Tuesday’s attack that killed 15 police personnel.

Preliminary investigation suggests that the Maoists did thorough reconnaissance and set up light machine guns on either side of the road in the Darbha Ghat area. As a road-opening party comprised of joint forces, on its way there from the Tongpal police station from the south, reached Tahakwada on National Highway 30, the rebels opened fire. Also, they had mined the area. No one was, however, killed in a landmine explosion, officials said.

Maoists launch “deliberate” or planned ambushes and “mobile” or unplanned ambushes, as the situation warrants. Almost any big attack, as was Tuesday’s, is a planned strike. As the rebels surrounded the forces and started firing, the first platoon, with some 20 personnel, got ambushed but the second platoon could not reach it because of the hostile terrain and the presence of a small nullah in between, a senior State police officer said.

The attack highlights one factor — intensified security, coupled with repression of locals, is no solution to the Maoist problem. State police officials agree that “excessive deployment” may have triggered the attack.

In the past few years, five camps of the joint forces were set up in the Darbha area. A sixth one is coming up at Keshlur. Officials now feel the increased security presence has restricted the movements of the rebels. They often use Darbha-Tongpal, located within a few kilometres west of the Orissa border, as a corridor to enter and leave Chhattisgarh. Since their movements were restricted, they might have retaliated, a senior officer said.

A section of officers blamed the collapse of the command structure for the increasing number of attacks on the police. The State went without a Director-General of Police for several weeks following the government’s decision to bypass seniormost officers and Naxal expert Giridhari Nayak, to appoint a relatively junior officer to the post. The morale of the forces has taken a beating, a senior officer toldThe Hindu .

The local people say that after Tuesday’s attack, the police have been harassing them. At Elengnarh, Koleng and adjacent villages, innocent civilians are being picked up randomly to squeeze out information. It is natural that a section of these people will join the rebels simply out of panic, said the secretary of a local gram panchayat on condition of anonymity. Even last Saturday, four persons were picked up from Chandmeta and their family is yet to be informed of their whereabouts, he said.

Moreover, every March, the rebels start their tactical counter-offensive campaign to push the police out of their base areas and inflict damage. Maoist military commanders earlier told The Hindu that if they did not “engage” the forces between March and June, the rebels would come under attack, with the green forest cover disappearing from winter till the onset of monsoon.

The Sukma warning

Tuesday’s Maoist strike in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district, which led to the deaths of 15 security personnel deployed to protect road construction work, and  one civilian, is the biggest attack  launched by the leftwing extremists  on security forces since 26 CRPF personnel were killed in an ambush in Narayanpur district in June 2010.

It is also the deadliest attack after last May’s ambush of a Congress convoy in the Darbha valley that led to 27 deaths. The attacks could be said to follow a pattern. Tuesday’s attack occurred barely 10 kilometres  from the spot where the Congress convoy was attacked last May. Both attacks were timed for elections — Lok Sabha  polls are round the corner now, while the Darbha attack took place amid  the build-up to last year’s assembly polls.

There are reports that standard  operating procedures (SOPs) were violated, again. The CRPF and state   police had been forewarned through intelligence inputs about a large Naxal assembly in the area. Both on  the ground and at the higher administrative and political levels, lessons have obviously not been learnt from the attacks and the patterns to which they apparently hew.
The Centre and the state must not only investigate the outrage on Tuesday, they must also deploy adequate force s

rength to ensure a secure environment for the upcoming general elections. The Sukma attack comes as a wake-up call at a time when the intensity of Maoist violence had appeared to be steadily declining. That decline — arguably in the face of the twin strategy of wide-ranging joint security operations begun in 2009 by Central paramilitary and state police forces and developmental outreach — had been confirmed by an internal document of the CPI(Maoist) last year that acknowledged an erosion of manpower and munitions as well as ideological reach.

For the state, as was underlined on Tuesday, there can be no room for complacency. There must be an urgent reassessment of the practices of security personnel on the ground and they must be educated anew about the inviolability of SOPs. At the same time, despite the temptations of the election season, political point-scoring must be avoided.

The Maoists will continue their guerrilla war as long as the state’s writ is not firmly re-established in the affected districts. They will not bid for peace until they find themselves completely outmanoeuvred and unable to sustain their fight. There can be no relenting in the project of reclaiming the physical space from the Maoists and restoring normalcy to people’s everyday lives.

n 2012, the young IAS officer, Alex Paul Menon was the Collector of Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district. On the evening of April 21, 2012, Mr. Menon had just finished his lunch and was about to preside over a function to announce the introduction of some agricultural schemes. But there was a squad of Maoists hiding among the villagers, and they suddenly launched an attack, killing two of Mr. Menon’s bodyguards. He was then taken hostage.

Mr. Menon was released after spending 13 days in Maoist captivity. He is now the deputy CEO at the office of the Chief Electoral Officer in Chhattisgarh. In the following piece, Mr. Menon explains how small steps of governance can go a long way in changing the lives of people.

Chindhbarri is an auxiliary village in Chhattisgarh’s Dhamtari district, about 140 kilometres from the State capital Raipur. It is a part of the Bastar Development Council, eight kilometres away from Bagrumnala, where Dr. Binayak Sen set up a clinic in 1994.

Chindhbarri is a tiny tribal hamlet of 75 families. In 2010, I was posted in this area as the chief executive officer of the zila panchayat. Though close to the periphery of the Gangrael dam, the village faced an acute shortage of water; 95 per cent of the households were Scheduled Tribes, and 85 per cent households below the poverty line. The average land holding was five acres and 65 per cent of farmers were marginal. Food was hard to come by. Only 38 per cent of families had food to last from six months to a year, while 50 per cent of families had food that would last them for six months or less. As a result, distress migration was quite common.

