India-Myanmar Border Problems: Fencing not the only solution IDSA

The unfolding events along the India-Myanmar border for the past few months have managed to bring the hitherto ‘neglected’ border into the consciousness of the policymakers in New Delhi. The first episode in the series started with the intermittent protests against the construction of a border fence since July, 2013 by various political parties and the affected people in Manipur. The protesters claim that the 10-km fence between border pillars no. 79 and 81, which is being constructed several metres inside the Indian territory because of Myanmar’s objections, would result in Manipur loosing substantial portions of its territory to Myanmar. They demanded that the Central government should first resolve the border dispute with Myanmar and conduct a joint survey of the border before constructing the fence.

These protests got a further fillip when on August 22, 2013, the Myanmarese army reportedly tried to set up a camp by felling trees in Hollenphai village near border pillar no. 76. While the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) denied any intrusion into the Indian territory by the Myanmarese army, the local people alleged harassments by the ‘intruders’. The subsequent visits of the state Governor and other high ranking officials to the affected area failed to assuage the feelings of the local people and the protest against the construction of the fence continues even today. Despite these protests, the Central government has decided to go ahead with the construction of fencing – a decision based on the successful experiment along the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders, where the fence has been effective in checking infiltration and illegal migration to a large extent.

But will a 10-km fence prevent the cross border movements of insurgents, gun runners and drug peddlers along the international border with Myanmar? The answer is no, because the vulnerability of the India-Myanmar border stems from a number of factors. First, even though the international boundary between the two countries had been formally delimited and demarcated following the boundary agreement on March 10, 1967, the boundary has not crystallised on the ground as lines separating two sovereign countries. This is because like most of the boundaries that India shares with its neighbours, the India-Myanmar boundaries is also an artificial line which is superimposed on the socio-cultural landscape of the borderland. As a result, the boundary line cuts across houses and villages thus dividing several tribes such as the Singphos, Nagas, Kukis, Mizos, etc., and forcing them to reside as citizens of different countries. These tribes, however, refuse to accept the artificial line and continue to maintain strong linkages with their kith and kin across the border.

Second, the border traverses a region which is infested with numerous insurgencies. These insurgencies have hampered the nation building process in this part of India. This in turn, has delayed the crystallisation of the international border with Myanmar and has contributed towards sustaining these insurgencies for so long. Third, the India-Myanmar border has a unique arrangement in place called the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The FMR permits the tribes residing along the border to travel 16-km across the boundary without visa restrictions. While the FMR has helped the tribes continue maintain their age old ties, it has also become a cause of concern for the security establishment. The insurgents have been taking advantage of the FMR and have been crossing over to Myanmar to receive training in arms, establish safe havens and re-enter India to carry out subversive attacks. It is estimated that various insurgents operating in the Northeast India have set up 15-20 camps in Myanmar. Another provision in the FMR, which allows tribal people to carry head load has also facilitated smuggling of arms and narcotics from across the border as these head loads are seldom checked. Over the years, the India-Myanmar border has become the main conduit for the trafficking of arms and high quality heroin from Myanmar. Smuggling of ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine and trafficking of women and children from the Northeast to Myanmar and further to Southeast Asia are also rampant along the border.

Fourth, the policymakers in Delhi have not given adequate attention to the India-Myanmar border and as a result it continues to be poorly managed. The Assam Rifles which has been deployed along the border to guard the boundary has also been straddled with responsibility of maintaining internal security. Given the security situation of the region, the force has deployed 31 of its 46 battalions for counter insurgency operations and only 15 battalions for guarding the border. Even these 15 battalions are not placed at the border but they operate from company operated bases which are located far inside the Indian territory. In short, the Assam Rifles functions more like a counter insurgency force rather than a border guarding force. As a result, they fail to dominate the border and prevent widespread infiltration and smuggling.

Similarly, infrastructural facilities at Moreh and Zokhawatar – the two designated points for normal trade and border trade respectively – is poor. The land customs station lack screening and detection machines, communication devices, banking facilities, warehouses, parking and quarantine facilities. These infrastructural deficiencies along with a restrictive trading list and opening of Namphalong market by Myanmarese government on the other side of the border have been adversely affected normal trade at Moreh and has given rise to informal trade. While the Government of India in 2006-07 had decided to upgrade the land customs station at Moreh into an integrated check post (ICP) housing all regulatory and security agencies within a single complex with all modern amenities to boost trade and curb smuggling, nothing on the ground has materialised even today.

Most importantly, India has been unsuccessful in garnering the cooperation of Myanmar for managing the border. Even though both the countries have set up a number of bilateral institutionalised mechanisms at various levels to discuss issues related to border security and management, these interactions have not borne any fruit. India’s frequent requests to the Myanmarese government for taking action against the Indian insurgent groups based in its territory have gone unheeded. And the border dispute which essentially involves disagreements over the placement of nine border pillars has remained unresolved. India’s patchy engagement with the military junta in Myanmar and its initial support to the democratic movement in that country have been largely responsible for Myanmar’s reluctance to cooperate with India.