We decided to reverse the fate of Chindhbarri.

First steps to a renewal

Many years ago, the social activist, Baba Amte had shown us the way forward with his unique water conservation models. We decided to replicate them in Chindhbarri. Backed by a non-governmental organisation and its committed volunteers, participatory micro-planning exercises were taken up by self-help groups and the local community. To begin with, we listed on a sheet of paper, the landholding size of each household, and its nature and needs. Then, we put down a list of various schemes under subheadings. All benefits possible from these schemes were listed to match the needs of each household. The idea was to move away from the usual bureaucratic jargon of “targeting numbers” to “targeting names.”

We chose one particular patch of land, measuring 40 hectares, and initiated water conservation plans all along it. We soon realised that based on the flow of water, the ponds needed to be dug in two private holdings. This is the situation in many tribal areas, as the predominant method is flood irrigation that warrants having your field in the area where water flows and stops, but water conservation necessitates ponds and farm ponds. By this time the village was so enthused that two villagers, Shankar and Maakan, volunteered to donate five acres each.

According to the plan, each household was to get farm ponds and fish seed, cattle protection trenches, dugwells, bund plantations, cash crops like mango and cashew, poultry sheds, vegetable seed kits, equipment for rice intensification, vermicompost pits, bio-gas and borewells. We also arranged to put up low-cost poly houses, or sabji kuty, according to the needs of each household.

Historically, the most marginalised residents of a village occupy the ridge or the periphery. We started from there. To conserve water, the ridge had to be cured first. This was undertaken for a set of 32 farmers for one patch for the first year, and later replicated in two other patches in two batches. Rs.143 lakh was spent by converging the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme with other schemes in a systematic way for three years. The funds are largely from the employment guarantee scheme. The work season for the employment guarantee scheme (September to June) falls in two financial years (September to March and April to June).

For a villager, a financial year has no resonance in his way of life. While he looks at the work season, we expect him to work according to the financial year. We decided to tweak the rules to provide double the sanctions in a single financial year, citing the work season spread across two financial years. It turned out to be a blessing in disguise as more spending appeared to instill confidence in the villagers.

Reaping the results

Four years later, this is what happened — 114 acres of land were levelled and bunded and made suitable for cultivation; 225 acres of land came under irrigation, thereby increasing paddy productivity twofold, and the village saw a big increase in vegetable, maize, fish and poultry production. Today, vegetable cultivation enables 60 per cent of families to earn up to Rs.20,000 an annum. Nobody has had to take a loan from the village’s grain bank in the past two years. Distress migration has stopped. In the last two years, many villagers have been able to buy assets like mobile phones, motorcycles and television sets. Now, Chhindhbarri’s gram sabha has decided to pay tax to the gram panchayat in order to strengthen it.

Chindhbarri is self-sufficient today and its people do not need freebies or doles. The spark that triggered off an experiment in Chindhbarri has now spread to 47 other panchayats and is still growing.

All this began with a small step: putting all the components of food on the plates of 32 families. We chose not to splatter our schemes and benefits but place them all on a single platter according to the hunger needs of the families. And, it has worked as a miracle cure.

Some of us who are in the Indian Administrative Service often debate the necessity of straitjacketed schemes of the government and the needs of rural India that are different in terms of scale, priority, need and participation. I’d often have my doubts and would say: “How long are we going to chop the foot to fit the sandal?” This provoked a senior retired colleague to reply with a smirk: “panchayat plans, planning commission schemes.” But the Chindhbarri experiment has shown that it is possible to pull a village out of poverty instead of letting it be the beneficiary of erratic schemes for decades. It stands as a tall example of what participative, decentralised planning can do to a community and what is possible once a motivated community decides to plan, execute, monitor and measure outcome all by itself.

As I write this, my mind is awash in questions. How long is it going to take us to eliminate poverty from every Indian household? Convergence is a buzzword in the administrative services. But what I fail to understand is this: if panchayats plan for every household as per its needs, and allotments are made with minimal use of schemes and non-restrictive guidelines, what is the need then for this forced marriage of schemes that we call “convergence”? With many of our allocations in schemes based on unreliable secondary data, and thereby an unhindered diversion of funds, what stops us from having a computer in every panchayat, collecting household data pertinent to all sectors, updating it periodically and planning and allocating based on primary household data?

This country has multiple schemes, multiple computerised databases for these schemes, and then multiple cards and multiple servers storing countless data, wasting valuable financial, human and energy resources. Are we, an IT superpower, going to wait for another 60 years to collect and collate household level data, plan and allocate as per household level needs, and till then, keep on inventing scheme after scheme? Isn’t it time for us to pause, take a breath, collect, collate, computerise every household level data, plan for every household and cull poverty in a clean stroke? Isn’t it time to have integrated databases, weeding out duplicates, and running targeted, name-wise allotments?

I have been reading volume after volume of committee reports and scheme guidelines to find answers, but the compass in my simple mind points to Chindhbarri alone.

This brings me to the story of a Zen guru who would tell his disciples: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” One day he was visited by one of his disciples with a nagging problem. “Master,” the disciple said, “I have five people who are hungry and thirsty, and I have rice, curry, soup, pickle and water. How do I divide it among all the five? On the pretext of equality if I divide all the five items equally among the five, nobody’s thirst or hunger is quenched. If I divide five items into one for each, again, I end up satisfying nobody.” The learned guru smiled and replied, “Give all five items to the neediest and the one most willing to find food for others, and after his hunger and thirst are quenched, you both jointly find food for the rest.”

It is the Zen master’s formula that should guide our approach today.

(Alex Paul Menon is an IAS officer. E-mail: alexpaulmenon@gmail.com )

Maoist (Naxal) Violence in India: Defeat the Ideology, not People!

“Maoists are the biggest internal security threat.” – Indian Prime Minister, 2004

Maoist Violence

Maoists, popularly known as Naxals, Naxalites or left wing extremists, are at war with the Indian State since 1967. They have succeeded in carving out a large chunk of area in the countryside, labeled by the media “Red Corridor,” along the eastern coast of India from Nepal border in north to Karnataka in the south, covering about 92,000 sq km. They are active in over 200 districts and have influence in about one-third of the geographical area of India. These are predominantly tribal areas. In brief, in the “red corridor” region the state administration or its machinery has been virtually absence and the rich and the powerful freely exploited poor farmers and tribal people.

Popular Misconceptions

In recent years the news of Maoist violence has become quite common so is their clashes with police or security forces, besides the usual kidnappings or killings. Maoists are the most misunderstood group by the ordinary people except for their negative image. Since the Maoists activities are concentrated in the tribal areas, city dwellers automatically tend to believe that the tribals are either Maoists or their supporters. Maoists are regularly painted as enemies of “development” by the government and highlighted by the media. Another widespread perception is that the Maoists are simply terrorists.

Then there are those who see Maoists as champions of the cause of out-castes and marginalized and voiceless tribals and dalits, or as protectors of their rights. There is certainly utter poverty, deprivation, and lack of development in areas where Maoists operate but it is wrong to conclude that they are there with a mission to eradicate these conditions. On the contrary, the history of past half a century testifies to only one thing: these conditions provide ideal fertile ground for their activities to both to sustain and flourish. They do occasionally take up the cause of exploited poor, but that is more to serve their cause and to win sympathy for their ideology – to overthrow the Indian State through protracted armed struggle. However improbable that might seem, but that is exactly what their ideology is.

A 2006 status paper of Home Ministry sums up the Maoist activities very succinctly:

“The naxalites operate in the vacuum created by absence of administrative and political institutions, espouse the local demands and take advantage of the disenchantment prevalent among the exploited segments of the population and seek to offer an alternative system of governance which promises emancipation of these segments from the clutches of ‘exploiter’ classes through the barrel of a gun.”

Origin of Maoists’ Uprising

Although the Maoist violence is generally traced to an incidence of 1967 in the Naxalbari village of West Bengal – a violent clash between the landless farmers and powerful landlords – ideological roots date back to the Telangana Movement of the late forties (1946 – 51) which was an effort to copy Mao’s peasant revolution of China. Maoists pick up different local issues in different regions. Thus, the Maoist struggle came about caste conflict in Bihar, got connected to land issues in Andhra Pradesh, and tribal exploitation provided them grounds to spread roots in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. They appear to be supporting separatism in J&K and in the Northeast. However, regardless of the causes they may appear to be fighting for, their ultimate ideological goal remains the same – to throw out the Indian State and establish a people’s State.

A Brief History of Evolution of Maoist’s Struggle

All shades of leftist parties in India are off springs of the Telangana Movement around the time of India’s partition – over 2500 villages in Andhra were organized into “communes” as part of the peasant struggle in 1948. The movement leaders’ strategy was based on Mao’s New Democracy. It ultimately gave birth to three branches of communism in India – one favored the Russian type revolution, another opted for the Mao’s Chinese model, and the third decided to go along the parliamentary democracy.

The idea of armed struggle to achieve the goal got a boost from an incidence twenty years later – in the Naxalbari village in the Darjeeling area in 1967. A land dispute between a poor farmer and landlords provided opportunity to a section of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) led by Charu Mujumdar to initiate a violent uprising. It soon spread to other neighboring areas and landless farmers picked up arms against landlords. It resulted in the formation of the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in 1968. The AICCCR adopted two basic principles for its operations – allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) CPM (ML)

In 1969 the AICCCR formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist) CPI (ML). The following year, CPI (M-L) elected Charu Mazumdar as its general secretary. Inspired by Mao’s doctrines Charu Majumdar provided ideological leadership to the movement until his death in 1972. He advocated that the oppressed peasants and lower class tribals should overthrow the rule of upper classes by force. Many intellectuals were also attracted to the ideology, which spread through Majumdar’s writings, particularly the “Historic Eight Documents” which formed the basis of Naxal ideology. Charu’s departure led to the collapse of the central leadership the CPI (ML) and the saga of splits and attempts for unification started which continued for next several years; many opted out of the idea of armed struggle along the way. It is a fact that practically all naxal groups have originated from the CPI (ML).

The Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation

In 1974 the CPI (ML) was reorganized and renamed as the CPI (ML) Liberation. It offered Indianized version of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: limited role for armed struggle and greater emphasis on mass peasant struggles. Its activities were brought into open for the first time during the post-emergency phase of 1977, when most leaders of the Communist movement were released from jail. It launched its political wing – Indian People’s Front (IPF) – in 1982 with a view to participate in the electoral process. The IPF recorded its first electoral victory under the banner of the IPF in 1989 and the Ara Lok Sabha constituency in Central Bihar sent the first “Naxalite” member to Parliament.