Given that the vulnerability of the India-Myanmar border is posing a serious challenge to the internal security of the country, the Government of India should pay immediate attention to effectively manage this border. It should first strengthen the security of the border by either giving the Assam Rifles the single mandate of guarding the border or deploying another border guarding force such as the Border Security Force (BSF). It should initiate a revision of the FMR and reduce the permitted distance of unrestricted travel. The construction of the ICP along with other infrastructure should be expedited. Finally, India should endeavour to meaningfully engage with Myanmar and solicit its cooperation in resolving all outstanding issues and better manage their mutual border.

Northeast’s Myanmar connect

Walking around the Bagyoke Aung San Market in Yangon gives one a personal sense of the cultural affinity between Myanmar and northeast India. Goods are stacked in a way peculiar to the northeast region and the similarity in the products on display is unmistakable. Every now and then one can hear people speaking in Mizo or some other common language. The traditional Burmese dress is worn just the way it is in the northeast and the street food and traditional food items of both the regions bear a close resemblance too. The saying that Southeast Asia begins in northeast India takes credence. The way the people of Myanmar have taken to the use of chopsticks seems like a natural phenomenon and the adoption of Indian food, including thebiryani , which is believed to have travelled here with the khansamas of Bahadur Shah Zafar makes it truly a place that author Thant Myint-U calls, “Where China meets India.”

Yet, India and Myanmar have not been able to exploit these close historical and cultural connections. Recent writings and research overflow with expositions on the opportunities that exist in the developing of connectivity infrastructure, but the gap between the purported potential and what has been realised remains enormous. What is also true is that the northeastern part of India and the western part of Myanmar consisting of Chin, Sagaing and Kachin states are both underdeveloped. The neglect leading to low economic and social development in the region has often been cited as one of the causes for the insurgencies raging on both sides of the border. Indeed, even as there are shared opportunities, both regions share very similar risks and challenges.

Stagnant economy

Some of the key reasons the northeast is unable to move from a largely subsistence agricultural economy to a production and manufacturing economy include the lack of scale economies, constraints in the supply chain of raw materials and the lack of access to a market, mainly emanating from poor infrastructure and restrictions across the border. The way out of this is to explore greater collaboration with Myanmar. The weaving industries in northeast India or the food processing industries, both in Myanmar and northeast India, have not been able to grow in a limited market. The expansion of this can provide a wider consumer base that these industries desperately need to ensure profitability and sustainability.

This has to go hand in hand with the development of supply chain hubs that will foster manufacturing units across the region. These will produce goods that can be consumed within the larger region and beyond. The rest of Asia has developed a strong network of supply chain and manufacturing hubs which in turn would augur well for governments and entrepreneurs of the two regions to link with. Japan, and to a lesser extent South Korea, have been particularly significant in developing the manufacturing and production networks across Southeast Asia. According to forecasts by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, India and Myanmar are on a trajectory which is predicted to see increased economic engagement with Japan. Today, significant investments have been made by Japan in Myanmar to help the country develop its infrastructure and in the northeast, it is one of the few countries which has been invited by the Indian government to undertake large scale investments. Singapore is another country which has significant investments in Myanmar. It is also a country that India is comfortable with inviting to invest in the northeastern part of the country.

Northeast India and Myanmar also share similar economic and business structures. The economy, which is largely agrarian and dependent on the export of unprocessed primary commodities and in which micro, small and medium enterprises are prevalent, provides for the basis of industrial development.

Trade imbalance

Yet the facts of history and the reality of borders cannot be wished away. Currently, there is trade imbalance in favour of Myanmar. Given that the development of a goods export-oriented economy may take some time to develop in the northeast, there is opportunity to step up trade in services. This is a sector where, following the relaxation of the movement of people across the border, a large number of people from Myanmar have come to educational institutes and healthcare facilities in the northeast.

Then there are concerns related to border management and security. There is a border dispute that needs to be settled by the highest levels of both governments. Even as goods move across the borders, so do drugs and arms. Human trafficking is another major issue. A secure and clearly defined border is a precursor to a peaceful and prosperous border region.

Scholars and policy makers in Naypyidaw are deeply aware of the need to engage with India. They have expressed the need to utilise well the northeast India-Myanmar connectivity project. This is however being jostled between limited capacity and multiple priorities. India’s own capacity and political will to see through the numerous projects that have been touted is under question. Yet the sense of urgency and the realisation that there is a limited window of opportunity to catch up with the rest of the world is discernable among stakeholders in Myanmar. In the northeast, stakeholders led by political leaders need to understand the opportunities that the reforms in Myanmar have presented. India and Myanmar must implement projects within their regions in a collaborative effort, while taking regional governments into confidence. They must settle outstanding border disputes.

A Manipuri folklore talks about prosperity that will fill the lands once the “eastern gates are opened.” Perhaps this foretells what is in store in the future.