In 1992, the CPI (ML) Liberation group decided to start functioning openly and disbanded the Indian People’s Front in 1994. The Election Commission recognized the CPI (ML) in 1995. Though the CPI (ML) Liberation started functioning overtly within the parliamentary democratic setup, it could not completely give up the path of armed rebellion. This is a peculiar dilemma within the ultra left movement which has time and again reflected the unpredictable character of the leftist’s movement.

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)

A few months after the birth of CPI (ML) the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed in 1969 by Kanhai Chatterjee, who supported the Naxalbari struggle but did not join CPI (ML) due to some differences. The MCC evolved out of the Dakshin Desh group. It stood apart and retained its identity when other groups were going through metamorphosis in the later years. Right from its inception, the MCC stood for taking up armed struggle as the main form of resistance and waging a protracted people’s war as the central task. In 2003, MCC merged with the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India-Maoists (RCCI-M) to form the Maoist Communist Centre-India (MCC-I). It would later merge with People’s War in 2004 to form the formidable CPI (Maoist).

Peoples War Group (PWG)

If today the left-wing extremists’ violence has grown to the extent to be declared “the greatest internal security threat” and if the Maoists got to be in the position to be running parallel government in different parts of the country, the credit mostly goes to the PWG – formally the Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist (People’s War Group). It was formed on Lenin’s birth anniversary on April 22, 1980 by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, one of the influential Naxalite leaders from Andhra Pradesh.

Since its inception the activities of PWG were confined to Andhra Pradesh, while the CPI (ML) Liberation continued to carry on its operations in Bihar. During the nineties, militarization became the characteristic feature of the PWG. In 1999, the CPI (ML) People’s War Group became People’s War after absorbing the CPI (ML) (Unity Organization) which was focused in Jehanbad-Palamu region of Bihar and some other groups with it. The merger allowed PWG foothold outside Andhra Pradesh and it gradually gained strength in different areas of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra.

Formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)

In 2004, the Naxal movement in India entered yet another phase of organizational transformation resulting in creation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or simply CPI (Maoist). It was a result of merger of two of the principal armed organizations –People’s War (PW) and the Maoist Communist Centre – India (MCC-I). It gave a significant boost to the morale of the Maoists struggle by giving enhanced ideological and operational synergy.

On the occasion of its formation the CPI (Maoist) announced that it aims to establish acompact revolutionary zone, stretching from Nepal to Bihar to Andhra Pradesh and beyond. It ultimately wants to establish a people’s democracy by seizing power through protracted armed struggle. The rebels reject participation in elections or involvement with any established government, because they see the state as ineffectual and ignorant to the needs of the poor.

Indian Government’s flawed Response

Hence, the major threat is from Maoists’ ideology; violence, kidnapping and other tactics are just means to achieve it. An ideological movement can’t be treated as merely law and order problem, nor can it be taken as a mere development issue.

Indian government’s strategy to counter Maoists is flawed. Since 2009 is handing over the troubled areas to security forces for combing operations under the unpublicized “Operation Green Hunt” in order to restore law and order. Simultaneously, it is handing over lands and resources of the regions to MNCs and corporate houses for physical development and alienating or displacing people. The government does not have a solution that considers the local people and put them at the center of attention. It is here that the correct solution of the “Red” problem lies – winning over the historically ignored and marginalized people. It necessarily implies providing exploitation and corruption free governance in these areas.

The shortcomings of Indian government’s counter Maoist response are apparent already. Its military strategy is grossly jeopardizing the well being and lives of the local populace. The combing operations harass more innocent people than capture the real Maoist ideologues. Even those “Maoists” who are caught fighting, took up arms either through compulsions or because they were led to believe that there is a better life after overthrowing the callous administration. Maoists on the other hand target and kill innocent people merely on suspicion of being “police informers.” The net result is further alienation of local population which has become disposable pawns for the two warring forces.

Likewise, the “development” initiative is also filled with serious pitfalls, particularly in the manner it is being undertaken currently. In the current liberalization, privatization, globalization regime development only means driving away local population so that the cash rich corporations can freely exploit the natural resources. Here again the local people are secondary and sacrificial goats. Left to defend themselves against the combined might of corporate-State they are doing everything to protect their lands and livelihoods. By favoring MNCs and big industrial houses in the name of economic reforms the government and its machinery has acquired the same image as the British in colonial times.

Although the “development” approach is better than the military route if it is implemented with informed consent and involvement of the local population, but by openly siding with corporate lobby the government is defeating its own purpose and allowing the Maoists to yet again appear as champions of the cause of the poor and neglected people. Driving away tribals and handing over their lands to business houses at throw away prices is not something any civil society can accept.

Learn from US’s Failure in Afghanistan

It is important to understand the difference between an ideological struggle and a fight against injustice, though they often appear same or similar. The conviction of ideology can be far too long lasting than the struggle for justice that only demands removal of injustice. The neighboring Afghanistan provides a textbook example of American failure to win the battle against Taliban and Al Kaida despite decade long occupation.

The US has failed to comprehend the power of ideology behind the two organizations and still sees their terror activities merely as crime and violence that must be punished. To its misfortune, every act of “punishment” for over a decade has only strengthened and propagated the ideology farther; even the killing of Bin Laden failed to kill the ideology. The rest of the world has witnessed the spread of anti-American wave from Iraq and Afghanistan to the whole Muslim world. Even the most arrogant American can’t claim that he or his country is safer today despite squandering away hundreds of billion dollars and decimating thousands of human lives over a decade of misadventure.

The Indian government must learn from the US folly and not compound the Maoist problem by over-indulging in the military solution or arming another section of society against the Maoists as the Chhattisgarh government did (created Salwa Judum) and got reprimanded by the Supreme Court. It must resist pressures from the business lobby for quick military solution. It should deny the Maoists the reasons for their existence by connecting directly with the local tribals and poor farmers and helping them stand on their own feet and govern themselves.

Therefore, the only correct option the government has in the “Red Corridor” is to go for the political solution which means winning-over its historically neglected citizens. All it has to do is to honestly implement the Panchayat Raj Act of 1992 and the PESA Act of 1996 by strengthening the PRIs and the Gram Sabhas to strengthen grass-root democracy.

Non-Implementation of the PESA Act – Government wants Paisa, not PESA

After the 73rd amendment, the Government also enacted the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act in 1996 (or simply the PESA Act, 1996). It mainly aims to protect the tribal population from exploitation by making Gram Sabhas centers of self governance. It is the most progressive legislation for the tribal regions, recognizing the traditional rights of the indigenous communities over the natural resources. As per PESA, the Gram Sabha will be involved in approval of development plans and programs, all decisions related to land acquisition as well as rehabilitation of affected persons, and in management of the minor forest produce. The Act specifically entrusts the Gram Sabha with the following functions:

Section 4.d: Gram Sabha shall safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary mode of dispute resolution

Section 4.e (i): Gram Sabha shall be responsible for approval of plans, programs and projects for social and economic development

Section 4.e (ii): responsible for the identification or selection of persons as beneficiaries under the development programs

Section 4.i: Consultation with Panchayat prior to land acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement activities in the scheduled areas

Section 4.m(ii): Endows ownership of minor forest produces (MFPs) to Panchayats

Section 4.m (iii): endows power to prevent alienation of land in Scheduled areas and to take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land of STs

Implementation of the law has been severely hampered by the reluctance of most State Governments to make laws and rules that conform to the spirit of the PESA Act. Weak political will has allowed the bureaucrats to continue to work as usual and PESA provisions have remained appealing on paper only. Probably the most glaring act of bureaucratic subversion is about the concept of ownership of minor forest produce (MFP). Forest officials have creative arguments to keep the tribal population away from the MFP which has always been a major livelihood support for them.

For example, officials argue that the power of Gram Sabhas can extend only to the forest located within the revenue boundaries of a village. The ground reality is that a reserved forest in generally not located within the revenue boundary of a village. The spirit of the law is clearly to provide the usual access to MFP from forests located in vicinity of the village.

Another argument against giving ownership of MFPs to Gram Sabhas is that it would lead to destruction of forests. Therefore, the ownership of MFP should mean the right to net revenues from MFP, after retaining administrative expenses of the Forest Department. This is also contrary to a whole body of empirical evidence from the national and international experience of JFM and community control of forests. Worldwide administrators are recognizing that the forest dwellers are the most suited people to entrust the well being of the forests along with all their biodiversity.

Such fanciful interpretations have almost killed the concept of ownership and control of local resources by the Gram Sabha.

There is yet another widespread tendency to see land and natural resources separately. Globally, there is a similar mindset amongst “environmentalists” and “forest conservators” who somehow see “forests” is isolation of biodiversity and forest dwellers. It becomes yet more comical when we talk about carbon-traders, speculators who trade in carbon credits; for them the forests are no more than a collection carbon sticks! Such ludicrous thinking comes from commoditization of natural resources that is becoming widespread in today’s world run largely by transnational corporations.

When the Fifth Schedule provisions offer protection to tribal culture and their traditional way of living, which is reaffirmed by various others laws including the PESA and Forest Rights Act, the idea is to allow them freedom to manage their socio-cultural affairs on their own. Since their lifestyle is intrinsically centered around land and surrounding natural resources, vital for their survival, it is clearly implied that they should be in the position to assert control on land, forests, and natural resources.

Ground reality however is strikingly different. It is a fact that the average size of the land holding by the tribals has been shrinking due to the State led acquisitions and the ill-designs of powerful non-tribal land mafia despite the fact that the sale of tribal lands to the non-tribals in the Scheduled areas is prohibited. Post liberalization-cum-privatization alienation of tribal land has become more perceptible and attack of natural resources of their regions has become rapacious.

If only Union and State Governments had honored the Samata Judgment (Supreme Court, 1997), a model of sustainable mining as well as “development” that was more respectful towards the tribal community would have evolved and most of the unlawful displacements, conflicts and suffering would have been avoided. Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006 was another recent legislative effort to enable tribals and other forest dwellers to assert rights over the forest land they had traditionally dependent upon. It also provided for empowering Gram Sabhas in asserting these rights, in line with PESA provisions. But again strong opposition of powerful vested interests and forest bureaucrats has been putting endless hurdles in its implementation.

What the short-sighted ruling elites and the plethora of governing bodies and tribal related departments have missed is that these tribal laws have offered them a one step strategy for development of the Fifth Schedule regions. As envisaged both in PESA and FRA, hand over control as well as management of land and natural resources to the Gram Sabhas of the Fifth Schedule areas and make all the parallel developmental activities subservient to the Gram Sabhas. This will also put a full stop to forced migration of tribals to urban areas in search of livelihoods.

PESA – A Potent Weapon Against Naxals (Maoists) In India !!

Posted on August 4, 2011by Goodpal

The Power of PESA

PESA, short for Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, is the most important law meant for the Adivasis (natives ofIndia) that can radically change the socio-political landscape ofIndia, only if it is implemented honestly. It can achieve three things simultaneously: (1) deprive the Naxal of the fertile ground of backwardness and poverty in the “Red Corridor” and make them baseless; (2) assimilate the 8 percent tribal Adivasis into the mainstream political current through self governance; and (3) preserve forests and local ecology because they only know their land and its resources the best. But unfortunately, state governments lack willpower, honesty, and far-sightedness to grasp the profound impact its proper implementation will have for the future development.

In last six decades, India has achieved significant milestones in the areas of economic growth, cultural assimilation and global political interests. However, the 8% tribal population of the country has been left to protect themselves against the guile of rich and powerful eyeing the natural resources and minerals of their indigenous land. Only geographical distance and remoteness of their habitat offered them some protection. But their isolation has also exposed them to the ruthless might of Naxal cadres, supposedly struggling to throw out the rulers of the country through the barrel of gun. None, except Mao would be happy in his grave to find faithful followers in a remote land that he never visited.

The Red Corridor

RED CORRIDOR

Naxals, the leftwing extremists, have carved out a large area along the eastern coast of India, spreading from Nepalborder to Tamil Nadu. Though started 40 years ago, the movement ceased to die out and instead had grown ominously. This region largely includes dense forests and tribal areas and consists of 92,000 sq km. Red Corridor is the label people have given to this area, which the government machinery never dared to reach. Naxals are the uninvited and self declared rulers in the Red Corridor.

About two years ago, the Indian government launched Operation Green Hunt to root out the Naxals. In reality, however, the tribals find themselves sandwiched between the Maoists on one side who can’t give up their armed struggle and the government on the other, that can not put the interests of a vulnerable minority — the adivasis — ahead of those with more money and political power.

Realizing that the lack of development and the absence of governance are primarily responsible for growth of the leftwing extremists, the government has drawn development plans to win over the tribal people.

Besides the plan of para-military force, the government has come up with plans for development of the territory included in the Red Corridor. Just recently, the central government has planned to spend Rs. 100 cr on every of the 33 (or 34) Maoist affected districts. This is an additional expenditure apart from the usual security related expenditure. According to reports, this additional money of Rs. 3400 cr will be spent on roads, electricity and drinking water.

Plus, there is the issue of implementing the PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act in its true spirit.

The PESA Act – Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996

Village level democracy became a real prospect for Indiain 1992 with the 73rd amendment to the Constitution, which mandated that resources, responsibility and decision making be passed on from central government to the lowest unit of the governance, the Gram Sabha or the Village Assembly. A three tier structure of local self government was envisaged under this amendment.

Since the laws do not automatically cover the scheduled areas, the PESA Act was in-acted in 1996 to enable Tribal Self Rule in these areas. The Act extended the provisions of Panchayats to the tribal areas of nine states that have Fifth Schedule Areas.

The PESA Act gives radical governance powers to the tribal community and recognizes its traditional community rights over local natural resources. It not only accepts the validity of “customary law, social and religious practices, and traditional management practices of community resources”, but also directs the state governments not to make any law which is inconsistent with these. Accepting a clear-cut role for the community, it gives wide-ranging powers to Gram Sabhas, which had hitherto been denied to them by the lawmakers of the country.

The full-fledged implementation of PESA will give Rs 50,000 crore to tribal communities to develop themselves. Nothing would deal a bigger blow to the Maoists than participative development by, for and of the tribal communities. Of the 76 districts highly infected by the Maoists, 32 are PESA districts. Hence, honest implementation of the PESA Act would empower the marginalized tribals so that they can take care of their developmental needs. This would deprive the Naxals of their ground support coming from the misguided and helpless tribals.

Why then the PESA Act is largely ignored by the State governments?

Tribals protest

The main hurdle in the proper implementation of PESA comes from the nexus of bureaucrats and politicians who would lose authority in tribal areas. They have always subordinated the welfare of poor tribals in favor of the rich or the powerful. Giving real autonomy to Gram Sabhas, as envisioned in the Act, would leave them without much influence.

Forestdepartment officials have long viewed the resource rich tribal regions as source of revenue. They often collude with timber mafias for petty gains. They fail to realize that forests are the only source of sustenance for tribals. In the vast tribal areas of Andhra, MP and Orissa, the tribals are primarily dependent on the collection and selling of the non-timber forest produce (NTFP). In Uttarakhand there have been reports of forest depots selling bamboos to companies at highly subsidized rates.

Previously, the Orissa Forest Development Corporation and the Tribal Development Corporation had exclusive rights for a number of NTFPs. But under liberalization wave since 1990, individual companies (for example, Utkal Forest Products) have been given collection rights for 29 NTFPs for 10 years. Various paper industries have been engaged, under the guise of ‘labour contractors’, for working bamboo areas. They have cornered bamboo collection rights in several forest divisions.

Economic liberalization has brought the corporate giants into the region hunting for minerals for their mega size industrial exploits. Industry is wrecking havoc with the living conditions of the tribals under the liberalization regime. Their acts force the helpless tribals to leave the land they have known to be their own since ages. Compensation and rehabilitation plans are hardly ever implemented with honesty and dignity.

This is a big source of poverty and displacement as commonly seen in states like Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. These attempts to rob the tribals of their resources are criminal, especially when it occurs in places like Kalahandi and Koraput districts where starvation deaths among tribals are legendary.

How to force state governments implement the PESA Act?

(a) Looking at the performance of State governments in implementation of PESA and their tendency to by-pass it, the Central government should issue a notification that all other laws will be subordinate to PESA in the fifth schedule (or PESA) areas.

(b) Land litigations are another headache of tribals who have been rendered landless by the rich or powerful. In order to restore speedy justice, follow the recommendation of the B.D Sharma Committee. It suggested issuing notification of a date, when all pending cases in any Court of Law in which the land of a tribal is alleged to have been illegally transferred or occupied by any person or body, shall stand transferred to the Gram Sabha in whose jurisdiction the land is situated.

Only PESA has the real potential to deal a fatal blow to the leftwing extremists thriving on their backwardness, ignorance, and isolation. The “Original Indian People” of India deserve a life free of exploitation, poverty, and fear.

The Forest Rights Act, 2006: Will It End the Historic Exploitation of Tribal Population?

Posted on May 8, 2012by Goodpal

The Historic Forest Rights Act, 2006

Passage of The Forest Rights Act, 2006 (Officially known as the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest-Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006) was an historic moment for India’s over 80 million tribal population who were forced to live like “encroachers” on their own land, since the British occupiers. It was also a moment of victory for the tribal rights activists across the country. The Act came into force on December 31, 2007. The forest rights act (which is also variously known as Forest Dwellers Act, Forest Tribes Act, Tribal Rights Act) aims to provide a framework which recognizes and vests forest rights in forest-dwelling tribes and foster a new forest conservation regime which almost makes them the caretakers of the local forests.

Roots of Exploitation of Tribal People

tribals protest for Rights

The indigenous tribes of India have lived on forest land for ages cultivating and collecting forest produce. However, their traditional rights have never been adequately recognized or recorded and they have been forced to live as under constant fear of the state officials.

This happened because of a series of Indian Forest Acts that were passed from 1876 through 1927 by the British. As occupiers, their primary concern was to generate maximum revenue from natural resources, and gain easy access to timber. Hence the laws were designed to prevent “unauthorized” access of people to forest produce. Of course, it would be foolish to expect them to be concerned about people, their subjects.

This gave birth to the all-powerful forest department and forest officials. They became lords of the jungles with almost absolute authority to arrest, confiscate property, and evict people. This was the British way of the management of forests and natural resources by excluding local people. They started the process of “survey and settlement” involving documentation of the land under the private ownership of individuals and state takeover of the rest of the land and resources. This dealt severe blow to the age-old tradition of managing land and resources largely as common resources belonging to the entire community.

Needless to say, the rights of tribals and forest dwellers were almost never recorded at the time of declaration of either reserved or protected forests, with the result that were reduced to the status of aliens and encroachers on the land they have lived since ancient times and their usual livelihood related activities got criminalized. Thus, the British ended up depriving  the native tribes their traditional peaceful lifestyle and the forests resources, their natural traditional caretaker.

The Forest Act of 1927 remained India’s central forest law even after independence (transfer of power from the White-rulers to the Brown-rulers!) and the native tribes remained subordinated to the whims and fancies of the forest authorities. In recent decades, conservationists who want to see forests and its resources separate from the tribal people and corporate houses that eye minerals and other resources of forests, have joined hands with the forest officials. The result has been increasing harassment, forced eviction and untold suffering of the poor forest dwelling tribes, on the one hand and clearing of forests and plunder of forest resources by timber mafia with regular connivance with forest officials, on the other. This situation gave birth to the Naxal Violence in India. By championing the cause of helpless trials they penetrated into their society as their saviors and the Indian government remained a moot spectator. Now the Prime Minister declares it the biggest internal security threat of the country.

Forests are More than Timber and Minerals

Forest offer Enough for All!

An estimated 147 million villagers live in and around forests and another 275 million villagers depend heavily on forests for their livelihoods. In particular, produce from forests such as fuel wood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) contributes significantly to household subsistence and income for people living in or adjacent to forests. Livelihood security for this segment of the population is critically linked to both ecological security and the security of access to, and control over, natural resources.

Since independence in 1947 well over 60 million people have been displaced by large development projects (such as hydroelectric dams, mines and other industrial projects) and wildlife protected areas. Comprehensive figures for displacement from protected areas are not available; some social activists claim that in the past five years, 300,000 families have been evicted from protected areas alone.

“Life was so beautiful in the forest. No one ever went hungry. The fruits alone sustained us for four months of the year. The forest used to provide us plenty. We also ploughed the land. But they threw us out, and drowned everything. And we are left with nothing.”  

- A 55 year old tribal women in Nabarangpur district in Orissa, now forced to work as a stone crusher for survival

The Ancient Tradition of Community Forest Management

Before the British, in most parts of India the land and natural resources were more or less the property of big landlords (zamindars / jagirdars) or local rulers. Putting it simply, they were mainly interested in collecting revenue from these areas and the day-to-day management was largely left to the people who lived in close contact with local natural resources. Their deep cultural and spiritual relationships with the surrounding resources created an intricate system of community based management where private ownership of land was much less important than community use. In fact there were, and still are, many tribal communities, particularly practicing shifting cultivation or hunting gathering, who had nearly no concept of individual land ownership.

Will the Forest Rights Act Restore the Dignity of Poor Tribals?

If one goes by the current status of implementation of the FRA, nothing much has changed on the ground for the poor and unfortunate forest dependent tribes. (Read the detailed PDF report: Appraisal_Forest_Rights_Act_2006)

• The tribal population is still not aware of the specific rights the FRA has given the.
• There are other overlapping laws that negate the spirit and content of FRA.
• There is vehement opposition towards implementation of the Act from the forest department officials who don’t want give their traditional power, the environmental activists who think forests are safer without people (they fail to imagine that humans can live symbiotically with its surroundings), and the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) cannot tolerate a situation where the poor tribals in Gram Sabhas are allowed to decide the fate of the so-called large “development” projects of the rich corporate houses and MNCs.

The Forest Rights Act may have all the best intentions for protecting the interests of forest dwelling tribes, but in reality its implementation is as superficial, if not worst, as the PESA Act, 1996. In a world where “development” only means increase in the bottom lines of corporate sharks and forcing poor people from rural areas towards cities to become cheap fodder for industry and businesses, the tribal people have to rely on their survival instinct more than the designs of “developed people.”

The state is not serious about Naxalism

On the campaign trail, Chief Minister Narendra Modi touted muscular rhetoric and a “zero tolerance” policy towards Naxalism. But those expecting Prime Minister Modi’s Government to overhaul the existing strategy should not hold their breath. The Naxal insurgency was described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as India’s “single biggest internal-security challenge” and estimated to affect one-third of India’s districts.

In practice, the threat has been met with “vacillation and ad hocism”. Naxals do not threaten major urban centres or critical regions that the Indian state most values, nor do they trigger the kind of fear or distrust elicited by other socially distant rebel groups. Instead, the Naxal insurgency has been, and likely will continue to be, treated as a chronic but manageable problem amongst a group deserving empathy and rehabilitation.

More bark than bite

Naxals re-emerged in a big way in 2004 with the formation of the Communist Party of India-Maoist. By 2009, Naxal violence had escalated to eclipse separatist violence in the Northeast and Kashmir. Armed cadres have grown from 5,000 in 2001 to as high as 20,000 with another 50,000-militia support.

These trends likely motivated Singh’s warning and the flurry of government activity including new security programmes, development schemes, and paramilitary deployments. But despite these efforts, noted analysts derided government efforts as timid and weak.

While it is true that the Indian state has chosen to fight Naxals with armed force, it relies on a minimalist strategy. States facing rebellion can select from different counter-insurgency options balanced against competing crises and priorities. Even strong states generally only employ significant effort to defeat rebels when their valued, core regions are threatened. Furthermore, governments are relatively more restrained against groups tied to the dominant national identity compared to those seen as outsiders.

Consequently, the Indian state’s strategy is narrowly focused on mitigating violence rather than defeating political subversion. It has eschewed the deployment of battle-tested counter-insurgency forces in favour of an often-criticised “developmental” approach and limited collateral damage.

There is a certain humanism expressed about the Naxals that has not been afforded many other insurgent groups. Indian leaders describe them in inclusive language — “backward Hindus” and “true Indians” — characterising them as less distant than Kashmiri or Naga rebels, demanding greater restraint. Former Home Minister Shivraj Patil described Naxals as “our children” and a leading police official explained that “Naxals are our own people” requiring selective action. Many regard Naxals as “misguided” people who only rebel “tactically”.

Not worth the cost

In the past, India has marshalled tremendous manpower, money and material to defeat insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir. However, when it comes to insurgency in less important territory like the Northeast or the Naxal belt, the Indian Government has preferred limited strategies of containment.

For now, Naxals do not project violence in major urban areas. State elites, in step with public opinion, generally treat the Naxal threat as a nuisance and, as one retired officer argued, maintain the appearance of doing something.

Since Delhi has opted not to deploy the military, police forces are the main line of defence despite being 20 per cent under strength and often misused. Police can prove effective counter-insurgents with major investments and overhauls as demonstrated in Punjab, and eventually Kashmir. But neither state nor Central police forces have been adequately trained, equipped, or reinforced enough to contend with the Naxals.

The exception may be Andhra Pradesh’s efforts, but even its storied Greyhound force only made gains after almost two decades of vacillating policies and drove a Naxal tactical retreat by displacing violence to neighbouring states.

Ambivalent approach

Even the Government’s developmental approach has failed to introduce political and economic reforms. A focus on infrastructure has crowded out spending on human development to 3 per cent of allocated funds. When accounting for the affected population size, the annual spending on security-related expenditure and the Integrated Action Plan (₹700 crore/year) is still a drop in the bucket compared to counter-insurgency spending in Kashmir and Punjab.

Federalism certainly poses some obstacles to comprehensive strategies but it cannot sufficiently explain the current ambivalence. When sufficiently threatened, the Central Government has deployed coordinated counterinsurgency campaigns across multiple states, as it did with the army’s 1971 Operation Steeplechase (in West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha) or even some coordinated operations during the Punjab campaign (across Haryana, Chandigarh and Delhi).

Federalism also did not prevent Operation Green Hunt in 2009 across multiple states, but disinterest may explain why it was poorly planned, under-resourced, unsustained, and overextended.

The Central Government can still invoke Article 355 to protect states from internal threats and exercise its powers of coordination and inducement for a more comprehensive campaign. But the Naxal belt is not considered to be worth the material and political costs.

What the state most values – economic and strategically critical regions – remain unthreatened. A threatened region of strategic or economic import may compel the costly and sustained inputs that an effective counter-insurgency campaign demands, but in other regions, the costs prove prohibitive.

A more efficient, less-corrupt Modi Government is unlikely to significantly change strategy towards the Naxal insurgency.

Modi recently expressed compassion for the Naxal base and has previously called for dialogue over violence against “our people”. His Tribal Affairs Minister recently described Naxalism as a “social problem”.

Significant escalation of counter-insurgency efforts is unlikely as Modi’s primary constituency is more concerned about corruption, economic issues, religious extremism and border threats over Naxalism.